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Monographie 9

STUDIES IN KUMĀRILA AND ŚAṄKARA

by

Wilhelm Halbfass

Dr. Inge Wezler
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Preface

In the preface of my book *Indien und Europa: Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung* (Basel/Stuttgart 1981), I announced the forthcoming publication of a volume of *Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara* which was meant to supplement the earlier volume and to present materials which would have been too specific to be included in the more general context of *Indien und Europa*. What is now being published is, indeed, closely affiliated with the earlier book, but it is more than a mere appendix. And although these *Studies* are not integrated into one coherent presentation, they have at least one common theme. They deal not just with Kumārila and Śaṅkara in general, but with their understanding of the Vedic revelation, or more specifically: with their understanding of the authority, unity and inner variety of this revelation on the one hand and the variety and legitimacy of human views and approaches on the other hand.

Apart from this common theme and their common affiliation with *Indien und Europa*, the three chapters and the "appendix" which make up the present volume are different and mutually independent, insofar as their actual genesis is concerned. The first chapter is connected with a long-term project in the history of the theory of *karman* and rebirth; a slightly modified version was read at the Oriental Institute of the University of Oxford. The second chapter grew out of a critical review of several recent contributions to the study of Śaṅkara, specifically those by T. Vetter, H. Brückner and S. Mayeda. The third chapter is a revised version of a paper read at the South Asia Seminar 1981/82 of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. More than the other two chapters, it is a mere sketch, introducing a variety of questions and suggestions without attempting a systematic exploration. The "appendix" is even more preliminary in character: It is a collection of observations concerning the so-called *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, which relate more or less directly to problems discussed in the preceding three chapters.

The philosophical and historical problems concerning the mutual relations between Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā and, more speci-

fically, the response of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta to the traditions of Prabhākara and Kumārila are numerous, intricate and for the most part beyond the scope of the following *Studies*. That Śaṅkara was aware of and perhaps familiar with the philosophy of Kumārila has simply been taken for granted. The actual evidence for such acquaintance may appear as somewhat disappointing, if not dubious. Apart from the so-called *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, the authenticity of which is certainly not beyond question, clearly identifiable references are very rare. A passage in the introduction of Śaṅkara's *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* may be among the acceptable, although still somewhat ambiguous cases; at least it was recognized as a reference to Kumārila by Śaṅkara's commentator and disciple Sureśvara. He associates Śaṅkara's characterization of an unacceptable view concerning final liberation (*mokṣa*) with a verse from the *Ślokavārttika* (*Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, v. 110) of Kumārila, whom he calls a "self-styled Mīmāṃsaka" (*mīmāṃsakaṃmanya*; i.e. somebody who falsely considers himself a competent investigator of the Veda). References to Śabara are, of course, more frequent and familiar. Quite apart from such direct or indirect references, and apart from his technical and conceptual expertise in Pūrvamīmāṃsā (as emphasized, e.g., by S.G. Moghe, Śaṅkarācārya and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. Mysore Orientalist 4, 1971, 79-89), Śaṅkara's attitude towards Pūrvamīmāṃsā methods and positions of thought concerns the structure and the basic orientation of his thought. Śaṅkara and Kumārila represent complementary and equally fundamental aspects of Hindu "orthodoxy"; and together, they exemplify its complex and ambiguous unity.

In conclusion, I want to express my gratitude for much generous help and good advice which I received while completing this volume. Specifically, I thank Dr. Richard Young (Tokyo) and Professors Lambert Schmithausen and Albrecht Wezler (Hamburg) for numerous useful comments and suggestions. In addition, I want to thank Albrecht Wezler for his editorial interest in my manuscript and for inviting me to teach at the University of Hamburg during his leave of absence (Winter 1981/82). After my return to Philadelphia, he sent me further useful and stimulating comments concerning the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, which led me to re-examine various statements in my "appendix". That we could not always reach complete unanimity, does not in any way affect my sense of gratitude. In the final stages of the production of this volume, much assistance was received from friends, colleagues and students at the University of Pennsylvania. Susan Stalker and Elliot Stern, Ph.D. candidates in the Department of Oriental Studies, helped to complete the index and made other valuable contributions. Dr. David Utz did most of the type-setting in a highly competent and conscientious manner. Professor Peter Gaeffke helped most generously

and unselfishly, when various obstacles arose in this process; I am particularly indebted to him. The Department of South Asia Regional Studies provided various forms of support and in general a congenial and intellectually stimulating atmosphere.

Philadelphia
December 1982

I.

Kumārila on Ahiṃsā and Dharma

1. "*Ahiṃsā* is one of the central ideas of Indian religions, and though the doctrine of 'non-violence' - literally 'non-injury (to living beings)' - is not universally followed in India, there will be only few who do not at least pay lip-service to it. In spite of its great importance for the religious attitude of the Indians, the history of the idea of ahiṃsā has rarely been investigated into, and the handbooks of Indian religions generally devote little space to it."[1] With these words, H.-P. Schmidt opens a thorough and stimulating inquiry into the origins and the early history of the doctrine of ahiṃsā. Against the view of L. Alsdorf,[2] that ahiṃsā is basically foreign to the Vedic tradition, and that its origins should not be sought in the teachings of the Buddha and the Jina either, but rather in non-Āryan sources, Schmidt argues that the world-view of the Vedic "ritualists" themselves provides its original basis and background. Our following observations are not meant to be a critical examination of this thesis, although they deal with ahiṃsā in relation to Vedic "orthodoxy". They will not focus on the question of the origins of ahiṃsā, or of the original relationship between Vedic ritualism and ahiṃsā. Instead, they will deal with a much later Indian perspective on this relationship - the views of Kumārila (7th century A.D.), the leading philosophical systematizer of the Mīmāṃsā school, on ahiṃsā and dharma.[3]

A history of the relations between ahiṃsā and dharma, of their affinities and tensions, of the various ways in which they have been coordinated with, or subordinated to one another, would be significant not just with reference to these two concepts themselves: It would, moreover, illustrate basic trends and fundamental ambiguities of Hinduism in general. References and claims to the concept of dharma are a familiar and symptomatic device of advocating and propagating the ahiṃsā doctrine. Ahiṃsā is said to be the "supreme dharma" (*paramo dharmaḥ*), comprising and legitimizing all other, more specific, rules of conduct and orientation.[4] Together

with the "Golden Rule" of not doing to others what one does not want done to oneself, it is presented as *dharmasarvasva*, as the totality and quintessence of dharma.[5] Such and similar claims are an obvious challenge to the "orthodox" understanding of dharma as a set of rules which are laid down in the sacred texts and specified according to time, place and "qualification" (*adhikāra*), which cannot be reduced to or derived from one basic principle, and which give, in fact, explicit legitimacy to certain well-defined acts of killing. The response, as documented in such texts as the *Manusmṛti*, has often been more or less apologetic;[6] and in general, there has been a considerable variety of attempts to balance, reconcile or integrate ahiṃsā and the scriptural dharma, to reinterpret the Vedic precepts or to limit the scope of ahiṃsā.[7]

Traditionally, the animal sacrifices prescribed for certain Vedic rituals have been in the focus of debate on the relationship between ahiṃsā and dharma. They have been a main target for the anti-Vedic criticism of the Buddhists and the Jainas, and they have also been criticized by such ahiṃsā-oriented Hindu schools as Sāṃkhya and Yoga.[8] On the other hand, they are one of the central issues in "orthodox" Vedic apologetics. At the time of the classical systems, the Mīmāṃsā takes the lead and the most uncompromising stand in the defense of the scriptural and ritualistic dharma against the claims of ahiṃsā. Other issues which have been raised in connection with ahiṃsā, e.g. capital punishment, suicide, or the fighting and killing which is part of the quasi-ritualistic caste duties of the kṣatriya, play no significant role in the context of this debate, and they may be omitted from our presentation.

2. In the extant Mīmāṃsā literature preceding Kumārila, i.e. in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and in Śabara's *Bhāṣya*, the attention paid to the problem of sacrificial *hiṃsā* and to the relationship between ahiṃsā and dharma, remains somewhat marginal. Śabara refers to the notion of *hiṃsā* in his commentary on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I, 1, 2, discussing the implications of the word *artha* in Jaimini's definition of *dharma*. Such rituals as the *śyena* sacrifice, meant to lead to the destruction of enemies, other human beings, cannot be considered acts of *dharma* since they lack the criterion of *artha*. According to Śabara, they are only described, but not enjoined by the sacred texts; the Veda teaches them as means, not giving any legitimacy to the ends to which they are supposed to be conducive: *hiṃsā hi sā, sā ca pratiṣiddhā. kathaṃ punar anarthaḥ kartavyatayā - upadiśyate? ucyate - na - eva śyenādayaḥ kartavyatayā vijñāyante. yo hi hiṃsitum icchet, tasya - ayam abhyupāya iti hi teṣām upadeśaḥ.*[9] The issue in this discussion is an act of violence and

destruction which is external to the sacrificial act itself - not taking place during the ritual but supposed to result from it. The question how to judge the killing of the sacrificial animal which takes place as an integral part of the *śyena* ritual itself is not discussed by Śabara, and, in general, he does not pay explicit attention to the issue of internal sacrificial *hiṃsā* or to other basic problems implied in the relationship between dharma and ahiṃsā. This is done by his great commentator Kumārila.

In the *Codanāsūtra* section of his *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila places the explication of the Vedic dharma and of the bloody rituals which it implies in a much wider context than Jaimini or Śabara. He defends its uniqueness and irreducibility much more explicitly and vigorously, and he takes special care to deny any independent, extra-scriptural authority to the principle of ahiṃsā.[10]

Kumārila rejects the idea of a universal cosmic causality, a general law of retribution which would cause the pain or injury inflicted upon a living creature to fall back upon its originator. This magico-ritualistic notion of cosmic retribution, which is based upon the presupposition of universal balance and reciprocity, is obsolete for Kumārila. He tries to give a "rational" refutation of such a notion, which seems to play a considerable role in the texts quoted by Schmidt, which has been preserved and developed in the traditions of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and which, closer to Kumārila's own time, is well documented in Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya* on Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*:[11] There is not only no scriptural, but also no perceptual or inferential evidence for the idea that somebody who causes pain or injury during a sacrificial performance is liable to a corresponding retributive suffering. Trying to infer suffering for the actor (*kartur duḥkhānumānam*) from the fact that the sacrificial victim has to suffer (*hiṃsyamānasya duḥkhitvam*) is nothing but a logical fallacy, based upon false analogies.[12]

If reciprocity were indeed the foundation of dharma and adharma, of reward and punishment, how could this apply to such obvious, though "victimless", violations of the norm as illicit drinking?[13] And if benevolence and the production of well-being or pleasure were dharma, would a sexual act with the wife of one's guru, a "mortal sin" (*mahāpātaka*) according to the *dharmaśāstra* rules, not be an act of dharma?[14] One should leave aside the criteria of pleasure and pain in trying to determine what is right and wrong in the sense of dharma and adharma. The only source which can teach us about dharma and adharma are the injunctions and prohibitions (*vidhi,*

pratiṣedha) of the Vedic "revelation".[15] They are specified according to the occasion of the act and the qualification of the actor, and they cannot be translated into or reduced to general, commonsensically "reasonable" rules and principles concerning pleasure and pain, violence or non-violence.

In this sense and on this basis Kumārila deals with another objection: Doesn't the Veda itself prohibit killing and injuring? How then can sacrificial killing be legitimate? Does the Veda contradict itself?[16] Indeed, the Veda contains some very specific prohibitions about killing; in particular, the killing of a brahmin is one of the "mortal sins" (*mahāpātaka*). But according to Kumārila, generalizing and universalizing such prohibitions indicates a basic misunderstanding of the Vedic dharma, which relates all acts to a specific frame of reference. Just as the identity of the *vaiśyastoma* ritual depends on its being preformed by a *vaiśya*, and the identity of the *agnihotra* depends on its being preformed at the right time of day, so the specific negative or positive value of an act of killing depends on its specified position in the context of dharma.[17] Killing which is an integral part of a positively enjoined, legitimate ritual such as the *jyotiṣṭoma* can certainly not have any negative value or effect. Although there may be no visible "difference in the form of killing etc.", it makes an essential difference whether or not such an act is a subsidiary part (*aṅga*) of a ritual: *rupābhede 'pi hiṃsāder bhedo 'ṅgānaṅgakāritaḥ.*[18] Should the opponent nevertheless maintain that acts of hiṃsā, insofar as they are hiṃsā, have the same negative character and lead to the same result, then one could say the same about all activities, insofar as they are activities; there would be a total collapse of distinctions (*sarvasaṅkara*), and all sacrifices such as the *citrā* etc., would have the same result.[19]

Kumārila applies the demarcation of "internal", sacrificial hiṃsā and "external", non-sacrificial hiṃsā also to the *śyena* sacrifice which may be used for destructive and harmful purposes. Even in this case, the internal hiṃsā as such is not to be considered as demerit or evil, being comparable to a sword, which can, but need not be an instrument of adharma.[20] If the act turns out to be an evil one, and if demerit accrues to its preformer, it is because of its being used for an evil external purpose of violence and destruction.[21]

Concluding this discussion, Kumārila emphasizes that anybody who denies the special status of sacrificial hiṃsā and claims that it is conducive to evil because of the common denominator of being hiṃsā (*hiṃsātvasādharmya*) is guilty of contradicting the sacred

tradition (*āgamabādhana*).[22]

3. It is evident from our brief presentation of Kumārila's discussion that it goes far beyond the text which it explicates, i.e. Śabara's statements on the *śyena* sacrifice in his commentary on *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* I, 1, 2. His contribution to the issue of hiṃsā and dharma is remarkable not only in terms of its peculiar style and intensity, but also in terms of its philosophical scope and context. Yet, it would be quite inappropriate to say that Kumārila initiated this kind of discussion concerning the legitimacy of ritual hiṃsā. There is clear evidence that by this time the issue had already been debated for a number of centuries in the schools of Vedic exegesis.

One of the contexts in which it appears is the exegesis of the doctrine of the "two ways", i.e. the "way of the fathers" (*pitṛyāna*) and the "way of the gods" (*devayāna*), which is found in such texts as the *Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa* and, above all, in two closely related sections of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-* and the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*.[23] The "way of the gods" is the way of those who, due to their knowledge and faith, reach the "world of brahman" beyond the sun, and liberation from earthly existence. The "way of the fathers", on the other hand, is the way of those who have relied on rituals and similar works and have enjoyed the reward resulting from these deeds, i.e. the sacrificial merit, in heaven, but have ultimately been unable to avoid returning to an earthly existence.[24] In accordance with its basically Upaniṣadic character, this doctrine, together with the "five-fire-doctrine" (*pañcāgnividyā*), has traditionally been commented upon not in the literature of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, but of Uttaramīmāṃsā.

One of the questions discussed is why those who enter upon the "way of the fathers" have to return to earth, and in many cases into a low and unpleasant earthly existence. Among the proposed answers, the suggestion is made that this is due to the "impurity" of the acts of killing which are part of the rituals, i.e. to an element of demerit accompanying the sacrificial merit. Many centuries before Kumārila, this suggestion is already rejected by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahmasūtra* III, 1, 25; what is enjoined by the sacred word cannot be impure: *aśuddham iti cen, na, śabdāt.* In discussing this issue, Bādarāyaṇa - or whoever the compiler of the Brahmasūtra may have been - obviously had predecessors, such as Kārṣṇājini or Bādari.[25]

The oldest extant commentary, Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, is quite explicit and precise in dealing with the problem: Since dharma and adharma are specified according to "place, time, and occasion"

(*deśa, kāla, nimitta*), only the sacred texts can tell us what they are. If they tell us that the *jyotiṣṭoma* ritual, which includes the killing of animals, is an act of dharma, this has to be accepted. And the fact that elsewhere the texts prohibit the killing of living creatures does not constitute a contradiction. The specific injunction to kill an animal for the *agnīṣomīya* offering which is part of the *jyotiṣṭoma* - *agnīṣomīyam paśum ālabheta* - is an "exception" (*apavāda*), which is stronger than the general rule (*utsarga*), and an act which is enjoined in this manner cannot imply adharma.[26]

Although Śaṅkara is probably familiar with the work of Kumārila, the present passage need not be taken as reflecting such familiarity and indebtedness; it may rather correspond to a tradition already well-established in Uttaramīmāṃsā itself. - Śaṅkara discusses the issue of sacrificial hiṃsā also at various other places, e.g. in his commentary on the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*.[27]

It is not necessary to present further textual references concerning this matter. There is, however, one other text which deserves special attention: the *Yuktidīpikā*, the anonymous, yet highly informative commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* which may have been composed during the 6th century A.D. (according to E. Frauwallner), thus predating Kumārila. The *pūrvapakṣa* presented in the commentary section on verse 2, which deals with Vedic rituals, comes surprisingly close to Kumārila's own argumentation. Just as the *Ślokavārttika* passage summarized earlier, it rejects the attempt to employ "helping" (*anugraha*) and "harming" (*upaghāta*) or the production of pleasure and pain as criteria of dharma and adharma; moreover, it states that, if this hypothesis were accepted, an act of cohabitation with one's teacher's wife could be associated with merit because of its potential of "helping" another being.[28] The Mīmāṃsā rule concerning *apavāda* and *utsarga*, which we found being used by Śaṅkara, is also referred to. Responding to this, the *uttarapakṣa* states that, although the Vedic sacrifices may lead their performer to the desired results, this is possible only at the expense of other beings, i.e. the sacrificial victims; and it involves a violation of one's sense of compassion (*kāruṇya*) and of the "Golden Rule" (*na tat parasya sandadhyāt pratikūlaṃ yad ātmanaḥ*) which in itself constitutes an imperfection and an impurity.[29] - That this text is indeed earlier than Kumārila is by no means fully established, and there is certainly no definitive evidence to exclude the possibility that it contains reminiscences of the *Ślokavārttika*.

In the same context, the so-called *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*, another anonymous commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* which was recently edited by E.A. Solomon, raises the issue of human sacrifices, which it associates with the *aśvamedha* and *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* III, 4, 11; more casually, the *Yuktidīpikā* also alludes to this same text.[30] By and large, the issue of Vedic "human sacrifices" is not very conspicuous in the debates about sacrificial hiṃsā, and it is not explicitly addressed by Kumārila. This was obviously not a matter of serious concern at the time of these debates. The ritual killing of humans attributed to the *ṭhaka* etc. will be discussed later.

At this point, it may be appropriate to add some observations concerning Prabhākara, Kumārila's great rival in the history of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and quite possibly his contemporary. As usual, Prabhākara's treatment in his *Bṛhatī* is much shorter and stays closer to Śabara's Bhāṣya. He explains the prohibition referred to by Śabara in the statement *hiṃsā hi sā, sā ca pratiṣiddhā* as a prohibition relating to the qualification of the sacrificer (*adhikāragata*) and not to the employment of any sacrificial techniques. It has to be understood as being *puruṣārtha*, "for the sake of the person", i.e. relating to the motivation of the sacrificer, and not as *kratvartha*, "for the sake of the sacrifice", i.e. relating to the internal structure and the completion of the ritual. Therefore, the prohibition of hiṃsā indicates only the illegitimacy of acts of "magic" rooted in evil, destructive intentions, but not of an act like the *agnīṣomīya* killing, which is only done for the sake of completing the ritual: *tasmād abhicārasya-anarthatāṃ pratipādayituṃ kṣamo, na-agnīṣomīyādeḥ, kratvarthatvāt.*[31]

The implications of this become clearer in Śālikanāthamiśra's *Ṛjuvimalā*: The prohibition of killing restricts man only in his pursuit of such actions as are motivated by his natural, spontaneous desire for results (*phale hi svataḥ pravṛttiḥ*); and it certainly prohibits any killing which is motivated by a desire to kill. It does, however, not limit him at all in executing what is part of his ritual duty (*kārya*), in doing what he does only because the Veda tells him to do it.[32]

4. We have already noticed that Kumārila denies any independent, extra-scriptural authority to the principle of ahiṃsā. In his view, there is no rational or perceptual basis for finding faults or defects (*doṣa*) in an act of killing. Even in the case of non-ritual hiṃsā, we do not actually *see* any "defects"; our uncertainty or uneasiness (*vicikitsā*) in this case is itself based upon the teachings of the sacred texts: *na hi hiṃsādyanuṣṭhāne tadānīm doṣadarśanam* | *bāhye'pi, vicikitsā tu śāstrād eva-upajāyate* ||.[33]

Ahiṃsā is not a rule which in itself alone would be "rationally" or "morally" self-evident; it is itself valid only insofar as it is scripturally enjoined. And even in this sense and on this basis, Kumārila does not like to present it as a universal, *prima facie* valid rule which would have to be modified only by a specific clause such as the traditional *anyatra tīrthebhyaḥ*, "elsewhere than at sacred places", i.e. "if not during rituals."[34] Just as certain acts of killing are *specifically* enjoined, other acts of killing are *specifically* prohibited; among these, the killing of a brahmin is the most grave.[35]

In this as well as in other cases, "morality" is derived from "legality". The moral claims of ahiṃsā are rooted in scriptural prohibitions. Such heretics as the Buddhists and Jainas, who advocate ahiṃsā against the Vedic ritual injunctions, owe the basis and starting-point of such anti-Vedic teachings to the Veda itself. Only, they have misused or misunderstood the Veda, have falsely universalized its prohibitions and have disregarded the internal differentiation of its dharma. In his *Tantravārttika*, Kumārila suggests that this has to do with a predilection for "dialectics" (*hetūkti*), the influence of the Kali age (*kalikālavaśa*), etc.; and just like bad children who hate their parents, the Buddhists etc. who teach ahiṃsā are no longer willing or able to admit the Vedic roots of their teachings.[36] Statements in the *śruti* and *smṛti* texts themselves which seem to criticize or discredit sacrificial hiṃsā have, of course, to be reinterpreted according to Mīmāṃsā rules concerning the concordance of the sacred tradition, and they are to be relegated to the level of "descriptive statements" (*arthavāda*), which by definition can never contradict a direct injunction (*vidhi*).[37]

To conclude that ritual hiṃsā entails adharma just because it is hiṃsā is a false application of an "analogical" (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*) inference, which is built upon the merely abstract and external similarity of intrinsically and essentially different types of actions.[38] Ultimately, this anti-Vedic analogical reasoning is nothing but a misuse of, and illegitimate extrapolation from, a Vedic premise, i.e. of the forbiddenness of certain types of hiṃsā. Similarly, to invoke the "voice of conscience" against the Vedic hiṃsā is nothing more than misusing an indicator which has its roots and its legitimacy in the Veda, by turning it against its own source. According to Kumārila, the "inner consent" (*ātmatuṣṭi* etc.), next to *śruti*, *smṛti* and the "conduct of the good" (*sadācāra*), one of the four sources for the knowledge of dharma,[39] can indeed have a legitimate function, but only in strict alliance with, and subordination to the Veda.[40] This "inner consent" or its negative counterpart, the "outcry of the heart" (*hṛdaya-*

krośana),[41] the warning and censuring voice of conscience, is *de facto* and *de jure* based upon the Veda. To claim any independent authority for it amounts to heresy. The *mleccha*, by the way, who has never had any access to the Veda or the Vedic tradition, is not credited with any "voice of conscience" or inner "affliction" at all.[42]

Merely as such, the "voice of conscience" is a fickle, unreliable guide. Insofar, Kumārila can obviously agree with the position stated in a *pūrvapakṣa* section of his *Tantravārttika*: While the "twice-born" Āryans are pleased when they see animals being killed for a ritual, this causes inner pain to the Buddhists.[43]

The rule of ahiṃsā, together with other general ethical ingredients in the teachings of the heretics, may indeed represent certain traces of Vedic dharma; but they are completely interwoven with their heterodox context and overshadowed by what is a mere "appearance of dharma" (*dharmābhāsa*).[44] In this context, the ideas of ahiṃsā etc., although originating from a good source, are "like milk put into a dog's bladder."[45] Accordingly, the teachings of the Buddhists or Jainas should be distrusted even insofar as they seem to be in accordance with the Veda. Udayana, the great Naiyāyika and champion of "orthodoxy" around 1000 A.D., presents the teachings of such heretics as the Buddhists on ahiṃsā etc. as a kind of fraudulent, hypocritical use of the Vedic ideas, destined to produce faith in their heretical teachings (*śraddhāpādanāya*).[46]

Even outside Mīmāṃsā, the inferential argument against Vedic hiṃsā, which we found being rejected by Kumārila, has become a familiar example meant to illustrate difficulties of inference (*anumāna*). The *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra (13th century), one of the most popular introductory surveys of the Nyāya system, refers to it three times in order to exemplify problems and defects of inferential reasoning, such as the role of the "additional qualifier" (*upādhi*) or the "pseudo-reason" (*hetvābhāsa*) known as *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.[47]

5. The relationship between dharma, ahiṃsā and hiṃsā is again discussed in the introductory verses of the first *Autpattikasūtra* section of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*. Again, the question is raised whether the distinction between dharma and adharma does not ultimately amount to the distinction between "helping" (*anugraha*) and "harming" (*pīḍā*). Even if sense-perception and inference fail to establish this correlation, isn't it simply a matter of universal recognition, of traditional, habitual familiarity (*lokaprasiddhi*)?

Kumārila, who may also be alluding to Bhartṛhari's remarks on *lokaprasiddhi*, replies that *lokaprasiddhi* requires a foundation, and that one has to search for this foundation. For the *saṃsāramocaka*, etc., hiṃsā, the very opposite of what the opponent presents as being established by *lokaprasiddhi*, means merit; others feel that penance - causing pain to oneself - cannot be meritorious. And since *mleccha* and *ārya* disagree in such a manner, one cannot say that dharma is established by virtue of its traditional familiarity and common acceptance.[48] Only the absolutely authoritative *śāstra* which is the genuine and unique heritage of the *ārya* can establish dharma; and the *ārya* can maintain his uniqueness only insofar as he relies on this *śāstra*: *na ca-āryāṇām viśeṣo 'sti yāvac chāstram anāśritam.*[49]

Kumārila does not give any further information on the identity or the teachings of the *saṃsāramocaka*, the "liberators from saṃsāra," and his commentators do not provide any help either. Sucaritamiśra paraphrases: *saṃsāramocakā nāma nāstikā bāhyahiṃsām eva dharmam āhuḥ;*[50] what exactly this "external", i.e. extra-ritual hiṃsā amounts to is not made clear, and it was obviously unknown to Sucaritamiśra himself. Various philosophical writers after Kumārila refer to the *saṃsāramocaka*, but again without providing any concrete details. The most significant among these references, insofar as the Hindu sources are concerned, is found in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (9th century). A. Wezler has recently dealt with this passage, noticing that the *saṃsāramocaka* so far seem to have been completely overlooked by the historians of Indian religions.[51]

Jayanta mentions the *saṃsāramocaka*, whom he characterizes as "devoted to the killing of living creatures" (*prāṇihiṃsāparāyaṇa*) and as "acting from delusion" (*mohapravṛtta*), side by side with the Buddhists.[52] Whatever their distinguishing features may be, both have in common that their traditions are outside the Veda (*vedabāhya*) and nothing but a fraud (*vañcanā*). Of course, the Buddhists are more adjusted to Vedic norms, including the norms of purity; Jayanta notes that even they avoid contact with the *saṃsāramocaka*.[53] The theme of ritual hiṃsā is referred to in the subsequent section of the *Nyāyamañjarī* where Jayanta presents a survey of the *sarvāgama-prāmāṇya* theory. This theory explains all well-established traditions as being revealed by God, and it advocates a certain level of tolerance also in the realm of ritual practice. Just as the Vedic practice of animal sacrifices, although it may be repugnant to "compassionate people" (*kāruṇiko lokaḥ*), is not considered as discrediting to the validity and reputation of the Veda, so should other and comparable religious habits be respected.[54]

Vācaspati's *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, commenting on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5, mentions the "pseudo-traditions of Buddhists, Jainas, *saṃsāramocaka* etc." (*śākyabhikṣunirgranthakasaṃsāramocakādīnām āgamābhāsāḥ*). The modern Pandit Balarāma Udāsīna gives an obviously artificial explanation, when he refers in this connection to a "special branch of materialists" who advocate hiṃsā on the basis of the assumption that "final release" takes place when the body is destroyed, coinciding with the destruction of the "soul" which is contained in it.[55] In a similar context, also side by side with the Buddhists, the *saṃsāramocaka* appear again in Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka*; in Śaṅkara's (?) so-called *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* and Vācaspati's *Tattvavaiśāradī* on *Yogasūtra/Yogabhāṣya* II, 5, they exemplify an attitude which confuses merit with demerit.[56] A further text mentioning them is Medhātithi's commentary on *Manusmṛti* II, 6 (introductory section).

More explicit statements about alleged teachings of the *saṃsāramocaka* (Ardhamāgadhī: *saṃsāramoyaga*) are found in Jaina literature, in particular in Malayagiri's commentary on the *Nandīsūtra* (ca. 12th century A.D.). According to Malayagiri, the *saṃsāramocaka* argue that killing and even torturing can be a genuinely meritorious action, motivated by compassion and altruism and guided by therapeutic skills. To inflict pain and death upon living creatures is an act of purification and of selfless help for others (*paropakāra*). It is a means of liberating them from the power of the bad *karman* which keeps them attached to the miseries of the "ocean of saṃsāra."[57]

Occasionally and somewhat casually, the *saṃsāramocaka*, described as "adherents of false views" (*micchādiṭṭhika*) and killers of beetles and other insects (k*īṭapaṭaṅga*), are also mentioned in Buddhist literature, in particular by Dhammapāla in his commentary on the *Petavatthu*;[58] this commentary may have been written around 500 A.D. and is certainly considerably older than Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*.

6. Who were the *saṃsāramocaka*? Is there reliable evidence for the existence of a group actually practising or propagating what is ascribed to the *saṃsāramocaka*? Is there at least a factual, historical core in these traditions? Do we have any documents produced by the *saṃsāramocaka* themselves?

Perhaps the most obvious association would be with certain Śaivite texts, in which bloody rituals are described and explained, and in which the killing of living beings, including humans, has a religious function and value. Among the older texts of this kind, the

Netratantra deserves special attention. Chapter XX of this text, which - though not one of the most ancient Tantras - has been repeatedly referred to by Abhinavagupta and commented upon by his disciple Kṣemarāja, exemplifies in a somewhat cryptic manner this idea of ritual killing (attributed to the so-called Yoginīs), which is motivated by a desire of "helping" (*anugraha*) the victims, of liberating living creatures from their "sins" (*pāpa*) and from the "fetters" (*pāśa*) and "stains" (*mala*) of their worldly existence. Ritual killing in this context and perspective is quite different from any act of "putting to death" (*māraṇa*) in the ordinary sense; it is an act of "liberation" (*mokṣaṇa*) or, as Abhinavagupta says in a passage of his *Tantrāloka* which paraphrases this section of the *Netratantra*, of "miraculous initiation" (*dīkṣā citrarupiṇī*). The necessity of the right qualification of the sacrificer, of being without *lobha*, *moha*, etc., is explicitly emphasized.[59]

These Śaivite teachings are based upon a strict separation of ritual and worldly killing, and their proponents obviously would have rejected the characterization as "external" (*bāhya*), i.e. non-ritual killing which authors like Sucaritamiśra apply to the practices of the *saṃsāramocaka*; and they are certainly far from propagating the meritorious character of hiṃsā *per se*. As a matter of fact, the general validity of ahiṃsā is accepted, and the presentation of the extraordinary case of ritual hiṃsā is often apologetic, e.g. in Jayaratha's commentary on Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* (Chapter XVI), which follows the "orthodox" Vedic justification of ritual hiṃsā. It appears likely that some of the *saṃsāramocaka* references are, indeed, reminiscent of Śaivite Tantric teachings or practices; but this can hardly account for all of them. It does not seem applicable at all in the case of the earliest reference, which is found in Dhammapāla's *Petavatthu* commentary. In general, direct identifications of the *saṃsāramocaka* with Śaivite Tantrism are conspicuously absent (although perhaps implied in Cakradhara's paraphrase of Jayanta).

Other concepts or practices of religiously motivated killing may have contributed to the traditions about the *saṃsāramocaka*; and we should not take it for granted that the "liberators from saṃsāra" referred to by the Jainas or Buddhists are identical with those in the Hindu sources, and that we are really dealing in all these cases with a concrete historical phenomenon, i.e. a genuine "sectarian" world-view with a corresponding "religious" practice. At any rate, it is not our primary concern to identify the *saṃsāramocaka* as such, but rather to clarify the role which the references to these "liberators from saṃsāra" play in the philosophical discussion about

ahiṃsā, in particular in the Hindu response to the Buddhists, and how this relates to certain Buddhist arguments against the ritual *paśuhiṃsā* and other peculiarities of the Vedic dharma. However, before pursuing this major issue further, it may be useful to review some other religious traditions presented as advocating the idea of meritorious, religiously motivated killing.

First of all, we may refer to the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, whose lifetime may be very close to that of Jayantabhaṭṭa. In his discussion of problems of the validity of sacred texts and traditions (*śāstra, āgama*), Bhāsarvajña presents a *pūrvapakṣa* concerning the teachings of those "who say that the killing of brahmins etc. is a means of attaining heaven or final liberation" (*ye brāhmaṇādivadhaṃ svargasya mokṣasya vā sādhanaṃ vadanti*). Immediately after this, the "traditions of the Jina, the Buddha, etc." (*jinabuddhādyāgama*) are mentioned.[60]

In his refutation of this *pūrvapakṣa*, Bhāsarvajña exemplifies the opponent's remark about the "killing of brahmins etc." by referring to the "sacred texts of the Thags" (*ṭhakaśāstra*) - a statement which seems to be the oldest extant reference to this notorious sect of assassins.[61] There is no authority in the texts of the Thags etc.; they are "produced for a visible purpose by somebody stricken with passion etc." (*rāgādyupahatena-eva dṛṣṭārthaṃ ṭhakaśāstrādi praṇītam*). They are as invalid and illegitimate as the abominable *Ḍākinītantras* mentioned a little later,[62] and they illustrate the dangers of not being under the guidance of the true *śāstra*, the Veda. Insofar as they are put side by side with the traditions of the Jainas and the Buddhists, they are meant to discredit these in the same way in which they are supposed to be discredited by the proximity to the *saṃsāramocaka* in the other texts.

In general, the Mlecchas, as exemplified by such "barbarian" invaders as the *hūṇa* or *turuṣka*, are associated with the ideas of violence, of indiscriminate killing, of not respecting life; and this is connected with their basic lack of dharma. Much more specifically, however, the *Bhūridatta-Jātaka* states about the East Iranian Kambojakas, that they commit acts of killing for the sake of religious merit. They believe that it is purifying to kill beetles and other insects, snakes, frogs, worms and flies.[63] This statement is supplemented by references to "Iranian" habits in various other texts.

S. Kawasaki has recently drawn attention to the remarkable references to the *maga* (Zoroastrian Magi) or *pārasīka* in the *Tarka-*

jvālā by Bhavya (or Bhāvaviveka; 6th century), and he has translated into English the pertinent passages from this text,[64] which is Bhavya's autocommentary on his *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and which has survived only in a Tibetan translation. Among the "perverted beliefs" of these people "who live in the land of the barbarians (*mleccha*),"[65] Bhavya mentions specifically their tradition of incest and of killing or harming living creatures, small insects, such as ants, as well as bulls etc., and he emphasizes that these perverted views and practices resemble quite closely the bloody rituals and certain incestuous practices found in the Veda. In Bhavya's view, this illustrates that the Vedic dharma, too, is a perverted dharma.

Kawasaki himself points out that Bhavya is not the first Buddhist author to refer to such and similar practices. Already Vasubandhu, author of the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Bhāṣya*, mentions the "Persian" practices of hiṃsā and of incest, and in particular the tradition of killing one's own parents when they are old, weak and sick.[66] According to Vasubandhu, the habits of the *pārasīka* illustrate *moha*, "delusion" (concerning dharma and adharma), as a cause of committing acts of destroying life (*prāṇātipāta*), *lobha*, "greed", and *dveṣa*, "hate", being the other causes. The practices of the Vedic ritualists (*yajñika*) and the actions of rulers who, following the "authority of the dharma-specialists" (*dharmapāṭhakaprāmāṇya*), seek merit in punishing offenders, are mentioned as other cases of killing "caused by delusion" (*mohaja*; the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* lists the "demerit" of the *saṃsāramocaka* as *mohaprabhava*[67]).

Various Buddhist statements attributing incestuous practices, especially the "mother-marriage" (*mātṛvivaha*), to the Persians, could be added to those given by Kawasaki, e.g. several explicit and implicit references by Dharmakīrti, very probably Kumārila's contemporary, which are supplemented by statements of Prajñākaragupta, Durvekamiśra, etc.[68] Although less frequently, such practices are also referred to in Hindu texts.[69]

The question to what extent the Buddhist statements about the *maga/pārasīka* correspond to historical reality need not concern us here. A few brief notes may suffice. Prescriptions concerning the killing of certain "noxious animals" are indeed familiar in Zoroastrianism. The most conspicuous Avestan passage prescribing such "purificatory" killing is Vendīdād (Vidēvdād) XIV, 5-6. Moreover, we have the testimony of various Greek and Latin writers, starting with Herodotus, which seems to be in basic agreement with what we find in the Buddhist texts.[70] The references to incest are also

supported by other sources.[71]

7. The main thrust of Bhavya's and Vasubandhu's references to the *maga* or *pārasīka* is to discredit the sacrificial practices of the Veda and to ridicule the Brahmanical self-elevation, their exclusivistic overestimation of their Āryan dharma. Vedic ritualism, the alleged basis of this claim of uniqueness, has, according to the Buddhist argumentation, itself a very close affinity with the practices of such Mlecchas as the "Persians". So how can it possibly support any claims of superiority and exclusivity?

Whether or not Kumārila and his successors were aware of these texts - their own arguments have to be understood in the general atmosphere of defense against charges of this kind. In trying to juxtapose and associate the Buddhist teachings with those of the *saṃsāramocaka* etc., they try to reciprocate and neutralize the Buddhist attacks upon the Vedic ritualistic dharma. Both the traditions of the Buddhists and of the *saṃsāramocaka* are relegated to the same level of "pseudo-traditions", of merely human conventions, and they are supposed to illustrate the dangers of not relying on the unerring and "authorless" (*apauruṣeya*) testimony of the Veda.[72]

The *saṃsāramocaka*, as apparently understood by Kumārila and as in fact explicitly described by Malayagiri, try to present their teachings as "rational" and as motivated by the desire to help others (*paropakāra*); the systematic infliction of pain (*pīḍā*), injury and death which they advocate is said to be conducive to the ultimate benefit of the victims, to the annihilation of their bad *karman* etc. Reference is made to the expertise of the good doctor who knows that sometimes he has to apply harsh means to bring about a change for the better (*pariṇāmasundara*).[73] The *saṃsāramocaka* presents himself as a benevolent physician in the wider context of saṃsāra. In this context, what may appear as *pīḍā* and *hiṃsā* can in fact be *upakāra*; "harming" and "helping" are far from being unambiguous criteria. What seems to be the strict opposite of the "altruistic" or "utilitarian" explanation of dharma, i.e. of the equation of *dharma/adharma* with *upakāra/pīḍā*, relies ultimately on the same principle. It is simply another way of reducing dharma to "altruism".[74]

Kumārila is aware of the possibilities of rationalizing hiṃsā as well as ahiṃsā. He knows about the temptations to justify a tradition in terms of its common familiarity (*lokaprasiddhi*), its acceptance by "important" (or numerous) people (*mahājanaparigṛhītatva*), its accordance with ancestral habits (*pitrādyanugama*). But he also

knows that others can claim these same criteria, related to other "continents", areas outside India, in support of their own views: *mahājanaparigṛhītatvaṃ pitrādyanugamādi ca | te 'py dvīpāntarāpekṣaṃ vadanty eva svadarśane ||*.[75] To defend the Vedic dharma, including its animal sacrifices, just in these terms would amount to abandoning it. It has to be accepted in its own right, without relying on external, merely human and potentially relative standards. Only the Veda itself can uphold the identity of its dharma. Only the Vedic injunctions (*codanā*) can save dharma and adharma from the "jaws of non-being" (*abhāvavaktra*).[76]

The Mīmāṃsā method of exegesis is designed to demonstrate the concordance and non-ambiguity of the Vedic revelation. The textual materials are arranged, i.e. coordinated or subordinated, in such a manner that conflicts and ambiguities can always be eliminated. An *arthavāda* cannot contradict a *vidhi*; the testimony of *śruti* is by definition stronger than that of *smṛti*. Nothing can jeopardize the validity of a direct scriptural injunction, such as the one enjoining the *jyotiṣṭoma* ritual.

8. What the Mīmāṃsā does amounts to a retrospective reconstruction of the Veda as an idealized fountainhead of the unity and identity of the Āryan tradition. Although the Mīmāṃsaka advocates the Vedic rituals as the center of dharma, he is no longer at home in the world in which these rituals were originally developed and enacted. The historical conditions have changed; his world is different from the old magico-ritualistic universe of the Veda. We have noticed earlier that Kumārila rejects the idea of a cosmic reciprocity which would imply that any act of hurting falls back upon its originator; in so doing, he rejects an idea which is a serious concern to the "Vedic ritualists" themselves and which is still important in such Hindu systems as Sāṃkhya and Yoga.[77] Kumārila has to reject it because he cannot accept a universal cosmic causality which would interfere with the specific, scripturally determined causality of the ritual. The fact that there is hiṃsā in it cannot imply that a positively enjoined ritual has negative side-effects, i.e. an ambiguous two-fold causality (*ubhayahetutva*, etc.).[78]

The Vedic rituals, if performed correctly by those who are entitled to perform them, produce *apūrva*, a "new" potential not subject to ordinary worldly causality and to what other schools may present as a more general mechanism of cosmic retributive causality.[79] The *apūrva* is inseparable from the Vedic *dharma*, and this *dharma* is completely different from a universal ethical code. It has as its cen-

ter the Vedic ritual prescriptions or injunctions (*vidhi, codanā*), rules which apply only to those who are within the Āryan order of "castes" (*varṇa*) and "stages of life" (*āśrama*) and which are by definition trans-empirical and not susceptible to rationalization and universalization. Within this ritualistic context of the Vedic *dharma*, the special injunctions concerning the killing of specific animals for ritual purposes are stronger than rules concerning life in general. In Mīmāṃsā as well as in grammar, the exception is stronger than the general rule. And the *apūrva*, the special result of the special ritual, is by definition stronger than any general retributive causality or the "common *adṛṣṭa*" (*sāmānyādṛṣṭa*) referred to by Jayanta.[80] If the apurvic value of a sacrificial performance is a positive one, all the parts of the ritual can only be seen as contributing to this positive outcome, and none of them can produce any independent and negative side-effects.[81]

In the context of his understanding of *dharma*, *vidhi* and *apūrva*, Kumārila does not consider it necessary to commit himself to the apologetic and conciliatory style found in numerous other texts, e.g. in the eighth chapter of the *Manusmṛti*. He does not try to justify or to legitimize ritual *paśuhiṃsā* in terms of ahiṃsā or to explain it away. He does not rely on the old argument that the sacrificial animal itself benefits from its role, and that its ritual death leads to an existence in heaven. By the time of Kumārila, this argument has been widely discredited; it has been ridiculed by the Cārvāka materialists and other opponents of the Vedic tradition.[82]

In reality, there is no need for apologies or acts of "appeasing" (*śānti*). In his commentary on the *Ślokavārttika*, Pārthasārathi quotes a Vedic prayer to Agni, asking for release from the "sin" (*enas*) incurred because of ritual hiṃsā, and he emphasizes that according to Kumārila this can only be an *arthavāda* which should not be taken literally.[83] There is in reality no such "sin" in the sacrifice from which Agni would have to liberate us. It is symptomatic that a Jaina text of the 13th century, refuting the Mīmāṃsā defense of ritual hiṃsā, utilizes this same prayer to Agni as an expression of support for the idea of ahiṃsā and as Vedic evidence against the Mīmāṃsā.[84]

9. "The ritualists were however deeply concerned with the killing and injuring of animate beings which occurs in the sacrifice itself."[85] The correctness of this statement by H.-P. Schmidt is amply documented in his article on the "origin of ahiṃsā" which has been the starting-point for our investigations. The fear of committing hiṃsā was clearly present with the "ritualists". But does this imply that

the *origin* of ahiṃsā has been established, and that the Vedic ritualistic world-view itself constitutes its only or its ultimate source?

However deeply many of the ritualists may have been concerned about ritual killings, it would certainly go too far to claim that this concern was intrinsic to or coextensive with their ritualism, that it originated and developed with them insofar as they were ritualists. Rather, it seems that there was a certain degree of tension or even conflict between their ritualistic preoccupations, their pursuit of certain practices supposed to lead to certain desired ends, and the suspicion that some of the means employed might violate rules which were not those of the rituals themselves, and unleash forces that might turn against the ritualists. We cannot exclude the possibility that this suspicion and concern was nourished by sources which were not those of Vedic ritualism itself.

Is there really a "ritual ahiṃsā-theory"? And in what sense can we say that this "ritual ahiṃsā-theory is the ultimate source of the later renunciatory ahiṃsā-doctrine"?[86] Does it not seem more likely that external factors contributed to these developments which subsequently led to a sharp and explicit conflict between ritualism and ahiṃsā as two basically different ways of religious orientation?

As indicated before, a systematic examination of Schmidt's thesis has not been the purpose of this paper. We have used his rich and stimulating observations as the starting-point for a discussion which has not at all focused on the "origin of ahiṃsā". Whatever this origin may be - the tension and conflict between Vedic ritualism and ahiṃsā remains a characteristic phenomenon of later religious thought in India.[87] Hindu "orthodoxy", as represented by the Mīmāṃsā, sees the universalization of the ahiṃsā doctrine as a threat to the Vedic dharma and the Āryan tradition. It tries to establish the full legitimacy of the bloody Vedic rituals against the claims of ahiṃsā. At the same time, however, it tries to demonstrate that the true origins of this false anti-Vedic ahiṃsā doctrine can be traced to the Veda itself, and that even in their criticism of the Veda, its opponents are ultimately indebted to the Veda.[88]

Notes

Ch. I: Kumārila on Ahiṃsā and Dharma

[1] H.-P. Schmidt, The Origin of *ahiṃsā*; in: Mélanges d'Indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou, Paris 1968, 625-655; ib., 625.

[2] Cf. Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien, Wiesbaden 1962 (Akad. d. Wiss. u.d. Lit. Mainz, Abh. d. geistes- u. sozialwiss. Kl., 1961, 6). - Other recent contributions to the study of *ahiṃsā* are: C. della Casa, Ahiṃsā: Significato e ambito originari della non-violenza. Indologica Taurinensia 3/4 (1975/76): 187-196. - U. Tähtinen, Ahiṃsā, London 1976. - P. Schreiner, Gewaltlosigkeit und Tötungsverbot im Hinduismus; in: Angst und Gewalt, ed. H. von Stietencron, Düsseldorf 1979, 287-308. - D.S. Ruegg, Ahiṃsā and Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism; in: Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula, London 1980, 234-241.

[3] On other implications of this relationship and on the concept of *dharma* in general see chapter XVII of my book Indien und Europa: Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung, Basel 1981 ("Dharma im Selbstverständnis des traditionellen und des modernen Hinduismus").

[4] Cf. the presentation and discussion of Mahābhārata passages by L. Alsdorf (see above, n.2), 32 ff.; special reference may be made to the passage Mahābhārata XII, 237, 18 f., which states that all other dharmas disappear in ahiṃsā just as the foot-prints of all other animals disappear in those of the elephant.

[5] Cf. Indien und Europa, § 325; on ahiṃsā in Neo-Hinduism, cf. § 342.

[6] Cf. L. Alsdorf (see above, n.2), 18 ff.; cf. also the compilation of texts in: Mitramiśra, Vīramitrodaya, ed. Nityānanda Śarmā, vol. II, Benares 1913 (ChSS), 526 ff. (*māṃsabhakṣyābhakṣyanirṇayaḥ*) and 537 ff. (*paśuhiṃsāvidhipratiṣedhau*); Santaśaraṇa, Saddharma ahiṃsāprakāśa, Kathmandu 1974.

[7] The Vaiśeṣikasūtra pays special attention to the legitimacy of killing in self-defense (VI, 1, 10 ff.; ed. Jambuvijaya), thus illustrating another aspect of the limitation of ahiṃsā; the text uses the euphemism *tyāga*, also referring to suicide as *ātmatyāga*.

[8] Cf. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sāṃkhyakārikā 2 (together with its commentaries); Vyāsa, Bhāṣya on Yogasūtra II, 29 ff. (especially II, 34). - On self-defense etc. see also Medhātithi on Manu VIII, 350; IV, 162.

[9] Cf. E. Frauwallner, Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā, Wien 1968, 20 f.

[10] ŚV, 79 ff. (v. 201 ff.).

[11] On Sūtra II, 34; as a much later document, see, e.g., Sāṃkhyasūtra I, 84 with Aniruddha's commentary. - In general, Sāṃkhya ideas seem to be the main target of Kumārila's argumentation in this section. - See also the reciprocity of "eater" and "food" in Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa XII, 9, 1, 1 and the "etymology" of *māṃsa* in Manu V, 55.

[12] ŚV, 86 (v. 234 f.); it seems to be this type of false reasoning about *hiṃsā* which Kumārila refers to as *karmānurūpya*, "conformity to the act", in TV, 124; Someśvara explains: *parapīḍātmakāt karmaṇas tadanurūpam ātmanaḥ pīḍātmakaṃ phalam bhavati-iti karmānurūpyopamānam* (NSudhā, 184).

[13] ŚV, 87 (v. 236 f.).

[14] ŚV, 88 (v. 244 f.); also 87 (v. 236); cf. YD, 15 (see below, n. 28).

[15] ŚV, 88 (v. 242 f.):
vihitapratiṣiddhatve muktvā-anyan na ca kāraṇam ||
dharmādharmāvabodhasya, tena-ayuktā-anumānagīḥ | .

[16] Cf. ŚV, 89 (v. 249 ff.). The commentator Umbeka (ed. S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, Madras 1971, 112) attributes this to the Sāṃkhya author Mādhava, who is often referred to as "destroyer of Sāṃkhya" (*sāṃkhyanāśaka*; this seems to be the correct reading instead of the *-nāyaka* in the printed text); see also V. Raghavan, Mādhava, an Early Unfaithful Exponent of the Sāṅkhya; in: Sarūpa Bhāratī (Lakshman Sarup Memorial Vol.), Hoshiarpur 1954, 162-164.

[17] ŚV, 89 (v. 252 ff.).

[18] ŚV, 90 (v. 258).

[19] ŚV, 90 (v. 259):
tathāpy ekaphalatvaṃ cet, kriyātvāt sarvasaṅkaraḥ |
yajitvādyaviśeṣāc ca citrādiphalatulyatā ||.

[20] ŚV, 80 (v. 205): *śyenas tatra-asivat pṛthak*; cf. also 84 (v. 223 ff.); Pārthasārathi, Śāstradīpikā, ed. Laxman Shastri Dravid, Benares 1916, 93: *śyenaphalaṃ ca hiṃsā, na śyenaḥ.*

[21] It is *anartha* because of "another action" (*kriyāntara*) to be accomplished by the ritual itself; cf. ŚV, 92 (v. 268).

[22] ŚV, 92 (v. 273 f.). - Cf. Medhātithi on Manu II, 10: *rāgalakṣaṇā laukikī hiṃsā, vidhilakṣaṇā-alaukikī hiṃsā;* also on II, 6 (ed. J.H. Dave, I, 167 f.).

[23] Cf. Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa I, 18, 45 ff.; Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad VI, 2 (= Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa XIV, 9, 1); Chāndogya-Upaniṣad V, 3-10.

[24] Chāndogya-Upaniṣad V, 10, 3: *ya ime grāma iṣṭāpūrte dattam ity upāsate;* Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad VI, 2, 16: *ye yajñena dānena tapasā lokāñ jayanti.*

[25] Kārṣṇājini is mentioned in BS III, 1, 9, Bādari in III, 1, 11; see also the reference to Pañcaśikha in Vācaspati's Tattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā 2.

[26] Cf. Śaṅkara on BS II, 1, 25. See also YD, 15 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *sāmānye hi śāstram ahiṃsām utsṛjya viśeṣe kratulakṣaṇe 'pavādaṃ śāsti, sāmānyavihitaṃ ca viśeṣavihitena bādhyate ... tasmād utsargāpavādayor viṣayabhedān na-asti śāstravirodha iti.* The Sāṃkhya reply is to reject the applicability of the *utsarga/apavāda* rule and to claim that the limited and merely instrumental validity of the sacrificial injunctions and the basic norm of ahiṃsā exist side by side; cf. in particular Vācaspati, Tattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā 2; also YD, 16. The rule has its origin in grammar; cf. Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini III, 1, 94.

[27] Especially on V, 10, 6; on this passage, see below, n. 79.

[28] YD, 15: *evaṃ hi parikalpyamāne gurubhāryāgamane 'pi sattvāntarānugrahasāmarthyād iṣṭaphalasambandhaḥ syāt.*

[29] YD, 16.

[30] Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (V_1), ed. by E.A. Solomon, Ahmedabad 1973, 7: *[agniṣṭome] tāvat paśuvadho 'śvamedhe manuṣavadho 'pi.* - On this text and the Sāṃkhyavṛtti, also edited by E.A. Solomon, cf. my review, Journal of the American Oriental Society 96 (1976), 144 f. See also YD, 14: *brahmaṇe* (instead of *brāhmaṇe in the printed text) brāhmaṇam ālabheta-ityādi.*

[31] Cf. Prabhākara, Bṛhatī with Ṛjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra, ed. A. Chinnaswami Sastri, fasc. 1, Benares 1929 (ChSS), 31; on the definition of *puruṣārtha* and *kratvartha* cf. Śabara on MS IV, 1, 2.

[32] Loc. cit. - Cf. also Padmapāda, Pañcapādikā, ed. Rāmaśāstrī Bhāgavatācārya, Benares 1891 (Vizianagram Sanskrit Ser.), 91 f. (non-injury either as a prohibition or as a positive mental act, *mānasī saṃkalpakriyā*); against *kratvarthā hiṃsā*: YSBhV, 323 (on IV, 7).

[33] ŚV, 86 (v. 233 f.); cf. 89 (v. 255 f.): *pratiṣedhajaṃ pratyavāyārthatājñānam.*

[34] Cf. Chāndogya-Upaniṣad VIII, 15.

[35] Cf. TV, 135 ff. (on I, 3, 7; concerning the killing of female members of the brahmin caste); also the quote in Someśvara, NSudhā, 201: *antaraṃ yādṛśaṃ loke brahmahatyāśvamedhayor ...* - See also Śaṅkara on Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad III, 3, 1: *bhrūṇahatyāśvamedhābhyāṃ na paraṃ puṇyapāpayor iti hi smaranti.* The ritual which is here referred to as the most meritorious of all acts, i.e. the *aśvamedha*, is itself associated with killing, sometimes even with human sacrifices; see above, n. 30.

[36] TV, 113 (on I, 3, 4): *vedamūlatvaṃ punas te ... mātāpitṛdveṣiduṣṭaputravan na-abhyupagacchanti;* cf. also 162 (on I, 3, 12): *ahiṃsādy apy atatpūrvam ity āhus tarkamāninaḥ* (concerning the Buddhists etc., who do not accept the Vedic origin of ahiṃsā).

[37] Cf. ŚV, 93 (v. 275 f.):
gītāmantrārthavādair ya kalpyate 'narthahetutā ||
pratyakṣaśrutibādhyatvāt sā-anyārthatvena nīyate | .

[38] Cf. TV, 124 (on I, 3, 7); Someśvara, NSudhā, 184, explains this inference as: *vaidiky api hiṃsā laukikīvad adharma iti.* In Bhartṛhari's terminology, this would be "dry reasoning"

(*śuṣkatarka*), based upon mere "similarity and dissimilarity" (*sādharmyavaidharmya*); cf. Vṛtti on VP I, 137 (resp. I, 129; = I, 153, ed. W. Rau).

[39] Cf. Manu II, 6; 12.

[40] Cf. Indien und Europa, § 320 ff.

[41] ŚV, 88 (v. 246; also 244: *krośatā hṛdayena*); cf. the reference to *paritāpa*, the "grief" of compassion, YD, 16.

[42] ŚV, 88 (v. 247): *aśāstrajño mleccho na-udvijate kvacit;* in his commentary on this verse, Pārthasārathi refers to the Mleccha's *hṛdayakrośābhāva.*

[43] TV, 125 (on I, 3, 7):
paśuhiṃsādisambandhe yajñe tuṣyanti hi dvijāḥ |
tebhya eva hi yajñebhyaḥ śākyāḥ krudhyanti pīḍitāḥ.

[44] TV, 124 (on I, 3, 7).

[45] Loc. cit.: *sanmūlam apy ahiṃsādi śvadṛtinikṣiptakṣīravad.*

[46] Cf. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka, ed. Ḍhunḍhirāja Śāstrī, Benares 1940 (ChSS), 418 (*biḍālavratanyāyena*).

[47] Keśavamiśra, Tarkabhāṣā, ed. Rudradhara Jhā, Benares 1952, 8; 13; 37.

[48] ŚV, 150 (v. 5 f.):
saṃsāramocakādeś ca hiṃsā puṇyatvasammatā ||
na paścāt puṇyam icchanti kecid, evaṃ vigānataḥ |
mlecchāryāṇāṃ prasiddhatvaṃ na dharmasya-upapadyate ||.

On Bhartṛhari's use of *lokaprasiddhi*, *lokaprasiddhatva* etc., which also affects his understanding of *āgama*, cf. VP I, 30 ff. In v. 3 of the *Autpattikasūtra* section (ŚV, 149), Kumārila quotes a verse which is identical with VP I, 40:
idaṃ puṇyam idaṃ pāpam ity etasmin padadvaye |
ācaṇḍāla(ṃ)manuṣyāṇām alpaṃ śāstraprayojanam ||.

However, Kumārila attributes this verse, which is also quoted by Jayanta (NM, 230) as a statement by "Vyāsa", to Pārāśarya (= Vyāsa); Jayanta defines *lokaprasiddhi* as *laukikānām avicchinnā smṛtiḥ*, which implies that it has no independent authority, but depends on *śruti* as its "root" (*mūla*).

[49] Loc. cit., v. 7.

[50] Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika with the commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, part II, Trivandrum 1929, 3.

[51] A. Wezler, Zur Proklamation religiös-weltanschaulicher Toleranz bei dem indischen Philosophen Jayantabhaṭṭa. Saeculum 27 (1976), 329-348; ib., 335.

[52] NM, 242; Cakradhara, Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga, ed. N.J. Shah, Ahmedabad 1972, 113, paraphrases: *ghūkacaṭakanyāyena prāṇivadhaṃ dharmam icchanti*; referring to *niṣiddhasevana* in Jayanta's following verse, Cakradhara mentions a Bhairavatantra.

[53] NM, 243.

[54] NM, 245; the *agnīṣomīya* offering and the *śyena* sacrifice are specifically mentioned in this context.

[55] ... *dehabhaṅge tadantargatajīvabhaṅga eva mokṣa ity evaṃ bruvāṇāś cārvākaviśeṣāḥ* (as quoted by G. Jha, The Tattva-Kaumudī, transl. into English, Poona[3] 1965, Notes, p. 9).

[56] Ātmatattvaviveka (see above, n. 46), 419: *saṃsāramocakāgama*; cf. 420: *sugatādyāgama*; YSBhV, 134: *etena-apuṇye puṇyapratyayaḥ*; Tattvavaiśāradī, ed. Nārāyaṇamiśra, Benares 1971, 148: *apuṇye hiṃsādau saṃsāramocakādīnāṃ puṇyapratyayaḥ*; cf. also YSBhV, 144 (on II, 12).

[57] Cf. Nandīsūtra with Vṛtti by Malayagiri (Śrīmanmalayagiryācāryapraṇītavṛttiyutaṃ ... śrīmannandīsūtram), ed. Veṇīcanda Suracanda, Bombay 1924, fol. 13 a f. (cf. also the extensive excerpt given by Vijayarājendra Sūri in his encyclopedia Abhidhānarājendra, Ratlam 1913-1925, vol. VII, 252 f.; s.v. *saṃsāramoyaga/saṃsāramocaka*): *tatas te 'vaśyaṃ tat-pāpakṣapaṇāya paropakārakaraṇaikarasikamānasena vyāpādanīyāḥ ... tīvraduḥkhavedanābhibhava-vaśāc ca prāg baddhaṃ pāpakarma-udīrya-udīrya-anubhavantaḥ pratikṣipanti.* Human as well as non-human creatures are mentioned. - Another, shorter reference is found in the Syādvādaratnākara by Vādideva Sūri (ca. 1100), as indicated by N.J. Shah in his edition of the Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga (see above, n. 52), 113, n. 1.

[58] Dhammapāla's Paramattha-Dīpanī, part III (commentary on Petavatthu), ed. E. Hardy, London 1894 (PTS), 67 (II, 1).

[59] Cf. Netratantra with commentary by Kṣemarāja, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Bombay 1926-1939 (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies), 216 ff.; 222 f. (XX, v. 4 ff.; v. 18 ff.). See specifically v. 8:

eṣām anugrahārthāya paśūnāṃ tu, varānane |
mocayanti ca pāpebhyaḥ pāpaughāṃś chedayanti tān ||

Kṣemarāja paraphrases *anugraha* as *mukti*.
Also v. 20:

troṭayanti paśoḥ pāśāñ charīraṃ yena naśyati |
śarīreṇa pranaṣṭena mokṣaṇaṃ, na hi māraṇam ||

Abhinavagupta discusses the topic of ritual hiṃsā in chapter XVI of his Tantrāloka; in his commentary on v. 58-62, Jayaratha quotes Netratantra XX, 8; 18-21; cf. Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with commentary by Rājānaka Jayaratha, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri (vol. I: Mukund Ram Shastri), Bombay (vol. I: Allahabad) 1918-1938 (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies), X, 23 ff. - I owe the reference to Abhinavagupta's discussion of ritual hiṃsā to A. Sanderson (Oxford). For a more "commonsensical" notion of compassionate killing, see Mahābhārata XIII, 118, 14 f. (I owe this reference to A. Wezler, Hamburg), where a worm (?, *kīṭa*) is addressed as follows:

.... *kutaḥ kīṭa sukhaṃ tava* |
maraṇaṃ te sukhaṃ manye, tiryagyonau hi vartase ||

For a comprehensive study of the Netratantra, its contents, character and date, cf. H. Brunner, Un Tantra du Nord: Le Netra Tantra. Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient 61 (1974), 125-197; on chapter XX and the female "demons" called *yoginī* cf. 183 ff.

[60] NBhūṣ, 391; cf. also 403: *purīṣādibhakṣaṇaṃ brāhmaṇādivadhaṃ ca kuryāt svargakāmaḥ.*

[61] NBhūṣ, 392. The oldest explicit references to the Thags (including a 14th century Muslim report) as well as the oldest usages of the word *ṭhaka* which we find mentioned in the available Western literature on this subject are several centuries later than Bhāsarvajña; cf. R. Garbe, Über die Thugs; in: Beiträge zur indischen Kulturgeschichte, Berlin 1903, 183-198; G. Pfirrmann, Religiöser Charakter und Organisation der Thag-Brüderschaften, Diss. Tübingen 1970. Following H. Jacobi, Garbe presents Maṅkha (also Maṅkhuka or Maṅkaka; 12th century), Śrīkaṇṭhacarita VI, 33, as the oldest traceable occurrence of the word *ṭhaka*. We may add here that the form *ṭhaga*, which is common in Hindi and other modern Indian languages, is already used by Maṅkha's contemporary Hemacandra in his Prakrit work Kumārapālacarita III, 59 (ed. S. Pandurang Pandit, Bombay 1900, 100; paraphrased as *ṭhaka* in the Sanskrit commentary by Pūrṇakalaśagaṇi). In his Prakrit dictionary Deśīnāmamālā II, 28 (ed. R. Pischel/P.V. Ramanujaswami, Bombay[2] 1938, 92; Hemacandra's autocommentary), Hemacandra uses *ṭhaka* to paraphrase *dhūrta*, "rogue", "deceiver", which in turn explains the Prakrit word *kālaya*. Also probably in the earlier 12th century, Puruṣottamadeva gives *sthaga* as a synonym of *dhūrta* in his Sanskrit dictionary Trikāṇḍaśeṣa III, 1, 14. This may be a (re-) Sanskritization of *ṭhaka/ṭhaga*; cf. Th. Zachariae, Prākṛtwörter in Purushottama's Trikāṇḍaçesha (1886); in: Opera minora, ed. C. Vogel, Wiesbaden 1977, 153. Nevertheless, the familiar etymological connection of *ṭhaka/ṭhaga* with the Sanskrit root *sthag* ("to cover", "conceal"; cf. Pali *thaketi*), which is accepted by many lexicographers and scholars like R. Garbe, may still be valid; for a similar semantic development, G.I. Ascoli, Kritische Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft, Weimar 1878, 257, n. 39, refers to *chadman* ("deceit", "fraud"; from *chad*, "to cover"). - Bhāsarvajña's remarks, together with other pieces of evidence (cf. G. Pfirrmann, 30 f., on some episodes reported by Hsüan-tsang in the 7th century) suggest that in some form the practices of the Thags (also known as Phansigars) date back to the pre-Muslim era, although later on Muslims, too, participated in these practices. The Muslim element and the possibility of more ancient Near Eastern roots of Thagism have been emphasized by W.H. Sleeman. Ramaseeana or a Vocabulary of the Peculiar Language Used by the Thugs, Calcutta 1836, 9 ff.; but Sleeman agrees that the "faith in its divine origin is of Indian growth". In Sleeman's detailed reports, there is no specific reference to the idea of "meritorious", scripturally sanctioned killing of brahmins. W. Crooke's claim that "in the Ellora cave temple, which was constructed about 760 A.D., we have a Thug represented strangling a Brahman" (Things Indian, London 1906, 474) cannot be substantiated and may be based upon a misinterpretation; however, the Thags themselves have mentioned the Ellora caves as containing pictorial or sculptural references to their practices; cf. G. Pfirrmann, 76 ff. The "blood chapter" (i.e. chapter 71) of the Kālikāpurāṇa, which would be a possible source of inspiration and legitimacy for Thagism, expressly prohibits the killing of brahmins as well as women; cf. already W.C. Blaquiere, The Rudhirādhyāya. Asiatic Researches 5 (1799; repr. 1801), 381 ff. G. Pfirrmann, 108f., tries to trace Thagism to the "theology of aboriginal tribes."

[62] NBhūṣ, 395; also referred to by Dharmakīrti in his autocommentary on Pramāṇavārttika I, 308 (ed. R. Gnoli, Rome 1960, 163).

[63] Jātaka, ed. V. Fausbøll, London 1877-1897, VI, 208:
kīṭā paṭangā uragā ca bhekā |
hantvā kimiṃ sujjhati makkhikā ca ...

[64] A reference to Maga in the Tibetan translation of the Tarkajvālā. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Tokyo) 23/2 (1975), 14-20.

65 Loc. cit., 14.

66 Loc. cit., 18 ff.; Kawasaki also refers to the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā, which precedes Vasubandhu's work and which has survived only in a Chinese translation, and to the Abhidharmadīpa; cf. Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, ed. P.S. Jaini, Patna² 1977, 154; several references to the *pārasīka* are found in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṃgraha and its commentary by Kamalaśīla; cf. v. 2446 f.; 2797; 2807 f.

67 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967, 240; YSBhV, 144 (on II, 12; see above, n. 56); cf. also Yogasūtra II, 34: *lobha*, *krodha* and *moha* as causes of *hiṃsā*.

68 Cf. Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika I (with autocommentary), ed. R. Gnoli, Rome 1960, 170 (on v. 321: *pārasīkamātṛmithyācāravat*); also 125 (on v. 245); and the commentary literature following Dharmakīrti, especially Prajñākaragupta, Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna 1953, 329 (v. 565); Durvekamiśra, Dharmottarapradīpa, ed. D. Malvania, Patna² 1971, 14 f. (*pārasīkaśāstra*). - See also NBhūṣ, 406 (*mātṛvivāha*).

69 Cf. P.V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra III, Poona 1946, 859, n. 1665.

70 Cf. S. Kawasaki, loc. cit. (see above, n. 64), 17 f.; G. Widengren, Die Religionen Irans, Stuttgart 1965, 113 ff.

71 G. Widengren, loc. cit., 288 ff.; S. Kawasaki, loc. cit.

72 The claim of *apauruṣeyatva* is, of course, rejected and ridiculed by the Buddhists; cf., e.g., Dharmakīrti, loc. cit. (see above, n. 68), 125 (v. 244 ff.), where the alleged *apauruṣeyatva* is reduced to mere custom and habit.

73 Cf. Malayagiri, Vṛtti on Nandīsūtra (see above, n. 57), fol. 13 a: *yat pariṇāmasundaraṃ tad āpātakaṭukam api pareṣām ādheyaṃ, yathā rogopaśamanam auṣadham*. The metaphor of the good doctor and of disease and therapy is generally quite familiar in Indian soteriological thought; cf., the "medical" use of the term *pariṇāmasundara* in Jineśvara's Pañcaliṅgī, v. 60 (as quoted by Malliṣeṇa, Syādvādamañjarī, ed. A.B. Dhruva, Bombay 1933, 64).

74 Cf. TV, 114 (on I, 3, 4), where the extreme altruism expressed in the bodhisattva's vow to take all suffering upon himself is presented as a case of self-deception and transgression (*vyatikrama*) of dharma.

75 TV, 113 (on I, 3, 4).

76 ŚV, 150 (v. 8).

77 See above, n. 11; also Vācaspati, Tattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā 2.

78 Cf. Śaṅkara, who usually follows the Pūrvamīmāṃsā in this and similar matters, on Chāndogya-Upaniṣad V, 10, 6: *na ca vaidikānāṃ karmaṇāṃ hiṃsāyuktatvena-ubhayahetutvaṃ śakyam anumātuṃ, hiṃsāyāḥ śāstracoditatvāt;* but cf. YSBhV, 323 (on IV, 7).

79 Cf. TV, 242 (on I, 3, 30): *yāgānuṣṭhānāt pūrvam abhūtam anuṣṭhānottarakālaṃ ca-apūrvaṃ jāyata iti yaugikatvād eva-apūrvaśabdābhidhānaṃ sarvatra labhyate.* On the role of *apūrva* in Mīmāṃsā and other systems and on its relation to the concept of *adṛṣṭa*, see my article Kar-

ma, *apūrva*, and "Natural" Causes; in: Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, ed. W. D. O'Flaherty, Berkeley 1980, 268-302; especially 273 ff.; on the development of the concept of *dharma*, cf. Indien und Europa, chapter XVII.

80 Cf. NM, 253 f.; the problem is how the specific ritualistic results of the "rain-producing" *kārīrī* ceremony relate to the pleasure or pain produced by "ordinary" merit or demerit; cf. also the expressions *sukhasambhogasādhanabhūtādṛṣṭa* (253) and *sāmānyasukha-sādhanādṛṣṭa* (254).

81 Such side-effects are often suggested by Yoga and Sāṃkhya authors; cf. Vācaspati, Tattvavaiśāradī on Yogasūtra II, 13; Tattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā 2.

82 Cf., e.g., the reference in: Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya, Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, chapter 1 (on the Cārvāka system); see also Viṣṇupurāṇa III, 18.

83 ŚV, 93 (on v. 275 f.): ... *agnir mā tasmād enaso viśvān muñcatv aṃhasaḥ.*

84 Malliṣeṇa, Syādvādamañjarī, ed. A.B. Dhruva, Bombay 1933, 66: *agnir mām etasmād dhiṃsākṛtād enaso muñcatu.*

85 H.-P. Schmidt, loc. cit. (see above, n. 1), 645.

86 Loc. cit., 650.

87 The attempts to resolve this tension and the numerous reinterpretations of *ahiṃsā* as well as of *yajña* are, of course, equally characteristic.

88 Kumārila and his successors do not pursue the other side of the development, which may have been less conspicuous or more problematic to them: They do not try to demonstrate how certain extra-Vedic, primarily Śaivite, forms of ritual killing, which seem to have existed already in Kumārila's days, relate to the Vedic rituals. However, later Śaivite Tantric authors themselves, such as Jayaratha in his commentary on Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* (chapter XVI), tend to emphasize the Vedic patterns in their demarcation and defense of ritual hiṃsā, and they use and extrapolate arguments found in Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra.

II.

Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in the Philosophy of Śaṅkara

The role of reason in the teachings of Śaṅkara has often been discussed; and some basic patterns and problems of the philosophical encounter between India and the West, of Western self-understanding and of the Indian response to the Western challenge have been reflected in these discussions. Śaṅkara's thought has been questioned, criticized and defended in terms of the relationship between reason and revelation, autonomous thinking and sacred tradition. On the Indian side, in Neo-Hinduism or Neo-Vedānta, the approach is often apologetic. Śaṅkara is defended against the claims of Western "rationality," either in the name of reason itself or in the name of a transrational "experience," which includes and fulfills, but does not contradict, the aspirations of human reasoning.

Already Rammohan Roy (1772-1833), who has been called the "father of modern Indian thought" and who has in fact initiated important modernistic developments in Hinduism, claims that the Upaniṣads, as well as their interpretation by Śaṅkara, if rediscovered and understood in their genuine meaning, are fully compatible with Western rational and scientific thought, and that they contain all the potential of a true "religion of reason." "Reason," correlated to the Sanskrit term *yukti*, is a key concept in Rammohan's thought.[1] In the writings of Rammohan's successors, who are less directly exposed to the ideas of the European age of enlightenment, the appeal to reason and common sense is less conspicuous. It is frequently overshadowed by or even replaced with the notion of a supra-rational, but not anti-rational "experience" or "intuition," which is associated with such Sanskrit terms as *darśana* and presented as the central and guiding principle of the Indian philosophical tradition and of Śaṅkara's philosophy in particular.[2]

Yet, the defense of Advaita Vedānta in the name of reason or

rationality has remained an important concern of modern Indian thought, and it is one of the characteristic features of Neo-Vedānta. Numerous authors have argued for "the rational basis of Advaitism,"[3] and they have presented the teachings of *śruti*, the Vedic-Upaniṣadic "revelation," as "rational truth." In their interpretation, Advaita Vedānta is a religion that "reconciles revelation with reason," or a philosophy that "reconciles the claims of reason with those of religious faith";[4] it appears as a system in which there is no room for the Western dichotomy and antagonism of reason and faith. Again and again, it is emphasized that Śaṅkara is not a dogmatic in the sense of blindly following his sacred tradition, and that his allegiance to the Veda "is not only founded on reason, but also ever remains open to it."[5] Moreover: "Though Śaṅkara accepts the authority of the Vedas so earnestly, yet he is not in the least reluctant to shake off its authority absolutely and without reservation when reason demands it."[6]

Such presentations should not primarily be seen as contributions to historical and philological research. They may be respectable attempts to rethink or reinterpret Advaita Vedānta in the context of the modern world; but their apologetic goal often overshadows the requirements of philological accuracy and conceptual precision. Other contributions are more cautious and closer to Śaṅkara's own words. N. K. Devaraja finds "inconsistent, even contradictory, statements" about the role of reason (*tarka*) in Śaṅkara's writings, and he tries to trace this "inconsistency" to a "confusion between two very different meanings or conceptions of reasoning," i.e., between *tarka* as "hypothetical argument" and as "valid inference."[7] The critical and differentiated treatment of the topic in K. S. Murty's book *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta* (1959; [2]1974), which emphasizes the subordination of reason and argumentation (*yukti*, *tarka*) to the authority of the Vedic revelation, is particularly remarkable and a somewhat unusual contribution from the Indian side.[8]

In Western literature on Śaṅkara, the question of the relationship between reason and the authority of the sacred texts plays a less conspicuous, but by no means negligible role. P. Deussen, certainly one of the most dedicated Western students of Śaṅkara and exemplifying an approach which is both scholarly and sympathetic, has paid special attention to this question; and he emphasizes the extent to which autonomous philosophical reflection actually occurs in Śaṅkara's thought and argumentation, in spite of the programmatic relegation of reasoning to a subordinate, merely auxiliary

function: "Of the possibility here suggested, of bringing in reflection as an aid, our author makes a far more extensive use than might appear from these expressions. Since this side of Śaṅkara's work has for us the chief interest, we will, as far as possible, pass over his endless quotations from the Veda, but, on the other hand, bend our whole attention to the philosophic reflection."[9] Of course, Deussen was writing at a time when most European historians of philosophy disregarded or denounced Indian thought, just as Oriental thought in general, as not being truly philosophical and as amounting to myths, dogmas and mere exegesis without autonomy of reason.[10] More recent authors, to whom the existence of genuine philosophy in the Indian tradition is no longer a matter of debate, still tend to dismiss the exegetical dimension of Śaṅkara's thought as philosophically irrelevant: "The exegetical dimension of Vedānta is of great interest to students of linguistics and Indian cultural history (and naturally Indian scholars themselves), but it is of very little interest to Western students of philosophy."[11]

Although from Japan, H. Nakamura, one of the leading Vedānta scholars of our time, echoes the traditional attitudes of Western thought and scholarship when he sees an unreconciled "conflict between traditionalism and rationalism" in Śaṅkara's thought; accordingly, he finds Śaṅkara's "philosophical standpoint" lacking in "thoroughness (or consistency)."[12] In this view, Śaṅkara appears as a philosopher in spite of himself, a serious and creative thinker insofar as his own reason and originality are able to stand up against his exegetic and traditionalistic preconceptions. S. Mayeda, H. Nakamura's successor and himself one of the most dedicated Śaṅkara specialists, states: "However, Śaṅkara is endowed with too much creativity and reasoning power to remain a simple traditionalist."[13]

2. To what extent does the problem of "reason" and "revelation," "rationalism" and "traditionalism" really apply to Śaṅkara himself and to the classical Indian tradition? To what extent have European problems and perspectives, specifically of the 19th century, been projected and superimposed upon Śaṅkara and the Indian situation? The manner in which it was understood by the 19th century Western historians of philosophy is certainly not the only way of understanding the nature of philosophical reflection and the relationship and tension between "reason" and "revelation." There is nothing like the classical Greek or Cartesian self-proclamation of human reason in the Indian tradition. The separation and confrontation of "reason" and "revelation," autonomous thought and sacred tradition is often rather evasive and ambiguous and generally

less radical and conspicuous than in the European tradition. The Indian tradition and Advaita Vedānta in particular have developed their own ways of contrasting, interrelating or reconciling these two dimensions of human thought and orientation, and we have to be ready to question and to readjust our Western conceptual patterns while using them as tools of interpretation.[14]

The following Sanskrit terms, used by Śaṅkara himself as well as by other Indian thinkers, relate to the problems of "reason" and "revelation": On the one side, i.e., on the side of "reason," we have *yukti*, *tarka*, *upapatti*, *puruṣabuddhi*, but also *anumāna* ("inference") and other terms referring to "worldly" methods of knowledge.[15] On the other side, we find, in addition to *veda* and *śruti*, such terms as *āgama*, *śāstra*, *upadeśa*, *śabda*, *vākya*, which have the connotation of authoritative "testimony" and "instruction," of something to be listened to, received and respected.

On the side of "reason," *yukti* and *tarka* are the most conspicuous and significant terms. Śaṅkara does not formally define these terms, nor does he use them in a strictly technical sense. He alludes to, but does not commit himself to, the technical meanings which the terms, in particular *tarka*, may have in other systems. In Nyāya, *tarka*, if used in a technical sense,[16] is not a "means of knowledge" (*pramāṇa*) in the full sense, but rather an auxiliary method of hypothetical or circumstantial reasoning which is supposed to contribute to the elimination of doubt and to bring about some kind of conditional certainty. The definition given in *Nyāyasūtra* I, 1, 40 (*avijñātatattve 'rthe kāraṇopapattitas tattvajñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ*) has been open to a variety of interpretations which often emphasize the negative, reductive functions of *tarka*, consisting in the elimination of false views rather than the establishment of truth.[17] Although Śaṅkara must have been familiar with the Nyāya definition of *tarka*,[18] other less technical uses were probably more significant to him. The word is already used, indicating various degrees of human "independence" or even of opposition to the sacred texts, in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and other ancient texts.[19] More specifically, Bhartṛhari's usage of *tarka* (including the compounds *śuṣkatarka* and *puruṣatarka*) seems to have had its impact upon Śaṅkara.[20]

Yukti etc. are often used as synonyms of *tarka*, but less frequently with a pejorative connotation. *Yukti*, *nyāya*, etc. may express, in a general sense, the claim of sound argumentation, of intelligibility and concordance with established rules and criteria, as opposed to blind "faith" (*śraddhā*) and uncritical traditionalism. In a famous,

frequently quoted or adapted verse, Kumārila claims that he is "without faith" (*aśraddadhāna*) and demands sound argumentation (*yukti*[21]). In another verse, Śaṅkara's Jaina contemporary Haribhadra says that he is not biased in favor of his own or against other traditions, and that one should follow the teacher whose teaching is "reasonable" (*yuktimat*[22]). Yet, *yukti* is also seen as potentially destructive, isolating human thought in itself and its own speculations.

One very significant field of application of *yukti* and *upapatti* and the corresponding verb forms (*yujyate, upapadyate*) is primarily negative and dialectical, i.e., related to refutations and reductio ad absurdum; this is best exemplified by the *Madhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna, which has had an undeniable impact upon the methodology of Advaita Vedānta.[23]

Śaṅkara is obviously aware of the different connotations and more or less negativistic implications of *tarka*, *yukti*, etc. But N.K. Devaraja's suggestion that there is one meaning of *tarka* in which it is rejected by Śaṅkara and another one in which it is accepted as a fully authoritative source of knowledge[24] is not very helpful and misses the basic issue: even if *tarka* amounts to "valid inference," it is still on the side of merely worldly "human cognition" (*puruṣabuddhi*[25]), and it cannot claim any authority which would be independent from or equal to that of the Veda.[26]

If there is a wide variety of implications, ambiguity and complexity on the side of "reason," the same can certainly be said about the other side, i.e., "revelation" or the Veda. It need not be emphasized that the Veda is not a well-defined body of clearly recognizable teachings. Śaṅkara's own thinking about the Veda is preceded by many centuries of Vedic exegesis, of debates over its extent and content, of epistemological and linguistic controversies concerning its status, structure and authority.[27] The Veda is not just a set of traditionally received and accepted texts or doctrines, but itself the mirror, if not projection of highly complex and varying philosophical aspirations; and the subordination of reason to the Veda, as found in Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, is not just a matter of habit or custom, but also of intense reflection and argumentation.

Our following presentation will show in detail how Śaṅkara sees the Veda - as a complex, differentiated structure of discourse, speaking at different levels and with different voices. The Veda not only teaches or enunciates the supreme and liberating truth concerning *ātman* and *brahman*; it also paraphrases itself, appeals to the

capabilities of those who rely on it, relates itself to the world of appearance from which liberation is sought. It is not only the source of those supreme teachings themselves, but also of the human possibilities of understanding and clarifying them, i.e., of legitimately reasoning and arguing about them. It speaks not only the language of authoritative testimony and instruction, but also of explication, persuasion and reasoning.[28] This is crucial for our topic, and it seems to be crucial for Śaṅkara's own self-understanding. Yet, it has rarely been taken seriously in the discussions about Śaṅkara's approach to "reason" and "revelation"; and in general, few serious and philologically conscientious attempts have been made to explore and to clarify this theme in the horizon of Śaṅkara's self-understanding.

3. It is now widely recognized that the study of Śaṅkara received a new impetus and direction from the investigations of P. Hacker, which provide examples of thoroughly philological, yet philosophically focused and committed research.[29] In 1979, the year of Hacker's death, three works were published which all reflect and acknowledge the influence of Hacker's works and which have also, directly or indirectly and more or less explicitly, a bearing on our theme of "reason" and "revelation":

1. A Thousand Teachings. The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara. Translated with introduction and notes by S. Mayeda. Tokyo 1979.
2. H. Brückner, Zum Beweisverfahren Śaṃkaras. Eine Untersuchung der Form und Funktion von dṛṣṭāntas im Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya und im Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya des Śaṃkara Bhagavatpāda. Berlin 1979 (Diss. Marburg).
3. T. Vetter, Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śaṅkaras. Wien 1979.

Although it does not thematically focus on the problems of "reason" and "revelation," T. Vetter's book is clearly the most pertinent of these three works published in 1979. It contains numerous stimulating observations and suggestions concerning the uses of *yukti* and *tarka* and their relation to the testimony of the Veda, and it will be extensively referred to and discussed in our following presentation.[30] S. Mayeda's translation of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* follows his exemplary critical edition of this text which is perhaps the only authentic non-commentarial work among the numerous writings attributed to Śaṅkara. Its direct thematic bearing on our topic may be rather limited; however, Mayeda's interpretation of Śaṅkara's use of *anvayavyatireka*, "positive and negative concomitance," will

have to be discussed later.[31]

The title of H. Brückner's dissertation seems to refer to an explicit thematic treatment of our topic. However, it turns out that Brückner disregards almost completely the complex and problematic implications and ramifications which her notion of "Beweisverfahren" ("method of proof") has in the context of Śaṅkara's thought. And apart from being a useful collection of textual passages, her study is challenging by virtue of its consistent failure to address the whole issue of "reason" and "Vedic authority" or "revelation."

As the subtitle of her dissertation indicates, H. Brückner wants to investigate Śaṅkara's use of "examples" in two of his major Upaniṣad commentaries. She insists that in Śaṅkara's writings the "examples" are part of a procedure of "proof" or "demonstration" in the full and strict sense, in accordance with the role which the *dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa* plays in the Nyāya theory of inference (*anumāna*); and she emphasizes the central importance of this "demonstrative function" ("Beweisfunktion") against all connotations of mere "illustration" or "persuasion," as well as against the conclusions presented in a dissertation by R. Brooks.[32] According to Brückner, Śaṅkara actually describes his own procedure when he says that in the Upaniṣads unity or identity is first presented as a mere thesis and then again as a conclusion which has been established by means of examples and reasons, i.e., that a basically "syllogistic" or inferential scheme is applied.[33] The implication is that Śaṅkara himself tries to prove or validate what he finds in the sacred texts as an authoritative, yet unproven thesis (*pratijñā*) and that he tries to subject the statement of *śruti* to the "categories of scientific logic".[34] The question what such a "procedure of proof" would imply in Śaṅkara's own context of thought, how it would relate to his understanding of the Veda and how, if at all, it might be reconciled with his numerous statements about the inadequacy of *anumāna* and of all worldly reasoning is never asked in Brückner's study.[35]

If this were actually *his* procedure, how could he, without compromising himself, criticize or attack the "reasoners" (*tārkika*, *haituka*)? It is hard to imagine that he should not have noticed an inconsistency of this kind.[36] Would there be any basic difference between the procedure described by Brückner and what Śaṅkara finds unacceptable in the methods of the "reasoners"? Of course, Brückner notes that Śaṅkara's "Beweisverfahren" is supposed to acknowledge Vedic "premises" and to proceed in such a way that it does not question or contradict the basic truths of the sacred tradi-

tion.[37] But does Śaṅkara criticize those "reasoners" only who, like the Buddhists, reject the authority of the Veda and who use reason and inference regardless of or even against the Vedic teachings? He is no less concerned about those who claim to use inference etc. as *independent* means of demonstrating or validating such Vedic truths as the existence of the self etc. and who credit these worldly instruments of cognition with an epistemic authority which belongs to the Veda alone.[38] Not only the anti-Vedic application of human reason, but any attempt to use it as an independent, potentially competing way to supreme truth has to be rejected.

Śaṅkara's statements about "demonstrative" procedures *in* the Upaniṣads have to be taken literally and not as vicarious statements about his own claims and methods. To find the language of "demonstration" and "proof" *in* the sacred texts is essentially different from crediting one's own human reasoning with the ability to supply such proofs or demonstrations.

4. As noticed earlier, T. Vetter's *Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śankaras* is highly relevant for our discussion, without thematically focusing on "reason" and "revelation". In this book[39] Vetter elaborates ideas and observations first presented at a symposium in Vienna in 1977.[40] Focusing on the "method of gaining release" ("Methode der Erringung des Heils"), he tries to utilize its varying constellations and formulations as a basis for establishing the chronological order of Śaṅkara's writings. In this attempt, he builds upon the investigations and hypotheses of P. Hacker. He accepts the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* as an early work of Śaṅkara, dating back to a period when he was still affiliated with the tradition of Yoga. Just like Hacker, he sees the commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad* and on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* as the earliest document of Śaṅkara's transition to Advaita Vedānta. Concerning Śaṅkara's other works, in particular the Upadeśasāhasrī, Vetter further differentiates and occasionally modifies Hacker's views. Specifically, his book deals with the following texts or portions of texts:

1. Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa.
2. Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya with Gauḍapādīya-Kārikā-Bhāṣya.[41]
3. Upadeśasāhasrī, Gadyabandha II.
4. Upadeśasāhasrī, Padyabandha XVIII, 90-101; 169-195; 198-204.
5. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya IV, 1, 2 (also I, 1, 1-4).
6. Upadeśasāhasrī, Gadyabandha I.

The guiding theme of Vetter's painstaking textual research is the "method of liberation". But although the relation between reason and Vedic revelation is not the thematic focus, it turns out to be a very important, even crucial issue, accounting for a good deal of what is particularly noteworthy, stimulating and perhaps questionable in Vetter's presentation.[42] As a matter of fact, it is a theme which plays a peculiar and conspicuous role in the text which is the subject-matter of Vetter's longest chapter, i.e., in Śaṅkara's Gauḍapāda commentary, supposedly his earliest Advaita work. Śaṅkara himself sees a scheme of "reason" and "revelation" (or "authoritative tradition") in the structure of Gauḍapāda's text; in his introduction,[43] he characterizes its four chapters as follows: The first chapter, devoted to the clarification of the *om*, is "dominated by authoritative tradition" (*āgamapradhāna*) while serving as an "aid to the understanding of the nature of the self" (*ātmatattvapratipattyupāya*). The second chapter is designed to teach "with reasons" (*hetutas*) the "falsity" or "emptiness" (*vaitathya*) of the world of plurality. The third chapter is supposed to teach, in an "argumentative," "rational" manner (*yuktitas*), the positive nature (*tathātva*, as opposed to *vaitathya*) of non-duality (*advaita*), since otherwise this non-duality, too, might be reduced to "emptiness" in the process of reasoning. The fourth chapter is designed to refute those un-Vedic teachings which are "opposed to the understanding of the true, positive nature" (*tathātvapratipattivipakṣa*) of non-duality, by using their own arguments (*upapatti*) and insofar as their falsity follows from the fact that they are mutually contradictory (*anyonyavirodhitva*).

Śaṅkara refers again to this scheme when he introduces chapters II, III, and IV,[44] stating that both the falsity of plurality and the truth of non-duality are first presented through authoritative tradition alone (*āgamamātra*) or as a "mere thesis" (*pratijñāmātra*) and subsequently supported by "examples," "reasons," "logical reflection" (*dṛṣṭānta, hetu, tarka*), so that they are finally established "by scripture and reason" (*śāstrayuktibhyām*[45]).

It is obvious that these statements, which go far beyond anything said by Gauḍapāda himself,[46] are very significant, insofar as the relationship between reason and revelation is concerned, and they are suggestive also with reference to Śaṅkara's later approach to this matter. However, it may be necessary to differentiate between the statements in this supposedly earliest and perhaps still transitional Advaita work and those in his later writings, which reflect his mature and definitive understanding of the nature and

necessity of Vedic revelation. It should also be noted that Śaṅkara considers neither Gauḍapāda's verses nor the prose of the Māṇḍūkya-"Upaniṣad" as *śruti*.[47] However, subsequent sections of our presentation will show to what extent Śaṅkara's observations on Gauḍapāda correspond to his statements about the didactic structure of *śruti* itself, as we find them in his - supposedly - later works, most conspicuously in his commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad.[48] To conclude this digression from our survey of Vetter's book, we may consider the possibility that what Śaṅkara first noticed about Gauḍapāda was subsequently included in and adapted to his understanding of *śruti* itself.

In general, Vetter says about the relationship between *śruti* and "rational argumentation" in Śaṅkara's works: "Das Gewicht dieser Quellen und ihr mögliches Nacheinander auf dem Erlösungsweg ist aber nicht in allen Texten gleich. Damit verbunden kann die Art des erlösenden Wissens mehr positiv oder mehr negativ sein; wo rationale Argumentation überwiegt, darf man ein mehr abstrakt-negatives Wissen erwarten. Śruti-stellen hingegen können sowohl negative als positive Inhalte übermitteln."[49] More specifically, Vetter deals with the meaning and function of *yukti/tarka* according to Śaṅkara's interpretation of Gauḍapāda's third chapter. He states a "vage Bedeutung des Überlegens, Nachdenkens, Räsonierens und indirekt Beweisens" and suggests: "... *yukti* und *tarka* sind 'Überlegung' der Möglichkeit und (vor allem) Unmöglichkeit einer Sache oder Lehre."[50] In a later passage, he summarizes his observations on the role of reasoning in the *Gauḍapādīya-Kārikā-Bhāṣya*: "Rationales Erwägen kann mittels Schlußfolgerung die Irrealität der Vielheit beweisen (3.32), mittels Überlegung (*yukti/tarka*) erreicht es das Selbst als das, was dem Irrtum der Vielheit zugrunde liegen muß (3.33); Überlegung ist insofern nicht unabhängig von Überlieferung, als sie zeigt, daß die Welt ohne die von der Überlieferung verkündete höchste Entität nicht erscheinen könnte (vgl. auch 4.121)."[51]

The question of "reason" and "revelation," of the sources of supreme, liberating knowledge is again discussed in Vetter's analysis of selected passages of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* and of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Concerning the second prose chapter of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Vetter maintains that it presents liberating knowledge as the result of *yukti*, of (human) thought and observation alone: "Wo kommt der Inhalt der erlösenden Wissens her? - Śruti und Smṛti werden nirgends erwähnt, er wird als das Resultat von Denken und Beobachtung präsentiert."[52] Already P. Hacker characterizes this chapter, which according to Vetter may be Śaṅkara's most significant philosophical endeavor,[53] as "purely argumentative."[54]

Further references to our theme are found in Vetter's discussion of exemplary passages in the longest and most intricate chapter of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, i.e., its verse-chapter XVIII. Concerning liberating knowledge, Vetter finds a cooperation and mutual supplementation of reasoning or deliberation (*yukti*, etc.) and the authority of the "great sayings" such as the *tat tvam asi*. He sees it as the peculiar and in a sense independent accomplishment of *yukti* to lead us to the true meaning of the word "I" (i.e., of the *tvam*, "you," in the *tat tvam asi*) and thus to the metaphysical "core of the individual."[55] The method by which *yukti* is supposed to achieve this goal is the method of "positive and negative concomitance" (*anvayavyatireka*) which Vetter discusses in an extensive, yet somewhat indecisive, note.[56]

While Vetter still sees a certain ambiguity in the relationship between *yukti/tarka* and *śruti/śāstra* in most of the passages under discussion, there is one passage where he finds a definite and precise "division of responsibilities" ("Verteilung der Aufgaben") between these sources of knowledge - Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* IV, 1, 2: *Yukti* alone is credited with making accessible the meaning of the "you" (*tvam*), i.e., the "core of the person" ("Kern der Person"[57]), while *śruti* is said to reveal the meaning of the "that" (*tad*). In Vetter's interpretation, this appears as the implicit goal and conclusion of Śaṅkara's other, less definite, statements on the relation between "reason" and "revelation", although not as his final word in a chronological sense.[58]

5. Vetter finds contradictions in Śaṅkara's works, but at the same time one "common intent". In the area of merely theoretical matters, Śaṅkara is, according to Vetter, not seriously concerned about systematic consistency and the avoidance of contradictions. However, unity and consistency are essential to him when he is dealing with the "attainment of salvation" ("Gewinnung des Heils").[59] If there are inconsistencies in this area, they cannot be relegated to a lack of concern about consistency, but have to be taken as indicating different stages in his development: Insofar as the "more practical instructions" are concerned, Śaṅkara is said to be more serious and conscientious about unity than in the "more theoretical passages."[60] Unfortunately, Vetter never tells us in unambiguous terms what he means by "theory" and "practice" and how these two relate to what he calls "method of attaining liberation" - which, one might assume, has in itself an aspect of theory as well as of practice and cannot simply be equated with the side of "practice."[61] Vetter's index has seven entries under "Theorie und Praxis," but none of

these refers to a clear definition or sufficiently explicit discussion. One implication seems to be that "theory" has to do with exegesis and polemics against other schools.[62] But may exegesis and polemics not relate to "practice" as well as to "theory"?

In his application of the concepts of theory and practice Vetter goes so far as to suggest that Śaṅkara may use the *theory* of Advaita, "non-dualism," as a convenient device for exegesis and polemics, while his actual soteriological path, which is a matter of more serious concern to him, is based upon or implies a dualistic world-view.[63] Vetter's treatment of the relationship between *yukti* and *śruti* is part of his presentation of the practical-soteriological dimension of Śaṅkara's thought, from which he takes his clues for a "construction of Śaṅkara's development"[64] and for his attempted establishment of a relative chronology of his writings.

Vetter admits that in Śaṅkara's works theory and practice "occasionally merge with one another" and, moreover, that this whole distinction is extraneous to Śaṅkara's own thought and would be unacceptable to him.[65] Nevertheless, he takes it for granted as a basic premise of his textual and chronological analysis. When Vetter notes in this context that Śaṅkara, while interpreting an Upaniṣadic passage or polemicizing against the Buddhists, also "guides souls to salvation" ("führt Seelen zum Heil"), he uses expressions with potentially misleading connotations. Śaṅkara may not be a theorizing metaphysician; but even less is he a soteriological practitioner. There is no temporal or eschatological urge to "save souls" in his thought. He teaches what he sees as the ultimate truth - a truth, however, which happens to be the truth of liberation and itself liberating truth. In addition, he explores and teaches what he regards as the conditions of understanding and realizing this truth, which means to understand and to realize it as being beyond all contexts of result-oriented physical or mental activities and techniques.[66] The "theoretical" statements of truth and fact in the Upaniṣads have to be accepted as such; one of the main targets of Śaṅkara's argumentation against the Pūrvamīmāṃsā is its tendency to relegate such statements to subordinate functions in "practical" contexts, i.e., in the context of goal-oriented methods and paths.

On the other hand, if one emphasizes the practical and soteriological orientation in Śaṅkara's thought, it seems hardly appropriate to separate it from the pedagogical dimension[67] which is its indispensable supplement and an essential ingredient of any soteriology which is not just a *theory* of liberation. And according to

Śaṅkara's own explicit statements, it is the "pedagogical" side (of methods of instruction and preparation for liberating knowledge) which leaves room for flexibility and variability, while there can be no compromise or variation as far as the nature of ultimate reality is concerned.[68]

We cannot and need not discuss here in further detail the problems and prospects raised by Vetter's approach. It is important to keep in mind that his construction of Śaṅkara's development remains inevitably hypothetical.[69] We have no factual biographical framework to which we could relate doctrinal variations; the framework itself has to be construed out of such variations. This is further complicated by the fact that Śaṅkara's writings do not simply present us with "doctrines," but also with complex and ambiguous patterns of relating one basic teaching or intent to a great variety of approaches and expressions. Their commentarial, dialectical and pedagogical dimensions imply such a wide range of immanent, legitimate flexibility and variability that it requires extreme caution to identify "inconsistencies" and "contradictions" which would be illegitimate in Śaṅkara's own horizon and which would provide reliable, unambiguous clues for actual *changes* in his thought and for a development from earlier to later positions.

Without questioning the merits of Vetter's meticulous textual analysis, we shall proceed on the basis of the assumption that there can be a meaningful and conscientious study of the texts which pays much less attention to differences and inconsistencies.[70] Instead, it may be oriented towards understanding that horizon or context of thought within which such - real or alleged - inconsistencies are perhaps less relevant than they appear to the modern philological interpreter, for instance insofar as the relationship between "reason" and "revelation" (*yukti* and *śruti*) is concerned. Our discussion of this issue on the basis of those texts which both Hacker and Vetter accept as genuine works by Śaṅkara will find much less significant variety and inconsistency than Vetter's *Studien*.[71] However, certain specific problems are posed by Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad* and on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās*, which seem to require a developmental explanation. It can hardly be denied that Hacker's interpretation of this text as Śaṅkara's first Advaita work, marking the transition from Yoga to Advaita Vedānta and to a more Upaniṣadic, scriptural orientation,[72] is attractive and intriguing also in the context of our presentation, although it should certainly not be taken for granted. In general, it is not our intention to confirm or to refute this or other chronological hypotheses; at any rate,

the exemplary value of Hacker's and Vetter's investigations, the challenge and stimulus they will provide for our further discussions, does not depend on the correctness of their chronological assumptions.

6. There is no systematic and comprehensive discussion of the relationship between reason and revelation in Śaṅkara's works; but there are many explicit statements, as well as casual remarks and symptomatic phrases. These statements can be easily divided into several different and apparently divergent groups.

Quite frequently, Śaṅkara emphasizes the supreme or exclusive authority of the Vedic "revelation" in matters of metaphysical and soteriological relevance, i.e., concerning the ultimate, liberating truth of *ātman/brahman*. Reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is to be rejected. Accordingly, Śaṅkara denounces the idea of an independent, extra-Vedic authority and usage of human reasoning and of the worldly means of cognition, and he criticizes and attacks the "reasoners" (*tārkika*[73]). Human reasoning as such is said to be groundless, restless and helpless without the light and guidance of the Veda.[74]

On the other hand, there are numerous more favourable references, which indicate a concordance and cooperation of reason and Vedic revelation. "Reason" and "scripture" appear side by side, often in *dvandva* compounds, such as *śāstrayukti, śāstranyāya, śāstrānumāna, śāstratarka, āgamopapatti, śrutiyukti, tarkāgama, śrutyupapatti*[75] or, with the addition of *smṛti*, in *śrutismṛtinyāya*, etc.[76] In Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad*, a statement against the "science of reasoning" (*tarkaśāstra*) in Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika is immediately followed by a remark which joins *śruti* and *upapatti* in a *dvandva* compound and implies their agreement.[77]

However, the exact meaning of the concordance of reason and revelation expressed in such compounds or juxtapositions may be ambiguous and is certainly not identical in all cases. It may refer to a relationship in which the function of reason is primarily exegetic, in accordance with the programmatic formula *vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā*.[78] But these compounds may also suggest mutual supplementation or parallelism rather than strict subordination of reason. In many cases, reason and Vedic revelation are joined together against a common target of refutation and in a common negative function, e.g., in such expressions as *śāstrayuktivirodha* or *śāstrayuktivivarjita*.[79] Insofar as the negative or reductive function

of reason is concerned, Śaṅkara acknowledges that it may be "autonomous" (*svatantra*) and without the support of scriptural statements (*vākyanirapekṣa*[80]).

There are other types of references to the relationship between reason and revelation which may be less conspicuous, but which are nevertheless essential for understanding this issue in the context of Śaṅkara's own thought. Among these, the statements relating to the manner in which the Veda itself employs, exemplifies and "originates" valid and legitimate reasoning are most central and significant.[81]

But first of all, we have to return to those statements which criticize and denounce the independent, unrestrained use of reason and argumentation and the attempts to gain an extra-Vedic, worldly access to that truth and reality which only the Veda can reveal. Unguided reasoning is "dried up" (*śuṣka*), i.e., fruitless and groundless.[82] Ultimate truth is not accessible to "mere *tarka*" or "mere reasonings."[83] Without the authority of the sacred tradition, the *tārkika* entangles himself in the figments of his own mind: *tārkiko hy anāgamajñaḥ svabuddhiparikalpitaṃ yatkiṃcid eva kalpayati.*[84] Mere argumentation inevitably leads to conflicting statements and viewpoints, to confusion and frustration, specifically insofar as the crucial theme of the self (*ātman*) is concerned.[85] Reasoning, worldly inference alone, is never definitive, has no final basis and conclusion (*niṣṭhā*[86]). It is the very essence of human reason to refute itself, to supersede itself, to be unstable and unfounded: *puruṣotprekṣāmātranibandhanās tarkā apratiṣṭhitā bhavanti... kaiścid abhiyuktair yatnena-utprekṣitās tarkā abhiyuktatarair anyair ābhāsyamānā dṛśyante. tair apy utprekṣitāḥ santas tato anyair ābhāsyanta iti na pratiṣṭhitatvaṃ tarkāṇāṃ śakyam āśrayituṃ, puruṣamativairūpyāt.*[87] In this same section of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, Śaṅkara refers to and dismisses a *pūrvapakṣa* view according to which the very insight into the "instability" (*apratiṣṭhitatva*) of reason should be seen as an achievement of reason and this "instability" itself should be recognized as a positive distinction (*alaṃkāra*) of reason, insofar as it implies openness for correction and improvement.[88]

Already Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtra* II, 1, 11, on which Śaṅkara comments, contains the word *tarkāpratiṣṭhāna*. Moreover, Śaṅkara's statements seem to be influenced by formulation in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, e.g., I, 34: *yatnena-anumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathā-eva-upapadyate.*

Bhartṛhari also uses the words *śuṣkatarka* and *puruṣatarka*.[89] *Śuṣkatarka* becomes generally familiar as a pejorative expression.[90]

More specifically, Śaṅkara criticizes various philosophical traditions because they give too much weight and authority to human reasoning and experience. In this context, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika are frequently referred to;[91] but also Pūrvamīmāṃsā is seen as a school which misuses reason in its attempts to establish the existence and nature of the soul in an inferential manner.[92]

In Śaṅkara's thought, the problem of the relation between revelation and reason is obviously connected with his understanding of the relationship between *śruti* and *smṛti* and with the postulate that the authority of *smṛti* is subordinate to that of *śruti*; this is specifically significant in Śaṅkara's extensive criticism of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.[93] Traditionally, the Sāṃkhya *smṛti* has been associated with reasoning and inference, to the extent that already Bādarāyaṇa (as interpreted by Śaṅkara) may refer to the Sāṃkhya *prakṛti* or *pradhāna*, i.e., its ultimate "nature" or "matter," by such terms as *ānumānika* or *anumāna*.[94] The variety of extra-Vedic philosophical traditions (*smṛti*, etc.) corresponds to the inevitably divergent attempts of unguided human reasoning to find its own ways and goals. Traditional teachings which are based upon mere reasoning have to be rejected; they are acceptable only insofar as they serve the goal of understanding the truth revealed by the Veda: *etena sarvāṇi tarkasmaraṇāny upakurvanti-iti ced. upakurvantu nama, tattvajñānaṃ tu vedāntavākyebhya eva bhavati.*[95] Like any other *smṛti*, traditions of reasoning, such as Sāṃkhya, and reasoning itself are subject to the authority of the Veda.[96]

Only the Veda has unconditional validity and authority; the *smṛtis* depend on it, just as, in the realm of worldly cognition, inference (*anumāna*) depends on perception (*pratyakṣa*[97]). Already the *Brahmasūtra* text itself uses the word *pratyakṣa* in the sense of *śruti* and *anumāna* in the sense of *smṛti*.[98]

7. In his treatment of the unconditional authority of the Veda, Śaṅkara is obviously indebted to the *vedamūlatva* principle, as used and systematized in Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Yet, he is in fundamental disagreement with the Pūrvamīmāṃsā understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation and with its assumption that the Veda teaches primarily what has to be done, i.e., that its authority is in the area of ritualistic duty (*dharma*) and expressed in the form of injunctions (*vidhi*). He criticizes the Mīmāṃsakas for giving too

much weight and authority to reason and inference insofar as such "factual" matters as the existence and nature of the soul (*ātman*) are concerned: In this respect, they appear side by side with the "reasoners" (*tārkika*) of the Sāṃkhya or Vaiśeṣika schools.[99] Obviously, their misuses of reason are seen as a reflection of the fact that they do not properly understand the nature and domain of the Vedic revelation and its relation to the worldly sources of knowledge.

The Mīmāṃsakas, just as the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, claim to be able to demonstrate the existence of a non-corporeal permanent self by using inference or other worldly means of knowledge. But their claims are unfounded. Such worldly indicators (*laukikaliṅga*) as the ego-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*), which they regard as their own intellectual accomplishments, are valid inferential reasons for the existence of the *ātman* only insofar as they have been put forth as such by the Veda itself: *āgamena tv ātmāstitve 'vagate vedapradarśitalaukikaliṅgaviśeṣaiś ca tadanusāriṇo mīmāṃsakās tārkikāś ca-ahampratyayaliṅgāni ca vaidikāny eva svamatiprabhavāni-iti kalpayanto vadanti pratyakṣaś ca-anumeyaś ca-ātmā-iti.*[100] Moreover, the Mīmāṃsakas are indebted to what Bādarāyaṇa has extracted from the Upaniṣads; Jaimini's Mīmāṃsāsūtras do not contain a proof for the existence of the self; what the commentator Śabara introduces is, in Śaṅkara's view, borrowed from Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtras.[101] Since the Mīmāṃsakas do not recognize the true, i.e., Vedic source of their argumentation about the *ātman* and do not follow its lead, they fail to recognize the true nature of the self and even argue against it.[102]

As a root of this misuse of reason, Śaṅkara sees the Mīmāṃsā interpretation of the Veda as a revelation of *dharma* only. They understand the central message of the Veda as a message of injunctions or commandments (*vidhi, codanā*) concerning what has to be done or accomplished (*kārya, sādhya*), while the non-injunctive statements found in the Veda, specifically the so-called *arthavādas*, have a secondary, less directly authoritative status. The *arthavādas* are supplementary, auxiliary, factual or quasi-factual statements, designed to motivate man for those actions which are enjoined by the *vidhis*, to explicate and exemplify their meaning and importance and to provide reasons and incentives which are intelligible and attractive to the human mind. The concept of *arthavāda*, which has its roots in the ritual Sūtras,[103] adds a pedagogical, didactic dimension to the impersonal, superhuman authority of the Veda. Here, the Veda not only enjoins or commands, but it also appeals to its students to follow and execute its commands. Being a "pedagogical", motivating device, an *arthavāda* does not commit the reader or listener to its

literal truth, and it gives him the freedom of indirect, metaphorical interpretation. Concerning the details of how the *arthavāda* sections of the Veda should be treated, there is considerable debate and disagreement among the schools of Pūrvamīmāṃsā; moreover, there are various sub-divisions of the *arthavādas* (*guṇavāda*, etc.). A further discussion of these problems is beyond the scope of this presentation.

However, a question which is of immediate interest as far as Śaṅkara's relation to Pūrvamīmāṃsā and his understanding of the role of reason are concerned, is the place of the Upaniṣads in the framework of *vidhi* and *arthavāda*. Quite frequently, the Upaniṣads are more or less explicitly associated with the *arthavādas*. Before the time of the classical Mīmāṃsā philosophers, this is already done by Bhartṛhari.[104] Kumārila mentions the Upaniṣads side by side with the *arthavādas*, and he tends to see the Upaniṣadic teachings about the self as being auxiliary to *dharma*, i.e., to the performance of ritual actions, insofar as the notion of a non-corporeal permanent self is a condition and incentive for performing such acts which are supposed to bear fruit in another life or world.[105] Maṇḍanamiśra, a Mīmāṃsaka as well as a Vedāntin and possibly Śaṅkara's contemporary, uses the phrase *mantrārthavādāḥ sopaniṣatkāḥ* in his Mīmāṃsā work *Vidhiviveka* as well as in his later Vedānta work *Brahmasiddhi*.[106] On the other hand, and by no means in a mutually exclusive manner, the Mīmāṃsakas interpret the central message of the Upaniṣads in terms of "meditative injunctions" (*upāsanāvidhi*) relating to mental acts of concentration or worship which are internalized quasi-rituals; or they present the exploration and understanding of the *ātman* itself as a duty which has to be performed.[107]

Śaṅkara himself uses the term *arthavāda* as a familiar device of exegesis.[108] But he insists that even an *arthavāda* can be the vehicle of genuine, fully authoritative revelation, provided that it is a *vidyamānārthavāda*, i.e., neither a mere repetition (*anuvāda*) of what is already known otherwise, nor a *guṇavāda*, which has to be explained metaphorically, since its literal interpretation would contradict obvious facts.[109] In general, however, Śaṅkara leaves no doubt that in his view the concept of *arthavāda* cannot do justice to the Upaniṣads, this "culmination of the Veda" (*vedānta*). On the other hand, the central statements of the Upaniṣads cannot be interpreted in terms of cognitive or meditational injunctions; the truth concerning *ātman/brahman* is nothing "to be done" or "enacted" (*kārya*[110]). Just insofar as they teach what truly *is* and has always been, the Upaniṣads are revelation in the fullest possible sense.

But although Śaṅkara does not agree with the Mīmāṃsā, its way of seeing the Veda as a complex, highly differentiated structure of discourse provides the indispensable background for understanding his own approach to the Veda. The notion of *arthavāda* is an important model for his own interpretation of the Veda as paraphrasing itself by means of examples and argumentation (*yukti*), as explicating its central statements for the sake of human comprehension.[111] His disciple Padmapāda occasionally uses the term *yuktyarthavā*da.[112]

8. Insofar as they teach the truth of non-dualism, the Upaniṣads reveal what cannot be known otherwise: The worldly means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) do not apply to the absolute unity of *brahman*. They are inherently related to the realm of "name and form", i.e., to particularity and plurality; they function properly in the context of *vyavahāra*, accompanying and guiding such ordinary worldly activities as eating and drinking.[113] But in the case of *brahman*, there is no "mark" (*liṅga*) which would make it accessible to inference. Absolute unity escapes the worldly means of knowledge, since it is incompatible with their underlying conditions; these means alone can neither prove nor disprove it.[114]

Does this imply that there is no direct confrontation between *śruti* and the worldly means of knowledge (*pratyakṣa, anumāna*, etc.)? They do not function in the same horizon or at the same level; and since *śruti* deals with what can never be the object of perception, etc., it seems that there can be no mutual contradiction. Indeed, Śaṅkara states that the Veda does not try to tell us that fire is cold and makes things wet.[115] It does not try to establish specific worldly facts *against* the data of our worldly experience. Yet, there is no such consistent "separation of domains" as we find it in Pūrvamīmāṃsā. In fact, Śaṅkara argues explicitly against the attempt to restrict the authority of *śruti* to its own specific domain (*svaviṣaya*) and to leave what is not within this domain to the claims of human reasoning; it is unacceptable for him to say: *yady api śrutiḥ pramāṇaṃ svaviṣaye bhavati, tathā-api pramāṇāntareṇa viṣayāpahare 'nyaparā bhavitum arhati.*[116] There is no self-sufficient "domain" in which human cognition could have a sovereignty and authority equal to the unconditional authority of the Veda; and the Veda does not simply leave this world to the "worldly" means of knowledge. On the other hand, the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas use the principle of the separation of domains against Advaita Vedānta. They claim that it would be factually and psychologically impossible for the Veda to remove that conviction concerning the reality and plurality of worldly existence which is

upheld by the more immediate testimony of sense perception, and that the human mind has the necessary freedom of responding to verbal revelation only in the area of *dharma*, which is inaccessible to worldly ascertainment.[117]

In Śaṅkara's view, the Vedic revelation negates the ultimate truth of plurality, the framework in which it appears and in which its worldly ascertainment is possible.[118] But this does not mean that it concerns only the ultimate metaphysical status of the world of plurality, without affecting its own internal conditions. Insofar as it speaks about transcendence, the Veda also speaks about what has to be transcended. There are no strict borderlines. The Veda "reveals" reality as well as appearance in its soteriologically relevant details; and it precludes a systematic and unrestricted usage and development of the worldly means of knowledge even *within* this world.

Śaṅkara sees this world as a constellation of "place, time and causality" (*deśakālanimitta*) or a network of "ends and means" (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*[119]). But this does not mean that it is a structure of empirically verifiable or falsifiable regularities. It is not at all a Kantian "context of experience", a realm of empirical inquiry and of progressive discovery of order and regularity. Instead, it is the realm of *saṃsāra*, of transmigration and of retributive causality, and it is governed by factors (such as *adhikāra, adṛṣṭa/apūrva*, etc.) which are themselves not amenable to worldly ascertainment and explanation. "Śaṅkara emphasizes that only *śruti* is a really authoritative source for our knowledge and understanding of the processes of karma and transmigration: attempts to explain this matter in terms of assumptions produced by human thought alone (*puruṣamatiprabhavāḥ kalpanāḥ*) are inevitably futile; the various theories and conceptualizations presented by the Sāṃkhya or the Vaiśeṣika, by the Buddhists or the Jainas, are contradicted by one another as well as by *śruti*."[120]

Śaṅkara agrees with the Mīmāṃsā that the Veda is the authoritative source of the knowledge of *dharma*; and he does not question the validity of the Vedic injunctions which constitute the center of *dharma*. But he does not understand this *dharma* in terms of a nonfactual "ought." The "work portion" of the Veda "enjoins" only insofar as it *describes* the network of *sādhyasādhanabhāva*; it reveals the relationship between acts and results, means and ends, and it leaves it to man to pursue such ends or not.[121] In this sense, Śaṅkara may be called the most radical advocate of the *iṣṭasādhanatā* interpretation of the Vedic injunctions.

The "certainty" of *anumāna* is derived from the regularity of natural phenomena; but the world is such that the possibility of exceptions or irregularities can never be excluded. Because of the "variety of place, time and occasion" (*deśakālanimittavaicitrya*), the same causal factor may produce completely different effects - in a manner which cannot be ascertained "by mere reasoning" (*kevalena tarkeṇa*[122]). Even the most familiar case of *anumāna*, the inference of fire from smoke, may be used to illustrate the unreliability of inference - *udvāpite 'py agnau gopālaghuṭikādidhāritasya dhūmasya dṛśyamānatvāt.*[123]

"Examples" (*dṛṣṭānta*, *udāharaṇa*) cannot exclude the possibility of such exceptions, and they cannot establish the "*invariable* concomitance" of such phenomena as fire and smoke, and they would certainly not be sufficient to establish *brahman* as the cause of the world, i.e., to justify a "cosmological proof".[124] There are no worldly "examples" which could *add* such proof or validation to the Upaniṣadic teachings about *brahman*.

It is a fundamental advantage which the Vedāntic teacher has over his opponent, the "logician," that he does *not* have to rely on "examples" and on the patterns of worldly experience, and that his teachings do *not* always have to be "in accordance with experience" (*yathādṛṣṭam*[125]). In various commentarial contexts, references to such "examples" or data of experience are dismissed as irrelevant, and the need to adjust the teachings of Vedānta to worldly experience is denied.[126] Of course, Śaṅkara himself uses many "examples," and he leaves no doubt that in his view they work at least as well for the teaching of Vedānta as they work for any other teaching; but unlike other teachings Vedānta is not *built upon* worldly "examples".[127]

9. Reason (*yukti*, *tarka*) as such cannot produce parallel, equally authoritative demonstrations of the truth of the Upaniṣadic "great sayings." It has its legitimate role under the guidance of and in cooperation with *śruti*. But this in itself has far-reaching implications and ramifications.

First of all, it requires according to Śaṅkara, that *śruti* should be interpreted *consistently*, i.e., as teaching one identical truth and as not contradicting itself: There cannot be different and conflicting doctrines concerning the one identical *brahman*. Variety may be found in the methods of preparation, the meditational or devotional approaches to what has not yet been properly understood as ultimate reality; but there can only be one true "science" concerning this

reality: *na ca-ekarūpe brahmaṇy anekarūpaṇi vijñānāni sambhavanti. na hy anyathā-artho 'nyathā jñānam ity abhrāntaṃ bhavati. yadi punar ekasmin brahmaṇi bahūni vijñānāni vedāntāntareṣu pratipipādayiṣitāni, teṣām ekam abhrāntaṃ, bhrāntāni-itarāṇi-ity anāśvāsaprasaṅgo vedānteṣu.*[128] Ultimately and ideally, the one Vedic message concerning the one identical *brahman* is conveyed by one single sentence (of the type of the *tat tvam asi*): *jñānaikārthaparatvāt taṃ vākyam ekaṃ tato viduḥ* ...[129]

The interpretation of *śruti* has to be committed to the postulate that it teaches the same truth about the same subject-matter, i.e., *ātman/brahman*, which may be referred to by a great variety of names. Within *śruti*, i.e., the Vedic-Upaniṣadic texts themselves, full reconciliation or concordance (*samanvaya*) has to be the goal of exegesis; in order to achieve this goal, Śaṅkara applies various exegetic devices, which we do not have to discuss in detail. His basic perspective is the distinction of "levels" of truth or rather of discourse, adjusted to different levels of understanding.[130] Concerning the relation of *śruti* to *smṛti, purāṇa*, etc., it is not seen in terms of strict *samanvaya*, but according to the *vedamūlatva* principle which implies a subordination of all other sources to the authority of the Veda and their partial and conditional recognition only. While Śaṅkara is indebted to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā view of the relation between *śruti* and *smṛti*, his view of the relation between *śruti* and reason is, as we have seen, quite different.[131]

This difference follows from the fundamental difference between the subject-matters of Pūrva- and Uttaramīmāṃsā, i.e., *dharma* and *ātman/brahman*. In the case of *dharma*, reason or secular human knowledge has a strictly and exclusively exegetic role in that it can only be applied to the sacred *texts* dealing with *dharma*, never to *dharma* as such and per se. In the case of *brahman*, on the other hand, there is an applicability, though governed and controlled by the sacred texts dealing with this subject-matter, not just to these texts, but also to their subject-matter itself and as such. After emphasizing that the understanding of *brahman* (*brahmāvagati*) is only achieved through thinking about and clarifying the meaning of the sacred words (*vākyārthavicāraṇādhyavasāna*), *not* by using such worldly means of knowledge as *anumāna*, Śaṅkara states: *satsu tu vedāntavākyeṣu jagato janmādikāraṇavādiṣu tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāya-anumānam api vedānta-vākyāvirodhi pramāṇaṃ bhavan na nivāryate, śrutyā-eva ca sahāyatvena tarkasya-abhyupetatvāt.* Referring to Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad II, 4, 5 and Chāndogya-Upaniṣad VI, 14, 2, he adds: *iti ca puruṣabuddhisāhāyyam ātmano darśayati. na dharmajijñāsāyām iva śrutyādaya eva pramāṇaṃ brahma-jijñāsāyāṃ, kiṃtu śrutyādayo 'nubhavādayaś ca yathāsambhavam iha pra-*

māṇam anubhavāvasānatvād bhūtavastuviṣayatvāc ca brahmajñānasya.[132]

This important programmatic statement has to be supplemented by cautionary remarks in later sections of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. In the commentary on Sūtra II, 1, 4, a *pūrvapakṣin* is presented who tries to utilize what has been said in the commentary on I, 1, 2 as an argument for the independent authority of reason. Śaṅkara responds to this in his commentary on II, 1, 6, trying to make sure that his own previous statements are not used for propagating independent reasoning under the pretext of scriptural exegesis: *naanena miṣeṇa śuṣkatarkasya-ātmalābhaḥ sambhavati. śrutyanugṛhīta eva hy atra tarko 'nubhavāṅgatvena-āśrīyate.*[133] This corresponds to the formula used in the concluding statement on Sūtra I, 1, 1: *vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā.*

The statement on Brahmasūtra I, 1, 2 is not only an important indication of how Śaṅkara's references to an alliance between reason and Vedic revelation should be understood. It may also provide a key for interpreting his other, at times apparently conflicting, statements in this matter. The Veda itself indicates its alliance with worldly, human insight - legitimizing, guiding, limiting its use: This is a framework and context which includes and covers most of Śaṅkara's different and allegedly divergent statements, a framework which accounts for a certain flexibility and variability in approaching the theme of reason and revelation and which provides the background for a basically coherent and consistent interpretation. On the one hand, Śaṅkara's way of finding reason and argumentation in the Upaniṣads themselves, in particular in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, may be seen as an exemplification of his programmatic statements on Brahmasūtra I, 1, 2; on the other hand, what he does in such argumentative texts as the second prose chapter of the Upadeśasāhasrī may be seen as his own utilization of those possibilities of reasoning and argumentation which in his view have been authorized by the Veda itself. What the chronological relationship of these "programmatic" statements and actual procedures may be is a question which we do not have to discuss in our present context.[134]

10. The Veda not only authorizes a certain limited use of human reasoning, it also employs argumentation and demonstration among its own modes of expression and communication. It uses the language of reason, of "logical" demonstration as a means of explication and persuasion, thus creating the basic patterns of and the openness for legitimate human reasoning. In this manner, reasoning itself is

traced back to the Veda, as a dimension of its own impersonal, yet benevolent and skillful manner of speaking to the world.

Śaṅkara says that in all the Upaniṣads ultimate unity is first presented as a thesis and then explicated or illustrated in the sense that the world, "by means of examples and reasons," is explained as a modification or part of the absolute self; finally, unity appears again as a conclusion or summary: *sarvāsu hy upaniṣatsu pūrvam ekatvaṃ pratijñāya dṛṣṭāntair hetubhiś ca paramātmano vikārāṃśāditvaṃ jagataḥ pratipādya punar ekatvam upasaṃharati.*[135] Śaṅkara continues that the cosmological passages dealing with the origination, continuation and dissolution of the world appear generally between "introductions" (*upakrama*) and summarizing "conclusions" (*upasaṃhāra*) concerning the unity of the individual and the absolute self; therefore, he sees it as their purpose to convey and to establish the idea of unity. The terminology which Śaṅkara uses in this context is in part identical with the terminology of the classical theory of inference. But it is also a terminology of persuasion and instruction, and its "logical" connotations cannot be separated from its "pedagogical" implications. That the sacred texts cannot teach their transempirical subject-matter without relying on "worldly words and meanings," and in general on worldly means of instruction, is emphasized in the preceding passage: *na ca laukikapadapadārthāśrayavyatirekeṇa-āgamena śakyam ajñātaṃ vastvantaram avagamayitum.* The use of "examples" is part of a procedure which - whatever its "logical" implications may be - is ultimately didactic or pedagogical: *taddṛṣṭāntopādānena tadavirodhy eva vastvantaraṃ jñāpayituṃ pravṛttaṃ śāstram ....*[136] The Veda itself may devise an "inferential procedure" in order to instruct us in accordance with the human way of understanding: *athavā śrutiḥ svayam eva ākhyāyikāvyājena anumānamārgam upanyasya-asmān bodhayati puruṣamatim anusarantī.*[137]

Śaṅkara's observations on the role of reason *in* revelation are exemplified by his interpretation of specific Upaniṣadic texts, in particular the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, which he divides into more "śāstric," "proclamative" and more "rational," argumentative sections and which he sees as a sequence of steps corresponding loosely to those in a "syllogism." In his introduction to Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad II, 5, which opens the so-called *madhukāṇḍa* (or *madhubrāhmaṇa*), Śaṅkara discusses the function of this section with reference to the threefold procedure of *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana* (mentioned before in II, 4, 5 and again in IV, 5, 6). He suggests that its function is to eliminate doubts which arise in connection with the "reasoning," *tarka*, which is implied by *manana*, or perhaps to pre-

sent again as a "conclusion" (*nigamana*) what was first presented as a thesis and then supported by a "reason" (*hetu*): *athavā-ātmā-eva-idaṃ sarvam iti pratijñātasya-ātmotpattisthitilayatvaṃ hetum uktvā punar āgama-pradhānena madhubrāhmaṇena pratijñātasya-arthasya nigamanaṃ kriyate. tathā hi naiyāyikair uktaṃ hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ nigamanam iti.* He rejects another explanation which his commentator Ānandagiri attributes to Bhartṛprapañca, and he emphasizes again that reasoning has to be in accordance with the sacred texts: *sarvathā-api tu yathā-āgamena-avadhāritaṃ tarkatas tathā-eva mantavyam.*[138] In the introduction to Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad III, 1, i.e., the opening of the so-called *yājñavalkyakāṇḍa*, Śaṅkara says that this section deals with the same topic as the preceding *madhukāṇḍa*, but that it is not a mere repetition, since it is dominated by reasoning: *upapattipradhānatvād atikrāntena madhukāṇḍena samānārthatve 'pi sati na punaruktatā. madhukāṇḍam hy āgamapradhānam. āgamopapattī hy ātmaikatvaprakāśanāya pravṛtte śaknutaḥ karatalagatabilvam iva darśayitum. śrotavyo mantavyaḥ iti hy uktam. tasmād āgamārthasya-eva parīkṣāpūrvakaṃ nirdhāraṇāya yājñavalkīyaṃ kāṇḍam upapattipradhānam ārabhyate.*[139]

In the introduction to IV, 5 (the *maitreyībrāhmaṇa*), the *madhukāṇḍa* is again characterized as being dominated by authoritative tradition (*āgamapradhāna*), the *yājñavalkyakāṇḍa* as being dominated by reasoning (*upapattipradhāna*), and the section on Maitreyī is now presented as a "conclusion" (*nigamana*; with another reference to Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 39): *atha-idānīṃ nigamanasthānīyaṃ maitreyībrāhmaṇam ārabhyate. ayaṃ ca nyāyo vākyakovidaiḥ parigṛhīto, hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ nigamanam iti.* In addition, the possibility of a somewhat modified explanation is suggested, and the concordance and cooperation of *āgama* and *upapatti* is again emphasized.[140] In his commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad II, 4, 10, which presents the Vedas and their auxiliary texts (sc. *itihāsaḥ purāṇaṃ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sutrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni*) as an "exhalation of this great being", i.e. *brahman (asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam)*, Śaṅkara explains that this eightfold variety of auxiliary texts is part of the mantras and brāhmaṇas, i.e. that it is the Vedic revelation itself which encompasses these ways of discourse and instruction.

Such didactic paths and structures are part of the inner richness and variability of the Veda, which is not just a "source of knowledge" side by side with other such sources, but a comprehensive framework, a universe of discourse adjusted to the requirements of those who rely on it. Repeatedly, Śaṅkara almost personifies the Veda, as if it were a good skillful teacher, reacting to the needs of students, or a loving, caring mother.[141] But it is, of course, an

impersonal structure which fulfills these "personal" aspirations, and which is not only the source of truth, but also the prototype of good teaching. The Veda teaches the ultimate truth by reaching down into the world of appearance and illusion, by relating its statements and its methods of instruction to the way reality *appears* to those who are still in ignorance.[142] It "translates" its proclamation of ultimate unity into the language of *vyavahāra*, of worldly practice and orientation. The employment of inferential or quasi-inferential procedures is part of this; *anumāna* itself has its genuine place in the context of *vyavahāra* and its practical patterns of analogy and regularity.[143] Only the Veda can legitimize the "transworldly" use of worldly inferential "marks" (*liṅga*) and can validate worldly "examples" (*dṛṣṭānta*) as indications or illustrations of the absolute self or *brahman*.

By pointing out "examples" and "inferential" methods *in* the Veda and by using such devices himself, Śaṅkara appeals to what the world accepts as proof and demonstration; but in terms of his understanding of the Veda, these are only illustrations, i.e., basically didactic devices, and there is no claim on his part to *add* proof and validity to what the Veda teaches.

11. As we have seen, the inferential demonstrations of the self which the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas claim as their own achievements are, in Śaṅkara's view, based upon Vedic "marks" or "reasons" (*liṅga, hetu*). Śaṅkara's two references to Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 39, which figure so prominently in H. Brückner's presentation, have to be understood accordingly.[144] Quoting the Nyāya definition of *nigamana* does certainly not imply a commitment to the Nyāya theory of knowledge and reasoning, or to the metaphysical background of the Nyāya system. This is quite obvious from other passages where Śaṅkara quotes the Nyāyasūtra text, e.g., in his commentary on Brahmasūtra I, 1, 4 (quoting Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 2) and II, 2, 37 (quoting Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 18). In both these cases, Śaṅkara uses the Nyāya formulations with approval and as convenient devices for appealing to those whom he wants to instruct and convince. But instead of accepting them as authoritative statements in their own context, he includes them in and adjusts them to his context of Advaita Vedānta. This is quite evident in his reference to Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 2, where he adds or even substitutes *brahman* in the Nyāya enumeration of decisive soteriological factors.

Moreover, we have to remember that by the time of Śaṅkara *nigamana* has also found its way into the exegetic terminology of

Pūrvamīmāṃsā. The following resonance of Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 39, applied to an exegetic context, is found in Śabara's commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra VII, 1, 12: *nigamanaṃ ca pratijñāyā hetoś ca punarvacanam. Nigamana* is often used as the counterpart of *upakrama*, "commencement," "initial statement," usually concerning the relationship between an initially stated general rule and its subsequent specification. The following passage from Śabara's commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra I, 4, 24 exemplifies the correlation of *upakrama* and *nigamana* in the context of ritual exegesis: *añjanasāmānyena vākyasya-upakramo, ghṛtena viśeṣeṇa nigamanaṃ, yathā-upakramaṃ nigamayitavyam ekasmin vākye.* In such contexts, *upakrama* may be replaced with *ārambha* and *nigamana* with *upasaṃhāra*, which, together with *upakrama*, is also a significant term in Śaṅkara's description of the structure of the Upaniṣads, in particular in his commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad.

The exegetic role of *upakrama* and *upasaṃhāra*, not sufficiently noticed by H. Brückner, is later formalized by their inclusion into the Uttaramīmāṃsā list of the six exegetic "marks" (*liṅga*), which are supposed to establish the purport (*tātparya*) of scriptural, specifically Upaniṣadic, teachings. The following verse is frequently quoted by later Vedāntins of all schools:[145] *upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāso 'pūrvatā phalam | arthavādopapattī ca liṅgam tātparyanirṇaye ||*.

In his 16th century compendium *Vedāntasāra*, Sadānanda exemplifies the relationship between *upakrama* and *upasaṃhāra* by referring to Chāndogya-Upaniṣad VI, 2, 1 (*ekam eva-advitīyam*) and VI, 8, 7-16, 3 (*aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvam*). He explains *upapatti*, the sixth and final "mark," as follows: *prakaraṇapratipādyārthasādhane tatra tatra śrūyamāṇā yuktir upapattiḥ;* and he illustrates this by citing the example of the clay from Chāndogya-Upaniṣad VI, 1, 4.[146]

As stated earlier, the Veda, as understood by Śaṅkara, speaks the language of direct enunciation and authoritative testimony as well as of illustration and argumentation.

Words like *āgama, śruti, śāstra* not only refer to the Veda as such and in its totality; they can also refer to one particular type of statement which occurs *in* the Veda,[147] one of the "languages" which it speaks. It speaks a language which requires simple listening and obedience, and another one which has to be accompanied by reflection, reasoning or meditation. However, Śaṅkara rejects the view, apparently presented by Bhartṛprapañca, that the threefold scheme of *śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana* corresponds to clearly separable por-

tions of the Upaniṣads.[148] In his view, the different levels and modes of instruction which are reflected by these three ways or levels of responding to the Vedic revelation cannot be described in terms of such a mechanical separation. In general, the scheme of *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana* does not play a very significant part in Śaṅkara's writings.[149]

With reference to Śaṅkara's programmatic statements in his commentary on Brahmasūtra I, 1, 2, we have suggested that his notion of an "alliance" between the Veda and human reason, his understanding of the didactic dimensions of the Veda and his way of finding the basis of legitimate reasoning in revelation itself provide a framework which includes most of his different observations on "reason and revelation." What may be perceived as inconsistency by Śaṅkara's modern readers, need not appear as such in this context. Śaṅkara may use "reason" and "argumentation" to the extent that he presents an entirely "argumentative" section such as the second prose chapter of the Upadeśasāhasrī, without abandoning or compromising his underlying conviction of the Vedic roots of legitimate reasoning and without contradicting his numerous explicit statements on the ultimate authority of the Veda.[150]

This does, of course, not imply that Śaṅkara could not have held more genuinely different positions in other periods of his life.[151] And even within the context of his fully developed Advaita Vedānta (i.e., excluding his Gauḍapāda commentary), there is room for ambiguity and oscillation, which is inherited and made more obvious and explicit by some later Advaitins. This may be illustrated by the role which *anvayavyatireka*, the method of "positive and negative concomitance" ("continuity-and-discontinuity", "coordinate presence and absence") plays in the thought of Śaṅkara and of his successors.

12. Since P. Hacker's pioneering monograph on the disciples of Śaṅkara, the meaning and functions of *anvayavyatireka* in Advaita Vedānta have been discussed by several scholars. Hacker's own statements are brief and somewhat evasive. He characterizes *anvaya-vyatireka* as a "logical method" aimed at clarifying the meaning of the "great sayings", such as *tat tvam asi*, and as "reflection on the fact that the contents of the words as well as of the sentence are well-established and that the contrary is logically impossible".[152] Whatever the exact implications of Hacker's statements may be, it seems clear that he sees *anvayavyatireka* as a method to be applied to the interpretation of the *tat tvam asi*, i.e. to the single words of this sen-

tence as well as to their interrelation in the sentence. This is stated more categorically by J.A.B. van Buitenen. He interprets *anvaya-vyatireka* as an exegetic device designed to bring about the understanding of *tat tvam asi* as an identity statement, the positive procedure of *anvaya* determining what is identical in the meanings of *tad* and *tvam*, and the negative procedure of *vyatireka* excluding from *tad* what is not in *tvam* and vice versa.[153]

S. Mayeda discusses the method of *anvayavyatireka* in the introduction to his English translation of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. In accordance with van Buitenen's interpretation, he characterizes the "*anvaya* method" as the "positive formulation" of what is compatible in the meanings of *tad* and *tvam*, and *vyatireka* as "a negative formulation used to exclude all the incompatible meanings."[154] Mayeda, whose presentation is not always very precise, seems to regard *anvayavyatireka* in its Vedāntic sense as a somewhat peculiar method introduced by Śaṅkara himself and used exclusively in the Upadeśasāhasrī. He describes it as a "meditational method rather than an exegetical method" and associates it with what he calls "*parisaṃkhyāna* meditation";[155] he adds that it is "essentially the same as *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*," but that it was already "neglected" by his own pupils and "dropped by later Advaitins" because of "a defect in logical exactitude."[156] - T. Vetter considers various aspects of *anvayavyatireka* without committing himself to any particular systematic or historical thesis.[157]

The interpretation by S. Mayeda and his predecessors has been carefully reviewed by G. Cardona, to whom we also owe a thorough and comprehensive study of the role of *anvayavyatireka* in grammatical literature.[158] Against Mayeda, Cardona emphasizes that "reasoning from *anvaya* and *vyatireka*" is not a kind of meditation and that it does not serve "directly to exclude incompatible meanings and to retain compatible ones" in *tat tvam asi* and similar sentences. Moreover, he rejects the contention that *anvayavyatireka* has a peculiar meaning in Advaita Vedānta or, even more specifically, in Śaṅkara's thought. Instead, he sees it as a much more widely used "mode of reasoning" which "involves the continued presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*)" of related entities and which in Advaita Vedānta "serves to discriminate between what is and is not the self as well as to show what meanings may be attributed to given terms". He characterizes its basic pattern as follows:

"1) a. When X occurs, Y occurs.
b. When X is absent, Y is absent.
2) a. When X occurs, Y is absent.
b. When X is absent, Y occurs."[159]

At this point, there is no need to discuss Cardona's stimulating argumentation. Instead, we may focus on the implications which the "method" of *anvayavyatireka* has with regard to our theme of "reason and revelation", and we can supplement Cardona's analysis by adding further historical and philosophical observations. This wider context may then lead us to a somewhat modified view of the role of *anvayavyatireka* in Advaita Vedānta as well as in other areas of Indian thought.

In Śaṅkara's own writings, the references to *anvayavyatireka* are much less conspicuous than in those of his disciple Sureśvara. The most significant occurrences are found in verse-chapter XVIII of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, which deals with the interpretation of *tat tvam asi*. After several references to "discrimination" or "distinction" (*viveka*) between self and non-self in the preceding verses, the method of *anvayavyatireka* is introduced in verse 96 (which is quoted as verse IV, 22 in Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*):

anvayavyatirekau hi padārthasya padasya ca |
syād etad aham ity atra yuktir eva-avadhāraṇe.

S. Mayeda translates this important verse as follows: "The logical means by which to ascertain [the meanings of] 'this' [and] 'I' should indeed be the method of agreement and difference of the words and of the meanings of the words." T. Vetter translates: "Anvaya-und-Vyatireka von Wortinhalt und Wort, um damit festzustellen, was 'ich' [bzw. 'du'] bedeutet dürfte nämlich in subtiler Überlegung (*yukti*) bestehen [und nicht jedermann zugänglich sein]."[160] The inaccuracies in these two translations are instructive and symptomatic: Mayeda's " 'this' and 'I' ", which mixes the *etad* in *syād etad* ... with the *tad* in *tat tvam asi*, is obviously prompted by his erroneous assumption that *anvayavyatireka* deals directly with the semantic compatibility of *tad* and *tvam*. Vetter's reversal of the subject (*yukti*) and the predicate nominative (*anvayavyatirekau*) - against the obvious intentions of Śaṅkara and the explicit understanding of Sureśvara - reflects his interpretation of *yukti* as a peculiar kind of "subtle deliberation", supposedly capable of establishing the existence and nature of the *ātman*.[161]

What the verse says can be rendered as follows: "(The method of) continuity-and-discontinuity ('coordinate presence and absence') of meanings and words, that should be the method, indeed, (which applies) here in the case of the ascertainment of the meaning of 'I'." The word "I" with reference to its contexts and predicates as well as the corresponding entity with reference to its properties have to be

investigated according to this method. This is then immediately exemplified by the reference to deep sleep (*suṣupta*) in verse 97 (= Naiṣkarmyasiddhi IV, 23), where the word *aham* is linked to a predicate (*na-adrākṣam*) which excludes all connotations of spatio-temporal particularity and where the continuity of "seeing" (*dṛṣṭi*), i.e. of the awareness as such, is coordinated with the discontinuity or absence of all its objective contents (*pratyaya*). The *anvaya* of one element is juxtaposed with the *vyatireka* of all others, and its continued presence is seen as indicating its independence from these other factors. Verse 98 adds scriptural legitimacy by quoting from Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 3, where *śruti* itself demonstrates how to achieve discrimination (*viveka*).

The following verses, although dealing with other questions, remain connected with the theme of *viveka*, until *anvayavyatireka* is again explicitly mentioned in verse 176. The subsequent discussion is summarized in verse 193, which emphasizes the necessity of clarifying the meaning of *tvam* before the "great saying" *tat tvam asi* can have its proper epistemic (and soteriological) impact. This refers, of course, to the situation in Chāndogya-Upaniṣad VI, where only the meaning of *tad*, i.e. the non-dual absolute "being" (*sat*), has been explained before the *tat tvam asi* is introduced. "If it were not aided by the remembrance of the (proper) meaning of *tvam*, the statement could not produce authoritative knowledge" (*tvamarthasmṛtyasāhāyyād vākyaṃ na-utpādayet pramām*). In the preceding verses, Śaṅkara has explained that it is for this very purpose of recalling the proper word-meaning that *anvayavyatireka* has been referred to (*anvayavyatirekoktiḥ padārthasmaraṇāya tu*); without a discriminating understanding of the word *tvam* (*tvampadārthāvivekataḥ*), the purport of the sentence, i.e. the eternal freedom of the self, would not become manifest. The reference to *anvayavyatireka* is for the sake of such discriminative understanding and for no other purpose (*anvayavyatirekoktis tadvivekāya, na-anyathā*): Śaṅkara emphasizes this again since he is obviously aware that such or similar methods of analysing the phenomena of awareness and of "extracting" the meaning of "I"/"you" have also been used in the context of extra-Vedic argumentations. For example, we may think of a statement such as *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* III, 2, 9, which claims that the *ātman* can be known without the sacred texts because of the separability of the word "I" from all physical connotations (*aham iti śabdavyatirekān na-āgamikam*). Śaṅkara's own references to the role of *anvayavyatireka* in Yogācāra etc. will be discussed later.[162]

13. *Anvayavyatireka* supports the "hearing" (*śravaṇa*) of the Upani-

ṣadic "great sayings" insofar as it serves to eliminate confusions and superimpositions from our self-understanding and from our usage of such words as "I" and "you". It does this by juxtaposing the continued presence of the pure subject of awareness with the discontinuity of its objective or objectifiable contents and by exposing the continued applicability of the word "I" in contexts where the connotations of spatio-temporal particularity which are habitually associated with this word have disappeared. It does not anticipate that insight which can only result from the "hearing" of the Upaniṣadic statements; but it is an essential prerequisite insofar as it helps to bring about the receptivity for the meaning and the liberating impact of the "great sayings".

Śaṅkara does not always use the expression *anvayavyatireka* when he refers to "continuity-and-discontinuity" as a means of achieving *viveka*, "discrimination". He may also use such terms as *vyabhicāra/avyabhicāra*. This is the case in the second prose-chapter of the Upadeśasāhasrī, which represents a highly concentrated effort to separate the essential nature of the *ātman* from everything that is "adventitious" or "accidental" (*āgantuka*), i.e. from the changing phenomena of the states of waking and dreaming and in general from all objective data. *Vyabhicāra/avyabhicāra* are the guidelines of this analytic procedure. What is essential never "deviates" (*vyabhicar*) or "ceases to be present", while what is "accidental" may always be discontinued and cease to accompany what is essential: *kiṃ ca svapnajāgarite na tava-ātmabhūte, vyabhicāritvād, vastrādivat. na hi yasya yat svarūpaṃ tat tadvyabhicāri dṛṣṭam. svapnajāgarite tu caitanyamātraṃ vyabhicarataḥ*[163]

Śaṅkara goes on to emphasize that this "non-deviating" essence persists in deep sleep, since only the objective contents (*dṛṣṭa*) are denied in this state, but not awareness or "seeing" (*dṛṣṭi*) itself: *paśyaṃs tarhi suṣupte tvaṃ, yasmād dṛṣṭam eva pratiṣedhasi, na dṛṣṭim.*[164] This corresponds to the statement in XVIII, 97 (*na vārayati dṛṣṭiṃ svāṃ, pratyayaṃ tu niṣedhati*), which, as we have seen, is meant to illustrate the "method" of *anvayavyatireka* introduced in the preceding verse. - In this analysis based upon *vyabhicāra/avyabhicāra*, the grammatical procedure of extracting identical word-meanings from different sentence-contexts does not play the role which it plays in the presentation of *anvayavyatireka* in chapter XVIII. But the appeal to the grammatical implications of *anvayavyatireka* is primarily didactic, and as far as the analysis of phenomena and its goal of *viveka* are concerned, the two procedures are not essentially different.

The terminology of *vyabhicāra* is already used in Śaṅkara's description of the relationship between "the fourth" (*turīya*) and the three worldly states (*avasthā*) of the consciousness. *Turīya*, identified with the *ātman* or absolute awareness, never "deviates" from the other three, i.e. never leaves them unaccompanied.[165] In the same sense, the "known" or "knowable" (*jñeya*) may be said to "deviate" from "knowledge" (*jñāna*), while on the other hand *jñāna* never leaves *jñeya* unaccompanied: *na jñānaṃ vyabhicarati kadācid api jñeyam.*[166]

It should be noted that in these passages Śaṅkara does not use *vyabhicāra* in the logical or epistemological perspective, i.e. in the sense of the logical "deviation" of an inferential reason (*hetu*) being present without its inferendum (*sādhya*). In Śaṅkara's usage, *vyabhicāra* and the corresponding verb-forms do not indicate an unaccompanied presence, but a failure to be present in a relationship of concomitance, and an ontological defect rather than a logical one.

Another important text dealing with the separation of what is essential from what is non-essential, i.e. with the isolation of pure awareness, is Śaṅkara's commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 3 (specifically IV, 3, 7). This is the Upaniṣadic section which Śaṅkara invokes after introducing *anvayavyatireka* in his Upadeśasāhasrī, stating that here the Veda itself teaches the discrimination of awareness and its contents.[167] While neither *vyabhicāra/avyabhicāra* nor *anvayavyatireka* are explicitly mentioned in the commentary on this section, the words *vyatireka* and *vyatirikta* are frequently used.[168] Moreover, Śaṅkara refers repeatedly to the simile of the extraction of the *muñja* grass from its stalk, which is already found in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa and the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad and which is subsequently used as one of the most familiar illustrations of the purpose as well as of the procedure of *anvayavyatireka.*[169]

Upadeśasāhasrī XVIII is not the only text where Śaṅkara uses the term *anvayavyatireka*; and although the contexts and connotations of these other usages may vary, they illustrate and supplement the statements of the Upadeśasāhasrī. - In his commentary on Brahmasūtra II, 1, 5, Śaṅkara relates the story of Prajāpati and the vital organs.[170] In order to determine which among them is superior to the others, Prajāpati asks them to depart successively from the body. It turns out that only "breath" (*prāṇa*) is indispensible, since the body and all the other organs could not subsist without it. Thus, "through this successive departure, the superiority of *prāṇa* is ascertained according to the method of continuity-and-discontinuity"

(*ekaikotkramaṇena-anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ prāṇaśraiṣṭhyapratipattiḥ*). This is obviously not a "technical" context. Still, the expression *ekaikotkramaṇa* may be taken as a graphic paraphrase of what Śaṅkara seems to have in mind when he refers to *anvayavyatireka* as a method of clarifying the meaning of *tvam*: the non-essential elements may leave; what is essential, will stay.

14. In his commentary on Gauḍapāda's Kārikā III, 31, Śaṅkara refers to the theory that *manas* is the principle of all plurality, or that all this plurality is nothing but *manas*, and he says, paraphrasing Gauḍapāda's argumentation: *anvayavyatirekalakṣaṇam anumānam āha ... sarvaṃ mana iti pratijñā, tadbhāve bhāvāt tadabhāve ca-abhāvāt.*

The final statement corresponds clearly to Cardona's first proposition:

"1) a. When X occurs, Y occurs.
b. When X is absent, Y is absent."

Although Śaṅkara calls this an *anumāna*, it is a more stringent relationship than what is ordinarily presupposed for an "inference", i.e. "positive and negative concomitance" in the sense of a statement and its contraposition: "When X occurs, Y occurs. When Y is absent, X is absent." In this case, *manas* is not simply inferred from plurality, but plurality is reduced to *manas* in a manner which amounts to identification.

It is this kind of reductive, identifying argumentation, applied to the relationship between "body" and "soul" (i.e. life, awareness, etc.), which Śaṅkara attributes to the materialists in his commentary on Brahmasūtra III, 3, 53-54. Just like Śabara before him, Śaṅkara refers to the dead body as a case against the universal and reversible concomitance - sometimes called "homogenous concomitance" (*samāvinābhāva* etc.) and amounting to what is known as "equipollence" in the terminology of traditional Western logic - between the organic body and the soul-constituents, life, etc.[171] In this case, the positive concomitance *tadbhāve bhāvād* has been proven wrong, since the dead body, while still being an organism, is without the soul-constituents life etc. Although the compound *anvayavyatireka* does not occur in this section, the word *vyatireka* is not only used by Śaṅkara, but also by Śabara and already by Bādarāyaṇa in Sūtra III, 3, 54; as we have seen, it is also a key-word in the Vaiśeṣika argumentation about the existence of the *ātman*.[172]

Corresponding to what we said about *vyabhicāra*, *vyatireka* can indicate an "exception to" or a "deviation from" a relationship of

concomitance either in the sense of occurring without its relatum or in the sense of leaving the relatum unaccompanied; in either case, we are dealing with a concomitance of presence and absence, i.e. a discontinuity. However, *vyatireka* - as used in the commentary on Gauḍapāda's Kārikā III, 31 - can also indicate a concomitance of absences (in the sense of *tadabhāve ca-abhāvād* or Cardona's "when X is absent, Y is absent"). In accordance with the different meanings of *vyatireka*, as well as with a more or less stringent usage of *anvaya*, we have different "modes" of *anvayavyatireka*, which serve different, although not always clearly distinguished, functions in the history of Indian thought. *Anvayavyatireka* as a combination of concomitant presences and concomitant absences may be used to support claims of identity and mutual reductibility, if it applies "concomitance" in the strict sense of a fully reversible, "homogenous" relationship. In a less stringent manner, i.e. in the sense of a statement and its contraposition, it is widely used in inferential reasoning, which does not normally require a reversible or homogenous concomitance between the inferential reason (*hetu*) and the inferendum (*sādhya*). In an essential, though often problematic and ambiguous sense, *anvayavyatireka* is related to the empirical ascertainment of causality (*kāryakaraṇabhāva*) or the relationship between means and ends (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*), and in general to the idea of order, regular succession and predictability in the universe.[173] In this sense, Śaṅkara refers to fortune-tellers as *anvayavyatirekakuśala*, since they know how certain dream-phenomena are accompanied or followed by actual events.[174] - The second "mode" of *anvayavyatireka*, which uses *vyatireka* in the sense of "discontinuity" or "concomitance of absence and presence", is primarily a method of differentiation and discrimination, designed to separate one element from its association or identification with others.

Although the word *anvayavyatireka* has clearly distinguishable connotations in its different contexts, it seems that in Śaṅkara's view these different connotations and usages converge in their basic implications and constitute variations of one basic phenomenon - i.e. thinking in terms of continuities and discontinuities.[175] This is not just one specific "mode of reasoning," but the basic structure and orientation of "reasoning" as such, of what Śaṅkara calls *yukti, tarka* or *anumāna*. - *Anvayavyatireka* is certainly not Śaṅkara's "own method". It is something he finds being used in numerous legitimate and illegitimate, i.e. extra-Vedic or anti-Vedic contexts; and he adopts its various "modes" cautiously and only insofar as they contribute to the clarification of the Vedic revelation or to the refutation of opposing views. - This can be further illustrated by Śaṅkara's

treatment of the teachings of the Buddhist Yogācāra school, which he combines with those of the school of Dignāga.

The Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda "rule of co-apprehension" (*sahopalambhaniyama*) proclaims the universal and reversible concomitance, i.e. the utter inseparability of awareness (*vijñāna*) and its contents or objects (*viṣaya*). As understood by Śaṅkara, it is used to support the "consciousness-only" theory, i.e. the reductive identification of extra-mental entities with elements of awareness. There can be no doubt that this is a much more significant challenge to Śaṅkara's own thought than its radical counterpart, the somewhat archaic materialistic *dehātmavāda* discussed in the commentary on Brahmasūtra III, 3, 53-54. It applies the principle of concomitant presences and concomitant absences in the context of a phenomenology of awareness, i.e. in an area which is much closer to Śaṅkara's own awareness-oriented thought.

In his commentary on Brahmasūtra II, 2, 28, Śaṅkara characterizes the Yogācāra argumentation as follows: *api ca sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo viṣayavijñānayor āpatati. na hy anayor ekasya-anupalambhe 'nyasya-upalambho 'sti*. In his commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 3, 7, he says, paraphrasing the "rule of co-apprehension": *yad dhi yadvyatirekeṇa na-upalabhyate, tat tāvanmātraṃ vastu dṛṣṭam*. Already Kumārila - without knowing Dharmakīrti's concept of *sahopalambhaniyama* - has argued against the Yogācāra idea of "co-apprehension" and for the separation (*bhinnatā*) of the "apprehending" (*grāhaka*) and the "apprehended" (*grāhya*) element of awareness (i.e., of *vijñāna* and *viṣaya*) by invoking *anvayavyatireka*. As an instance of an "apprehending" part continuing to be present, while the "apprehended" element is absent, he mentions the case that somebody remembers that he has perceived something, but does not recall the content of his perception:

na smarāmi mayā ko 'pi gṛhīto 'rthas tadā-iti hi |
smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam. ||

......

tadatyantāvinābhāvān na-ekākāraṃ hi jāyate |
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siddhā-evaṃ bhinnatā tayoḥ.[176]

Earlier in the same chapter of his *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila has presented the Yogācārin himself arguing in terms of *anvayavyatireka*: Contact with external objects cannot be the cause of the definite forms or contents of awareness, since these "forms" (*ākāra*) occur also in memories, dreams, etc., when there is no such contact. On the other hand, they can never, not even in the waking state, occur without consciousness and its dispositions or impressions (*vāsanā*);

therefore, they are caused by the impressions:

na hi tatra-arthasaṃsargaḥ, kevalā vāsanā-eva tu |
hetutvena-upapannā-iti sā-eva jāgraddhiyām api. ||
anvayavyatirekābhyām evaṃ jñānasya gamyate |
ākāraḥ, na hi bāhyasya jñānāpeto nidarśyate.[177]

There is a noticeable, though somewhat evasive difference between the two usages of *anvayavyatireka*. As used in the Yogācāra *pūrvapakṣa*, it serves primarily to establish *vāsanā* as the cause of *ākāra*; but it also exposes the contrast between the continued presence of *jñāna* and the discontinuity of the alleged "contact with external objects". In Kumārila's own argument, *anvayavyatireka* is not meant to establish or to refute a causal relationship between the "apprehending" and the "apprehended" element, but to demonstrate their separability. In this sense, i.e. as a challenge to the "rule of co-apprehension" (*sahopalambhaniyama*), Kumārila's statements are quoted and refuted in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*.[178]

Unlike Kumārila, Śaṅkara does not explicitly mention *anvayavyatireka* in his discussion of the "rule of co-apprehension"; but he mentions it repeatedly in his presentation and refutation of the *vāsanā* theory. Referring to dreams etc., his Yogācāra *pūrvapakṣin* argues: *api ca anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vāsanānimittam eva jñānavaicitryam ity avagamyate.* Against this view, Śaṅkara claims that the perception of external objects is possible without *vāsanā*, while *vāsanā*, being an "impression" (*saṃskāra*) from the outside, is always dependent upon objects: *api ca vinā-api vāsanābhir arthopalabdhyupagamād eva-anvayavyatirekāv api pratiṣṭhāpayataḥ.*[179] - In this section, Śaṅkara argues largely *ad hominem* and in the context of ordinary worldly assumptions, and he applies *anvayavyatireka* as a worldly dialectical device which can easily be turned around. Earlier in his refutation of the *pūrvapakṣa* and in reference to the "rule of co-apprehension" (*sahopalambhaniyama*) as well as to the causal argument for the *vāsanā* theory, Śaṅkara characterizes his opponent's procedure as "fabrications concerning discontinuities, continuities, etc." (*vyatirekāvyatirekādivikalpa*):[180] This is what reasoning from *anvayavyatireka* in all its variations amounts to, if it is used without the guidance of the Vedic revelation.

We cannot and need not discuss here the extent to which Śaṅkara's presentation corresponds to the actual argumentation and the intentions of the Yogācārins and, more specifically, of the "Buddhist Logicians" of the Dignāga school who are included in this presentation; nor can we discuss the important and complex role which *anvayavyatireka* plays in Buddhist philosophical litera-

ture in general.[181]

15. Śaṅkara may be aware of the specific technical implications which the various "modes" of *anvayavyatireka* have in grammar, logic, epistemology or psychology, and of their specific functions as devices of analysis and discrimination or of coordination and identification. But it is not essential for him to define one such mode and to distinguish it from others. Whatever its specific technical details may be, *anvayavyatireka* has to do with positive and negative concomitance, deals with constants and variables, with the co-occurrence and non-co-occurrence of various types of phenomena - words, meanings, entities or events. As such, it exemplifies the nature of human reasoning (*yukti, tarka, upapatti, anumāna*), which is groundless in itself and has no legitimate direction, if it is not guided by the Vedic revelation.

Reasoning in terms of *anvayavyatireka*, of the "mutual deviation" (*itaretaravyabhicāra*) of states of consciousness etc., has to be legitimized by the Veda itself. This is what Śaṅkara emphasizes again in connection with his programmatic statements against "dry", "fruitless" reasoning (*śuṣkatarka*) in his commentary on Brahmasūtra II, 1, 6: *śrutyanugṛhīta eva hy atra tarko 'nubhavāṅgatvena-āśrīyate. svapnabuddhāntayor ubhayor itaretaravyabhicārād ātmano 'nanvāgatatvam;* and in his commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 3, 23, he invokes the "revelation of the continuity of vision" (*dṛṣṭyaviparilopaśruti*), i.e. of the continued presence of the witnessing subject in deep sleep etc., against "worldly" argumentation. In the words of Sureśvara, *anvayavyatireka* has no "basis" (*āśraya*) apart from the Vedic "words and meanings."[182]

In Sureśvara's writings, specifically in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, but also in his extensive subcommentaries (*vārttika*) on Śaṅkara's Bṛhadāraṇyaka- and Taittirīya-Upaniṣad commentaries, *anvayavyatireka* plays a much more conspicuous and explicit role than in Śaṅkara's own writings. Sureśvara quotes Śaṅkara's most important statements on *anvayavyatireka* in the fourth chapter of his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi or elsewhere,[183] and he adds numerous statements of his own. It is obvious that the relationship between *anvayavyatireka* and the authority of the Veda is a central issue in Sureśvara's thought. While he tries consistently to be faithful to Śaṅkara's intentions, he often goes beyond Śaṅkara's explicit statements, and he supplements and expands his observations in various directions. A brief review of his contributions to this theme seems to be appropriate at this point.

In accordance with Śaṅkara's usage, Sureśvara often refers to the grammatical connotations of *anvayavyatireka*.[184] But its essential function is to separate the self from anything that is not the self. In this function, it is also introduced in connection with the theory of the "sheaths" (*kośa*) in the *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika*, which also combines *anvayavyatireka* and *vyabhicāra/avyabhicāra* in an important sequence of verses concerning the "states of consciousness."[185] It is a method of analysis and discrimination, which appears in close terminological association with *yukti* and *anumāna* (not in the strict sense of "inference"); these terms may even be used as if they were its interchangeable synonyms.[186] - The Vedic texts, though "sentences", can produce the knowledge of the *ātman*, which is not the meaning of any sentence, if their "hearing" is preceded by *anvayavyatireka: anvayavyatirekapurassaraṃ vākyam eva-avākyārtharūpam ātmānaṃ pratipādayati.*[187] But this liberating knowledge can certainly not be brought about by *anvayavyatireka* alone: *na tv anvayavyatirekamātrasādhyo 'yam arthaḥ.*[188]

He who has practised the method of "continuity-and-discontinuity" with reference to the problem of "self" and "non-self" has met an essential preliminary requirement of liberating knowledge. It is part of his *adhikāra*, his soteriological "qualification" or "competence", and it can be added to other requirements, such as "inner control" (*śama*), "restraint" (*dama*), etc.[189] The discriminative knowledge achieved through the method of "continuity-and-discontinuity" does not anticipate the liberating insight which comes from the Vedic word, nor is there a gradual transition from one to the other. In a sense, reasoning in terms of *anvayavyatireka* produces only an openness which has to be filled, or perhaps even a confusion which has to be eliminated, by the Vedic revelation. To him who has freed himself from false superimpositions by reasoning in this way, who has discarded the whole sphere of objects, who asks in bewilderment (*vīkṣāpanna*) "who am I?" (*ko 'smi*), who may even think that he himself has been discarded (*tyakto 'ham*) in this process - to him the Veda speaks in a meaningful and soteriologically effective manner when it says: *tat tvam asi.*[190] The discriminative knowledge which is the result of such reasoning remains in the sphere of difference (*bheda*), of mutual exclusion and non-being (*abhāva*), and it cannot realize the absolute non-duality of the "witness" (*sākṣin*) or self.[191]

At this point, Sureśvara seems to be ready to recognize a certain positive potential not only in the differentiating philosophy of the Sāṃkhya school, but even in the more radical way in which the Buddhists have discarded all superimpositions and objectifying

identifications of the self, in fact pursuing the unguided, extra-Vedic use of *anvayavyatireka* to the extreme consequence of their denial of the self (*anātmavāda*). However, this extreme of reasoning is also an extreme of delusion (*moha*); not paying any attention to the Veda and trying to see through "the eye of reason alone" (*anumānaikacakṣus*), the Buddhists remain in darkness.[192] - Just as Śaṅkara himself, Sureśvara believes that the Veda not only authorizes legitimate *anvayavyatireka*, but actually uses it as a means of instruction and illustration; his commentator Ānandagiri refers to the "Vedic method called *anvayavyatireka*" (*anvayavyatirekākhyaśrauta-yukti*).[193]

The statements in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* are supplemented by numerous references in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika*, specifically in its massive introductory part, the *Sambandhavārttika*. Here, Sureśvara deals more explicitly with the *prasaṃkhyānavādin*, who teaches that the Veda, instead of directly revealing the truth, enjoins certain meditational and intellectual activities which, if properly performed, will lead to the realization of truth. Again and again, Sureśvara emphasizes that the Veda is self-sufficient, that its power and authority of revelation is neither dependent upon nor paralleled by worldly verification, and that the supreme truth which it teaches and which transcends all result-oriented "works" (*karman*) cannot and need not be mediated by worldly activities. - The analytic and discriminative understanding brought about by the "rational" procedure of *anvayavyatireka* should in no way be confused with the Vedic revelation of the *brahman*-nature of the self.[194] That the Veda itself speaks "with arguments" (*yuktibhiḥ sārdham*) does not mean that it attempts to justify its soteriological message which it emits "naturally" (*prakṛtyā*), as an outflow of its own essence; it only means that it offers "rational", "intellectual" incentives to accept this message. In this respect, the role of *yukti* in the *jñānakāṇḍa* is analogous to that of *arthavāda* in the *karmakāṇḍa*, which, without adding to the authoritativeness of the *vidhi*, is conducive to its execution.[195] - The more systematizing account of *anvayavyatireka* which Vidyāraṇya gives centuries later in his *Pañcadaśī* is no longer as close to Śaṅkara's own ideas as Sureśvara's statements; around 1600, Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī presents a fivefold classification of *anvayavyatireka*, referring to *dṛgdṛśya, sākṣisākṣya*, etc.[196]

Padmapāda, the other famous disciple of Śaṅkara, pays much less attention to *anvayavyatireka* than Sureśvara; but he tries to provide a more formal description or even definition of *tarka* than either Śaṅkara or Sureśvara. Reasoning, reflection (*tarka*) "sup-

ports the means of knowledge" (*pramāṇānām anugrāhakas tarka iti*) insofar as it contributes to the subjective certitude concerning the objects of valid knowledge, specifically the non-dual *ātman/brahman* which is the "object" (*viṣaya*) of the Vedic revelation. *Tarka* cannot add to or subtract from the validity (*prāmāṇya*) and objective certainty of this revelation. It can only make us ready to accept it without doubt and hesitation by demonstrating its possibility (*sambhava*) and by removing apparent contradictions (*virodha*) from the Upaniṣadic "great sayings."[197] Later on in his *Pañcapādikā*, Padmapāda discusses *manana*, the more directly exegetic "reflection" which traditionally follows the "hearing" (*śravaṇa*) of the Vedic texts (or, according to Padmapāda, of the *śārīraka*, i.e. the Brahmasūtra text). He defines it as "pondering" (*anusandhāna*) over the "examples" (*dṛṣṭānta*) and "argumentative explications" (*yuktyarthavāda*) found in the Vedic texts, as well as over other "inferences which are not incompatible with the Vedic statements" (*vākyārthāvirodhyanumāna*).[198]

16. *Anvayavyatireka* as a method of separating the "non-self" from the "self" and of analysing the meaning of *tvam* in *tat tvam asi* illustrates the significance which reasoning has in Śaṅkara's and Sureśvara's exegetical and soteriological thought. But does this mean that *yukti* alone is capable of uncovering the ultimate, though indirect referent of *tvam*, i.e. the non-dual self? In his interpretation of Śaṅkara's commentary on Brahmasūtra IV, 1, 2, T. Vetter says: "Śāstra (Schriftzitate und das mit ihnen begründete theologische System) macht das Absolute zugänglich, Yukti (rationale Überlegung) den Kern der Person." He refers to "Śāstra und Yukti" as "theologische und rational-psychologische Untersuchung der Wortinhalte" respectively, and he adds: "Während in diesem Textstück eine klare Verteilung der Aufgaben erreicht ist: Yukti ist für den Inhalt von 'du', Śāstra für den Inhalt von 'jenes', liegt dies im Hinblick auf andere Stellen etwas komplizierter."[199]

In Vetter's view, such "clear division of responsibilities" seems to be the implicit goal of Śaṅkara's thought about the relation between *śruti* and *yukti*, something which he approximates more or less successfully in his writings. Interpreted in this sense, the Upaniṣads, which contain the *tat tvam asi* etc., would be authoritative and indispensible only insofar as the meaning of the *tad* is concerned. The *tvam*, however, would be - more or less explicitly - left to "rational", "rational-psychological" investigation, which would lead us to the discovery of what we really are, the "core of the person", and thus enable us to understand the liberating message of

identity. It is obvious that there are problems in this approach. If *yukti* alone can reveal the true meaning of *tvam*, i.e. that reality which is also the meaning of *tad*, what then is left as the content of the Vedic message? If, on the other hand, scripture alone can teach us the identity of the meanings of *tvam* and *tad*, i.e. the true reality of the *tvam*, would it not be inconsistent to claim another, "rational" way of discovering this reality?

Vetter admits that in his interpretation the role of the Veda is somewhat precarious and redundant: "Man kann nun auch noch fragen, wozu hierbei der Satz 'du bist jenes' nötig ist, wenn er sowieso die eventuell von Śrutisätzen unterstüzte rationale Untersuchung (*yukti*) des Ich, das in diesem Satz angesprochen wird, voraussetzt, und diese Untersuchung schon dessen Natur der Geistigkeit und Leidlosigkeit ans Licht bringt; in USG II wird ja auch der Yukti der gesamte Erlösungsweg anvertraut."[200] But does Śaṅkara ever credit "rational investigation" alone with making accessible the true reality of the *tvam*? And is it really *yukti* alone which accomplishes liberating knowledge according to the second prose chapter of the Upadeśasāhasrī? This does certainly not follow from the mere absence of scriptural quotes. - Our preceding investigations have shown to what extent Śaṅkara sees legitimate reasoning itself *within* the horizon of revelation, as something not independent in its "rationality", but received and revealed as a pedagogical device and as a means of explication. This may be problematic for us; but it has to be recognized as a constituent factor of Śaṅkara's own orientation -and as something that might help us to understand why he did not see or take seriously as inconsistency or contradiction what we tend to see as such.

In what sense and why does Śaṅkara consider human reason inadequate to reach truth and certainty? What exactly does the priority and superiority of the Veda mean to him? Why is the Veda epistemologically and soteriologically indispensable, and in what sense does human thought depend on it? As we have seen, these questions have many implications and ramifications, and we have to avoid a one-dimensional answer.

First of all, Śaṅkara criticizes the factual and inescapable groundlessness and vacuity of *tarka* in the sense of hypothetical, speculative reasoning. But he also questions the reliability of *anumāna*, inference in general, and he emphasizes the incalculable character of the empirical world of appearance, with which it is concerned and on the regularity of which its own validity is based. In fact,

Śaṅkara's criticism of reason often blurs the distinction between merely hypothetical reasoning and inference in a more positive sense. Moreover, the goal of Vedāntic thought and teaching, the self or *brahman*, is such that, even if reason were fully reliable in the worldly sphere, it could certainly not establish knowledge of this transworldly, transempirical reality. Without the aid of revelation, human reason cannot discover reliable worldly signs or analogues of this reality.

In claiming its own methods and criteria, human reason displays an anthropocentric attitude of self-confidence and arrogance which is incompatible with that receptivity and openness which is a condition of liberating knowledge. Relying on his own "worldly potential" (*sāmarthyaṃ laukikam*[201]) of intelligence and reasoning alone, man remains attached to that very world from which he seeks final liberation. No effort of "worldly" reflection by the ego upon itself will yield the liberating insight into the reality of the *ātman* as the one absolute witness.[202] Confusion and contradiction arise when the thinker thinks of himself in an inference-oriented and self-objectifying manner; and the "tenth man" who is not reminded of his own identity by somebody else will count and re-count the other nine without ever taking notice of himself.[203] Knowledge of the *ātman*, which coincides with the *ātman* itself, is not the result of mental activities. Only in listening to the apparently external voice of the Vedic revelation can man transcend the network of result-oriented activities and see himself as what he is and has always been, i.e. as the *ātman*.

Revelation, the Veda, is the indispensable source of liberating knowledge; it is the condition of its possibility. In Śaṅkara's view, this relates to the soteriology of each single individual as well as to the structure of the authoritative tradition; and it has implications of validity and legitimacy as well as of factual genesis and derivation. The Veda alone can lend final validity to statements about the self or the absolute; it is the basis of certainty and clarity in this matter. Moreover, the very legitimacy of "hearing" and studying the Veda is determined by the Veda itself, insofar as it lays down the conditions of qualification, the "mandate" (*adhikāra*) for liberating knowledge.[204] The Vedic revelation is not a neutral, universal message which could be separated from its original source; the soteriological efficacy of this message depends on its being legitimately received from its original and continuous source. On the other hand, the individual may not always be aware to what extent he is factually indebted to the Veda, i.e. to what extent the Veda is the ultimate

factual source of certain insights and ways of thinking, even of "reasoning" and inference, which he takes for granted or claims as human accomplishments.[205] Legitimate reasoning itself is rooted in and has to be measured against the Veda.

In Śaṅkara's understanding, the Upaniṣads, the "knowledge portion" of the Veda, respond to human reason, appeal to it, provide it with a context, goal and basis. They contain so many hints and implicit patterns of reasoning that they seem to anticipate all merely human intellectual efforts. Thus the Upaniṣads are not a set of dogmas against which human reason would have to revolt or assert itself, but rather a source to which it traces itself and its own legitimacy, a universe of meaning in which it can exercise its potential without having to proclaim its autonomy, and to which it can subordinate itself without having to sacrifice itself.

It is obviously impossible for a modern Western reader to follow Śaṅkara into all the details of his Vedic exegesis. But it is equally impossible to understand his thought in its philosophical as well as in its historical dimensions without fully recognizing and respecting its fundamental commitment to the Vedic revelation.[206]

Notes

Ch. II: Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in the Philosophy of Śaṅkara

[1] Cf. Indien und Europa, chapter XII (especially § 194).

[2] Cf. Indien und Europa, § 250 ff.; 278 ff.

[3] E.g. T.R.V. Murti, The Rational Basis of Advaitism. Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1930), 57-81.

[4] Cf. P. Schreiner, Some Remarks about the Function of Reason in Modern Advaita Philosophy. Ānvīkṣikī 6 (1973), 114-122; ib., 119 (quote from G.R. Malkani).

[5] R.S. Naulakha, Shankara's Brahmavada, Kanpur 1964, 36.

[6] S.K. Mukherjee, Śaṅkara on the Relation between the Vedas and Reason. Indian Historical Quarterly 6 (1930), 108-113; ib., 113.

[7] An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge, Delhi 1962, 62; 65; on p. 68, Devaraja suggests that Śaṅkara's insistence on the ultimate authority of the Vedas was due to certain "ultra-orthodox moods".

[8] Cf. also M. Hiriyanna, The Place of Reason in Advaita; in: Indian Philosophical Studies I, Mysore 1957, 45-52.

[9] The System of the Vedānta, transl. by Ch. Johnston, New York 1973, 96 (German original: Leipzig[3] 1920; 1st ed.; 1883).

[10] Cf. Indien und Europa, chapter IX.

[11] E. Deutsch, Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction, Honolulu 1969, 5; cf. 6: "We want to find in Advaita Vedānta that which is philosophically meaningful to a Westerner and to articulate this content in universal philosophical terms." According to Deutsch, this amounts to an interpretation of Śaṅkara in terms of levels of "experience".

[12] Conflict between Traditionalism and Rationalism: A Problem with Śaṅkara. Philo-

sophy East and West 12 (1962), 153-162; especially 157.

13 A Thousand Teachings, 48.

14 Cf. Indien und Europa, § 266 ff.

15 Other terms which may be mentioned in this context and which refer either to "reflection" or to "methodical examination" are *manana*; *vicāra*; *nyāya*; *ānvīkṣikī*; *parīkṣā*; another important term with a wide range of connotations - from "conjectural modification" (in Mīmāṃsā) to "reasoning" in the sense of *yukti* - is *ūha* (sometimes combined with *apoha*; e.g. Vyāsa and Vācaspati on Yogasūtra II, 18; Medhātithi on Manu II, 6; ed. J.H. Dave, I, 163; already Avadānaśataka, ed. J.S. Speyer, I, 209).

16 There is also a broader sense, in which it appears in the title of several Nyāya works, e.g. in Keśavamiśra's Tarkabhāṣā.

17 Cf. S. Bagchi, Inductive Reasoning, Calcutta 1953, 4 ff.

18 Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 39, which precedes the definition of *tarka*, is quoted twice in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad; see below, § 10 f.

19 Cf. Indien und Europa, § 266 ff.; Maitrī-Upaniṣad VII, 8 has the expression *vṛthā-tarka*.

20 See below, n. 89 f.

21 This verse from Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā is quoted, e.g., in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṃgraha (v. 3242 etc.) and Ratnakīrti's Sarvajñasiddhi (cf. G. Bühnemann, Der allwissende Buddha, Wien 1980, 71; 146). A modified version is found in Yāmuna's Saṃvitsiddhi (in: Siddhitraya, ed. Rāmamiśra Śāstrin, Benares 1910, ChSS, 88). - According to TV, 80 (on I, 3, 2), the Mīmāṃsā is an "array of methods" (*yuktikalāpa*).

22 Lokatattvanirṇaya I, 38 (ed. L. Suali, Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana 18, 1905, 278); the verse is quoted by Guṇaratna and Maṇibhadra in their commentaries on Haribhadra's Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, v. 44 (by Guṇaratna also in the introduction). Cf. also L. de La Vallée Poussin, Une stance jaina et bouddhique. Journal Asiatique X/17 (1911), 323-325.

23 Most of the occurrences in this text are in negative formulations, such as *na-upapadyate* or *na yujyate*; cf., e.g., VII, 20 ff.; II, 7; 16 ff.; also XXIV, 14; and Gauḍapāda, Kārikā III, 27.

24 See above, n. 7.

25 Cf. BSBh I, 1, 2 (Works III, 8).

26 See below, § 8.

27 Cf. the contributions by G. Oberhammer in: Offenbarung, geistige Realität des Menschen, ed. G. Oberhammer, Wien 1974. - YD, 14 (on Kārikā 2) mentions several definitions of the Veda, one of which includes *tarka*: *aṅgāni vedās tarkā vā, yathā-āha - vedavedāṅgatarkeṣu vedasaṃjñā nirucyate*; a definition which includes *tarka* is also mentioned by Bhartṛhari in his Vṛtti on VP I, 10.

[28] See below, § 10.

[29] Cf. the contributions on Śaṅkara and Advaita Vedānta in: Kleine Schriften, ed. L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978.

[30] Cf. also my review of Vetter's Studien in: Orientalistische Literaturzeitung (forthcoming).

[31] Cf. my review in: Journal of the American Oriental Society 100 (1980), 43-45.

[32] Cf. Beweisverfahren, 51 ff.; 57 ff.; also 35: "Vorherrschen der Beweisfunktion"; 41: "Beweisfunktion im Vordergrund", etc. - Brückner does not refer to the discussion of "examples" in BSBh III, 2, 20 or to Sureśvara's discussion of the compatibility between "comparison" (*upamāna*) and non-duality in his BUBh-Vārttika II, 4, 459 ff.

[33] Beweisverfahren, 163: "Sein eigenes Verfahren scheint mir Śaṁkara selbst am besten zu beschreiben, wenn er über das der śruti sagt: . . . sarvāsu hy upaniṣatsu pūrvam ekatvaṃ pratijñāya dṛṣṭāntair hetubhiś ca paramātmano vikārāṃśāditvaṃ jagataḥ pratipādya punar ekatvam upasaṃharati." For the translation of this passage from BUBh II, 1, 20, cf. 51 f., n. 5.

[34] Cf. Beweisverfahren, 55; also 58 f.; 68; 74; 181.

[35] See below, § 6 f.

[36] To reduce Śaṅkara's critique of "inference", "reason" etc. to occasional "polemical invectives" ("polemische Ausfälle", Beweisverfahren, 128, n. 1) against misuses of argumentation is as insufficient as N.K. Devaraja's references to Śaṅkara's "ultra-orthodox moods" (see above, n. 7).

[37] Beweisverfahren, 56.

[38] Cf. BUBh I, 1, intr.

[39] Cf. the reference to the work of P. Hacker and S. Mayeda in Vetter's preface.

[40] Cf. Erfahrung des Unerfahrbaren bei Śaṅkara; in: Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils, ed. G. Oberhammer, Wien 1978, 45-59.

[41] On Gauḍapāda, cf. also T. Vetter, Die Gauḍapādīya-Kārikās: Zur Entstehung und zur Bedeutung von (a)dvaita. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 22(1978), 95-131.

[42] It is referred to in several of Vetter's eight interpretive key questions (Studien, 17 f.), most explicitly in question E: "Wo kommt der Inhalt des erlösenden . . . Wissens her?"

[43] Cf. the presentation and discussion by Vetter, Studien, 38 ff.

[44] Cf. Works I, 196; 208; 227 f.

[45] Cf. also Works I, 227: *āgamataḥ pratijñātasya-advaitasya* . . .

[46] But cf. Kārikā: *niścitaṃ yuktiyuktaṃ ca yat*; Śaṅkara explains *niścitam* as *śrutyā niścitam*.

[47] Cf. Studien, 34 ff.

[48] See below, § 10.

[49] Studien, 38.

[50] Studien, 46; on p. 47, Vetter notes, that *yukti/tarka* are used more freely than *anumāna* in the formal sense.

[51] Studien, 71.

[52] Studien, 89.

[53] Cf. Studien, 89: "der vielleicht bedeutendste denkerische Versuch".

[54] Cf. Kleine Schriften, ed. L. Schmithausen, Wiesenbaden 1978, 214.

[55] Cf. Studien, 107: "Klärung des Inhalts von 'du' bzw. von 'ich' durch Überlegung (*yukti*)"; 114: "Kern des Individuums".

[56] Studien, 104 ff.

[57] Studien, 118; on Vetter's interpretation of this and related passages, see below, § 16.

[58] In USG I, which according to Vetter would be later than BSBh IV, 1, 2, the relationship is again found to be less clear and definite.

[59] Studien, 15.

[60] Cf. Studien, 17.

[61] Cf. also Studien, 18: "Ausserdem ist festzustellen: je älter ein Text, desto schwieriger ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Theorie und Praxis . . ."

[62] Cf. Studien, 8; 17; 19, where "theory" is paraphrased accordingly.

[63] Cf. Studien, 19: "Er verschmäht dann zwar nicht die Vorteile, welche der Advaita-Begriff in Exegese und Polemik bisweilen bietet, es erscheint mir aber als umgekehrte Welt, wenn man diese Episoden seinem sich überall als sehr ernsthaft darbietenden Streben nach dem Heil unterordnen will." The second part of this statement is somewhat surprising, if not incomprehensible, in its context; it seems to involve a typographical error.

[64] Cf. Erfahrung des Unerfahrbaren bei Śaṅkara (see above, n. 40), 56.

[65] Cf. Studien, 17.

[66] Cf. Indien und Europa, § 261.

[67] However, this is a pedagogical orientation without the temporal urge of "saving souls".

[68] Cf., e.g., BSBh III, 3, 1; and below, § 9 (specifically n. 128).

[69] Vetter himself modifies his earlier assessment of the feasibility of a complete relative chronology of Śaṅkara's writings; cf. Studien, 18.

[70] There may, indeed, be "(at least) six positions" concerning "being" in Śaṅkara's writings (cf. Studien, 13 f.); but this does not mean that there is no basic unity of orientation in this matter.

[71] The Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa may be disregarded in the context of this presentation; but see the appendix on this text.

[72] Cf. Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin: Einige Beobachtungen; in: Kleine Schriften, ed. L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978, 213-242 (originally Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 12-13, 1968/69).

[73] Cf. BUBh II, 1, 20 (Works I, 743 ff.); also on Taittirīya-Upaniṣad III, 10, 4.

[74] Cf., e.g., BSBh II, 1, 11.

[75] Cf., e.g., US XII, 18; XVI, 65; XVIII, 43; 88; XIX, 25; USG I, 44; BUBh I, 4, 10 (Works I, 676); II, 5, intr. (Works I, 770); IV, 5, intr. (Works I, 939); on Taittirīya-Upaniṣad III, 4, 10; on Kaṭha-Upaniṣad I, 2, 20.

[76] Cf. USG I, 43; BUBh I, 4, 10 (Works I, 676; this is a *pūrvapakṣa*; *śruti*, *yukti* etc. are repeatedly combined in *pūrvapakṣa* sections). - As a matter of fact, appeals to the concordance or coordination of *śāstra*/*āgama* and *yukti*/*tarka* are not at all unusual in the philosophical literature of Śaṅkara's time and of the period prior to it. On the Buddhist side, they appear, e.g., in the works of the Madhyamaka commentators Bhāvaviveka (Bhavya) and Candrakīrti; cf. Sh. Iida, Āgama (Scripture) and Yukti (Reason) in Bhāvaviveka; in: Kanakura kinenronbunshū (Kanakura Festschrift), Kyoto 1966, 79-96; also Reason and Emptiness, Tokyo 1980, 105; 226f.; 231; Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā on Madhyamakakārikā I, 1 (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, 42: *yuktyāgamābhyām*); see also L. de La Vallée Poussin, Dogmatique bouddhique. La négation de l'âme et la doctrine de l'acte. Journal Asiatique IX/20 (1902), 237-306; especially 253 f. (n. 3). On the Hindu side, see, e.g., Uddyotakara, Nyāyavārttika on NS I, 1, 14 (ed. V.P. Dvivedin, Calcutta 1914, 75), where the word *śāstra* (as juxtaposed with *yukti*) refers to the Sūtra text; also Maṇḍana, Sphoṭasiddhi, v. 36, where *āgama* refers to the tradition of grammatical philosophy.

[77] On Taittirīya-Upaniṣad III, 10, 4 (Works I, 320): *kāpilakāṇādāditarkaśāstravirodha iti cet. na. teṣāṃ mūlābhāve vedavirodhe ca bhrāntatvopapatteḥ. śrutyupapattibhyāṃ ca siddham ātmano 'saṃsāritvam.*

[78] BSBh I, 1, 1 (Works III, 6); cf. here also Manu XII, 106 (*vedaśāstrāvirodhinā tarkeṇa*) with commentaries.

[79] Cf. US XVI, 65; XVIII, 88. - Cf. also Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, v. 474 ff., which is probably not authentic.

[80] BSBh II, 2, 1 (Works III, 220).

[81] See below, § 10.

[82] BSBh II, 1, 6 (Works III, 188); cf. also Indien und Europa, § 268.

[83] Cf. BSBh II, 1, 11; II, 2, 6; on Kaṭha-Upaniṣad I, 2, 8 (*kevalena tarkeṇa*, *kevalābhir yuktibhiḥ*, etc.)

[84] On Kaṭha-Upaniṣad I, 2, 9 (*na-eṣā tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā*).

[85] Cf. BUBh I, 4, 6 (Works I, 653): *tārkikais tu parityaktāgamabalair asti na-asti kartā-akartā-ityādi viruddhaṃ tarkayadbhir ākulīkṛtaḥ śāstrārthaḥ*; on the other hand, everything becomes clear to those who follow the sacred texts alone (*kevalaśāstrānusārin*) and who are without conceit (*śāntadarpa*).

[86] Cf. on Kaṭha-Upaniṣad I, 2, 8: *tarkyamāṇe 'ṇuparimāṇe kenacit sthāpita ātmani tato 'ṇutaram anyo 'bhyūhati, tato 'py 'ṇutaram iti na hi tarkasya niṣṭhā kvacid vidyate*; cf. also the problems and confusions concerning the self described in the commentary on Aitareya-Upaniṣad II, 1, intr.

[87] BSBh II, 1, 11; cf. also the attack against the "reasoners", BUBh II, 1, 20 (Works I, especially 743 ff.).

[88] This *pūrvapakṣa* also quotes Manu XII, 105 f. (. . . *vedaśāstrāvirodhinā yas tarkeṇa-anusandhatte* . . .).

[89] Cf. VP II, 484 (ed. W. Rau); Vṛtti on I, 30 and on I, 137/129 (= I, 153, ed. W. Rau).

[90] Cf. Bhāsarvajña, NBhūṣ, 393; also the expressions *śuṣkavāda*, *śuṣkavigraha*: Bhāgavata-purāṇa XI, 12, 20; 18, 30. Maitrī-Upaniṣad VII, 8 has *vṛthātarka*; Jayanta, NM 4, uses *kṣudra-tarka*; NM, 109 also quotes Bhartṛhari, VP I, 34.

[91] Cf., e.g., BSBh II, 1, 1 ff.; BUBh IV, 3, 22.

[92] Cf. BUBh I, 1, intr. (Works I, 608).

[93] Cf. BSBh II, 1, 1 ff.; among the philosophical systems, only Sāṁkhya and Yoga are commonly referred to as *smṛti*, but analogous questions are asked with reference to Vaiśeṣika and other systems.

[94] Cf. BS I, 4, 1; I, 1, 18; 3, 3; on the other hand, *pradhāna* can also be called *smārta* (BS I, 2, 19). - On the special role of the Sāṃkhya tradition, which combines some recognition of the Veda with an extensive use of reasoning, cf. BSBh II, 1, 12.

[95] BSBh II, 1, 3 (Works III, 184); on the relation of *tarka* and *smṛti*, cf. also BSBh II, 1, 4.

[96] Insofar, the coordination of *śruti*, *smṛti*, *nyāya* etc. in *dvandva* compounds does certainly not imply that they have the same weight or function at the same level; see above, n. 75 f.

[97] Cf. BS I, 3, 28 with BSBh (Works III, 123: *pratyakṣaṃ śrutiḥ, prāmāṇyaṃ praty anapekṣatvāt. anumānaṃ smṛtiḥ, prāmāṇyaṃ prati sāpekṣatvāt*); cf. BSBh II, 1, 1 (Works III, 182): *vedasya hi nirapekṣaṃ svārthe prāmāṇyaṃ, raver iva rūpaviṣaye.*

[98] Cf. BS I, 3, 28; III, 2, 24; IV 4, 20; cf. also the Mīmāṃsā use of *pramāṇa* in the sense of "standard of exegesis" and the list of six such exegetic *pramāṇas* (starting with *pratyakṣa* as direct and explicit scriptural statement).

[99] Cf. BUBh I, 1, intr. (Works I, 608); II, 1, 20 (Works I, 734); II, 5, 15 (Works I, 775, where the expression *paṇḍitammanya* refers to the Mīmāṃsakas).

[100] BUBh I, 1, intr. (Works I, 608); in his commentary on MS I, 1, 5, Śabara uses primarily inference or hypothetical reasoning to establish the existence of the soul, but he refers also to Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 3, 7; Kumārila says with reference to this section: *ity āha nāstikyanirākariṣṇur ātmāstitāṃ bhāṣyakṛd atra yuktyā* (ŚV, 515; the final verse of the *Ātmavāda* chapter).

[101] BSBh III, 3, 53 (Works III, 424): *ita eva ca-ākṛṣya-ācāryeṇa śabarasvāminā pramāṇalakṣaṇe varṇitam* (followed by a reference to Upavarṣa). We cannot discuss here the implications which this passage may have concerning the original status and mutual relations of MS and BS; cf. A. Parpola, On the Formation of the Mīmāṃsā and the Problems concerning Jaimini. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 25 (1981), 145-177; specifically 153. Even if Śaṅkara assumed an original continuity of Pūrva- and Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtras, he found this unity and continuity abandoned by the later Pūrvamīmāṃsā commentators.

[102] Cf. BUBh II, 1, 20 (Works I, 734): *tathā ca nyāyavidaḥ sāṃkhyamīmāṃsakādayo 'saṃsāriṇo 'bhāvaṃ yuktiśataiḥ pratipādayanti.* This statement corresponds to Śaṅkara's own view, although it does not appear in a *siddhānta* section.

[103] A satisfactory systematic and historical analysis of this important and problematic concept has not yet been written.

[104] Cf. his Vṛtti on VP I, 8, where the expression *arthavādarūpāṇi* is illustrated by a number of Upaniṣad quotes; the authenticity of this Vṛtti has been disputed.

[105] Cf. TV, 80 (on I, 3, 2): *lokārthavādopaniṣatprasūta*; 81: *upaniṣadarthavādaprabhavatva* (v. l.: *upaniṣatprabhavatva*). See also TV, 12 (on I, 2, 7): *etena kratvarthakartṛpratipādanadvāreṇa-upaniṣadāṃ nairākaṅkṣyaṃ vyākhyātam*; Someśvara, NSudhā, 24 f., explains: *paralokaphaleṣu karmasu vināśidehādivyatiriktakartṛbhoktṛrūpātmajñānaṃ vinā pravṛttyanupapatteḥ.*

[106] Cf. Vidhiviveka, ed. M.L. Goswami, Benares 1978, 199; Brahmasiddhi, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras 1937, 74. In a corresponding passage of Prabhākara's Bṛhatī (ed. Chinnaswami Sastri, fasc. 1, Benares 1929, ChSS, 18 f.), the Upaniṣads are not mentioned.

[107] Cf., e.g., Maṇḍana, Vidhiviveka, 192: *vedānteṣu tāvad ātmatattvapratipattikartavyatā*; Vācaspati paraphrases in his Nyāyakaṇikā (loc. cit.): *ātmā jñātavya iti hi pratipattir ātmani vidhīyate, tatparatvaṃ ca vedāntānām.* In his following statements, Vācaspati analyses and criticizes this view, first pointing out the threefold implication of *pratipatti* (*tisraḥ khalv imāḥ pratipattayaḥ sambhavanti, śrutamayī, cintāmayī, sākṣātkāravatī ca-iti*) and then the problems of correlating "injunction" and "liberation", which is not something "to be accomplished" (*sādhya*). - The followers and commentators of Kumārila, e.g. Pārthasārathi, indicate more or less explicitly that the Upaniṣads should not be seen as amounting to mere *arthavādas*, but the relationship remains somewhat elusive; cf. Śāstradīpikā, ed. Lax-

man Shastri Dravid, Benares 1916 (ChSS), 372 ff.; also Someśvara, NSudhā, 24 f.

108 Cf. Gītābhāṣya XVIII, 66 (Works II, 295): *yathā-arthavādānāṃ vidhiśeṣāṇām...*; BUBh I, 2, 5 (Works I, 697) paraphrases the word *praśaṃsā*: *na-apūrvārtho 'nyo 'sti.* The most conspicuous passage using the concept of *arthavāda* (or *stuti*) is BUBh IV, 4, 22 (Works I, 934 f.). Śaṅkara argues against Pūrvamīmāṃsā attempts to construe Vedic references to renunciation as arthavādas, and he insists that renunciation is enjoined by genuine vidhis, which are accompanied by arthavādas. What is accompanied by an arthavāda in such a manner cannot itself be a mere arthavāda; renunciation (*pārivrājya*) is something to be practised, just as the new and full moon ceremony: *yadi pārivrājyam anuṣṭheyam api sad anya-stutyarthaṃ syāt, darśapūrṇamāsādīnām apy anuṣṭheyānāṃ stutyarthatā syāt.* Śaṅkara's argumentation in this passage is obviously *ad hominem* and does not indicate an abandonment of his basic conviction that the message of the Veda has ultimately to be understood in terms of information, and not of injunction. - Cf. also YD, 16 ff., on vidhi and "renunciation."

109 Cf. BSBh I, 3, 33 (Works III, 138): *vidyamānavāda āśrayaṇīyo, na guṇavādaḥ.*

110 Cf. BSBh I, 1, 1-4; II, 1, 6; BUBh I, 4, 7; US I, 12 ff.; Gītābhāṣya XVIII, 66.

111 See also the references to Sureśvara in § 15 (especially n. 195).

112 See below. n. 198.

113 Cf. BUBh IV, 3, 6 (Works I, 867; with specific reference to "analogous" - *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* - inferential reasoning).

114 Cf. BSBh II, 1, 6 (Works III, 188): *rūpādyabhāvād dhi na-ayam arthaḥ pratyakṣasya gocaraḥ. liṅgādyabhāvāc na-anumānādīnām*; cf. also BSBh I, 1, 2.

115 Cf. BUBh III, 3, intr. (Works I, 802): *na ca pramāṇāntaraviruddhārthaviṣaye śruteḥ prāmāṇyaṃ kalpyate, yathā* (printed: *tathā*) *śīto 'gniḥ kledayati-iti*; similarly II, 1, 20 (Works I, 737); even more strongly Gītābhāṣya XVIII, 66 (Works II, 294 f.): *na hi śrutiśatam api śīto 'gnir aprakāśo vā-iti bruvat prāmāṇyam upaiti. yadi brūyāc chīto 'gnir aprakāśo vā-iti, tathā-apy arthāntaraṃ śruter vivakṣitaṃ kalpyaṃ, prāmāṇyānyathānupapatteḥ, na tu pramāṇāntaraviruddhaṃ svavacanaviruddhaṃ vā.* Śaṅkara's presentation of this matter may, of course, vary according to the dialectical situation and the opponent whom he addresses.

116 BSBh II, 1, 13 (Works III, 194); this *pūrvapakṣa* adds: *tarko 'pi svaviṣayād anyatra-apratiṣṭhitaḥ syāt.*

117 Cf. Pārthasārathi, Śāstradīpikā, ed. Laxman Shastri Dravid, Benares 1919 (ChSS), 312: *na ca-āgamena pratyakṣabādhaḥ sambhavati, pratyakṣasya śīghrapravṛttatvena sarvebhyo balīyastvāt.* - Cf. also US XVIII, 14 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *śrutānumānajanmānau sāmānyaviṣayau yataḥ / pratyayāv akṣajo 'vaśyaṃ viśeṣārtho nivārayet*; similarly: Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on Yogasūtra I, 49; also on I, 42 (and YSBhV, 103).

118 Cf. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Advaitasiddhi, ed. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrin, Bombay 1917, 373 f.; *vyāvahārikaprāmāṇyamātram . . . na-advaitāgamena bādhyate, bādhyate tu tāttvikaṃ prāmāṇyam.*

119 Cf., e.g., BUBh I, 1, intr. (Works I, 609); BSBh III, 2, 3 (Works III, 344 f.; on *deśakālanimitta* and dreaming); also BUBh IV, 4, 22 (Works I, 934): *sādhyasādhanādisarva-saṃsāradharmavinirmukta.*

[120] W. Halbfass, Karma, *apūrva* and "Natural" Causes; in: Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, ed. W.D. O'Flaherty, Berkeley 1980, 268-302; ib., 299 f. (with reference to BSBh III, 1, 1).

[121] Cf. BUBh II, 1, 20 (Works I, 742 f.): *tasmāt puruṣamativaicitryam apekṣya sādhyasādhanasambandhaviśeṣān anekadhā-upadiśati. tatra puruṣāḥ svayam eva yathāruci sādhanaviśeṣeṣu pravartante, śāstraṃ tu savitṛpradīpādivad udāsta eva.*

[122] BSBh II, 1, 27 (Works III, 213); Śaṅkara adds that in the case of *brahman* the inadequacy of reason is even more obvious. - Concerning the incalculable variability of this world, see also Bhartṛhari, VP I, 32 f. (*avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād*...).

[123] BSBh II, 1, 15 (arguing against the *asatkāryavāda*); Śaṅkara has no notion of strictly deductive reasoning.

[124] Cf. BSBh I, 1, 2 (Works III, 8), where Śaṅkara emphasizes that the Sūtra *janmādy asya yataḥ* should not be understood as an attempt to infer the existence of *īśvara* or *brahman.*

[125] BSBh II, 2, 38 (Works III, 257).

[126] Cf., e.g., BSBh I, 4, 27; IV, 4, 8.

[127] Cf. BSBh II, 1, 13 f. (waves and ocean and other similes); also II, 1, 6, where the reference to "worldly experience" (Works III, 187: *dṛśyate hi loke*...) and its "examples" serves as a convenient dialectical device.

[128] BSBh III, 3, 1 (Works III, 375); on the other hand, Śaṅkara emphasizes that the principle of contradiction cannot be used as a basis of questioning the authority of the Veda, and that it should not be applied in a narrow sense; cf. BSBh II, 1, 27.

[129] US XVII, 9.

[130] Cf. The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. M. Sprung, Dordrecht 1973.

[131] See above, § 7.

[132] BSBh I, 1, 2 (Works III, 8).

[133] BSBh II, 1, 6 (Works III, 188 f.).

[134] On the chronological hypotheses of P. Hacker and T. Vetter, see above, § 4 f.

[135] BUBh II, 1, 20 (Works I, 738).

[136] BUBh II, 1, 20 (Works I, 737).

[137] BUBh IV, 3, 2 (Works I, 862).

[138] BUBh II, 5, intr. (Works I, 770); the Nyāya statement quoted by Śaṅkara is NS I, 1, 39.

[139] BUBh III, 1, intr. (Works I, 782).

[140] BUBh IV, 5, intr. (Works I, 939). - BUBh IV, 3, intr. (Works I, 860 f.) states that in the preceding sections Janaka has first been instructed briefly by scriptural references, that then the four states of consciousness have been referred to, and that now an understanding has to be brought about - in the context of the Upaniṣad itself - by means of reasoning: *evam abhayaṃ pariprāpito janako yājñavalkyena-āgamataḥ saṃkṣepataḥ. atra ca jāgratsvapnasuṣupta-turīyāṇy upanyastāny. . . . idānīṃ jāgratsvapnādidvāreṇa-eva mahatā tarkeṇa vistarato 'dhigamaḥ kartavyaḥ*. IV, 3, 21 (Works I, 891) again presents the sacred texts as explicating and reinforcing authoritative statements by argumentation: . . . *ity āgamataḥ. iha tu tarkataḥ prapañcitaṃ darśitāgamārthapratyayadārḍhyāya*. See also Padabhāṣya on Kena-Upaniṣad, intr. (Works I, 15) and II, 1 ff. (Works I, 25 f.; on the Upaniṣadic use of the form of the dialogue).

[141] Cf. US XVIII, 3: *mātṛvac chrutir ādṛtā*; on Kaṭha-Upaniṣad III, 1, 15: *mātṛpitṛsahasrebhyo 'pi hitaiṣiṇā vedena-upadiṣṭam ātmaikatvadarśanam*. Repeatedly, the Veda appears as the subject of "mental acts", i.e. intentions, assumptions, etc.; cf. on Chāndogya-Upaniṣad VIII, 1, intr. (Works I, 566), which emphasizes the Upaniṣad's consideration for people of slow understanding (*mandabuddhi*) and concludes: *sanmārgasthās tāvad bhavantu, tataḥ śanaiḥ paramārthasad api grāhayiṣyāmi-iti manyate śrutiḥ*. Various examples of this type are found in BUBh, e.g. I, 5, 17 (Works I, 706): *etasya-arthas tirohita iti manvānā śrutir vyākhyānāya pravartate. . . pitur abhiprāyaṃ manvānā-ācaṣṭe śrutiḥ*. - See, on the other hand, Bhāsarvajña, NBhūṣ, 393: *vedas tv ājñāsiddhatvena-upadiṣṭaḥ pitrādivākyavat. na hy atra yuktyā kaścid arthaḥ pratipāditas . . .*

[142] Cf. Gītābhāṣya XVIII, 66 (Works II, 295); BUBh II, 1, 20 (Works I, 742 f.) - See also Sureśvara, Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavarttika II, 19 ff., specifically the metaphor of the "mother" in v. 23.

[143] Cf. BUBh IV, 3, 6 (Works I, 867): inference and the daily activities of eating and drinking.

[144] See above, n. 100; H. Brückner, Beweisverfahren, 27, calls the Nyāya quotes "schöne Funde".

[145] Cf. e.g., Madhva, Bhāṣya on BS I, 1, 4, where the verse appears as a quote from a "Bṛhatsaṃhitā" (not Varāhamihira's work); Vidyāraṇya, Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha, ed. Rāmaśāstrī Tailaṅga, Benares 1893, 2; 229 (cf. also the Pūrṇaprajña, i.e. Madhva chapter in Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya's Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha); Sadānanda, Vedāntasāra, § 184.

[146] Cf. Vedāntasāra, § 185; 191. - *Upakrama* and *upasaṃhāra* together constitute *one* of the six "marks".

[147] Cf. the use of the term *śruti* as one of the six exegetic criteria (*pramāṇa*) in Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

[148] BUBh II, 5, intr.; the name of Bhartṛprapañca is mentioned by the commentator Ānandagiri.

[149] On Padmapāda's treatment of this scheme, cf. P. Hacker, Schüler Śaṅkaras, 152. There is a similar scheme in Yoga (cf. Yogabhāṣya on Sūtra I, 48: *āgama*, *anumāna*, *dhyānābhyāsa*), which Vācaspati (Tattvavaiśāradī on I, 48) identifies with *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *nididhyāsana*; cf. also YSBhV, 114.

[150] See above, § 9; Śaṅkara does usually not include scriptural quotes in his argumenta-

tion against extra-Vedic groups; cf., e.g., BSBh II, 2, 18-36 (against Buddhists and Jainas); he may, of course, invoke the authority of Vedic revelation in a general sense when he is dealing with the "independent reasoning" of the Buddhists etc.; BSBh II, 2, 24 has one casual reference to the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad.

151 See above, § 4 (on Śaṅkara's commentary on the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad and on Gauḍapāda's Kārikās).

152 Cf. Schüler Śaṅkaras, 74: "Reflexion darüber, daß der Inhalt der Wörter und des Satzes wohlbegründet und das Gegenteil logisch unmöglich ist"; in another section (93 f.), Hacker emphasizes the affinity between this "logical method" and the distinction (*viveka*) between self and non-self.

153 Cf. Rāmānuja's Vedārthasaṃgraha, Poona 1956, 63.

154 A Thousand Teachings, 53.

155 Loc. cit., 52; 56; p. 66, n. 23 suggests that this method is only found in US XVIII. - Cf. also K.S. Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta, Delhi² 1974, 152: "It was Śaṅkara himself who first gave rise to this type of tarka."

156 A Thousand Teachings, 57; 55.

157 Cf. Studien, 104 ff.

158 *Anvaya* and *vyatireka* in Indian Grammar. Adyar Library Bulletin 31/32 (1967/68), 313-352.

159 On Reasoning from *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in Early Advaita; in: Studies in Indian Philosophy, Memorial Vol. Sukhlalji Sanghvi, ed. D. Malvania and N.J. Shah, Ahmedabad 1981, 79-104; specifically 79; 87; 93; 96 f.

160 Studien, 104 ff.

161 Cf. Sureśvara's introduction to Naiṣk. IV, 22 (= US XVIII, 96): *tasya ca yuṣmadasmadvibhāgavijñānasya kā yuktir upāyabhāvaṃ pratipadyate*; also to IV, 23 (= US XVIII, 97): *kathaṃ tau yuktir* . . .

162 See also VS III, 2, 13: *aham iti pratyagātmani bhāvāt paratra-abhāvād arthāntarapratyakṣaḥ*. - In Advaita Vedānta, the individual ego-sense has, of course, to be discarded; cf. Sureśvara, Naiṣk. III, 32, denying the *ahaṃdharma* in deep sleep (*suṣupta*).

163 USG II, 89 (ed. S. Mayeda, p. 210); the reading *caitanyamātram* which Mayeda gives in his critical apparatus seems to be preferable to the *-mātratvād* printed in the text. - See also Gītābhāṣya II, 16 (Works II, 14 f.) and below, Appendix, n. 65: "being" (*sat*) in correlation with *avyabhicāra* and as irreducible ingredient of all cognition.

164 Loc. cit., 93 (ed. S. Mayeda, p. 211); cf. 209 (p. 215): *advaitabhāvaś ca sarvapratyayabhedeṣv avyabhicārāt. pratyayabhedās tv avagatiṃ vyabhicaranti.* In these words of the "pupil", the usage of this "method" seems to be carried further than in any other text by Śaṅkara.

165 On Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad VII (Works I, 187); apart from his Gauḍapādda commentary, *turīya* plays virtually no role in Śaṅkara's writings (but cf. US X, 4). - *Anvayavyatireka*

and *vyabhicāra/avyabhicāra* are combined in Sureśvara's Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika II, 656.

166 On Praśna-Upaniṣad VI, 2 (Works I, 133).

167 Cf. US XVIII, 98: *svayam eva-abravīc chāstraṃ pratyayāvagatī pṛthak*; in BUBh IV, 3, 2 (Works I, 862), Śaṅkara suggests that in this section the Veda itself may have chosen the *anumānamārga* in accordance with our ways of thinking.

168 Cf. BUBh IV, 3, 7 (especially Works I, 871 ff.); *vyabhicar* in the sense of "occurring without" is used on p. 872: *vyatiriktacaitanyāvabhāsyatvaṃ na vyabhicarati* (sc. *pradīpaḥ*); cf. IV, 3, 6 (Works I, 865): *anumānasya vyabhicāritvād*. - See also the appendix on YSBhV.

169 Cf. Śaṅkara, loc. cit., 869 f.; Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa V, 1, 2, 18; XII, 9, 2, 7; and more specifically Kaṭha-Upaniṣad II, 3, 17: *taṃ* (sc. *puruṣaṃ*) *svāc charīrāt pravṛhen muñjād iva-iṣīkām*; Sureśvara, Naiṣk. III, 46; Vidyāraṇya, Pañcadaśī I, 42; on the Buddhist side, see Dīghanikāya II (Sāmaññaphalasutta), 86; Aśvaghoṣa, Buddhacarita XII, 64. - The simile of the "bilva-fruit on the hand" (US XVIII, 180) appears also in the introduction to BUBh.

170 Cf. Chāndogya-Upaniṣad V, 1, 6 ff.; a parallel version (with Brahmā instead of Prajāpati) is found in BU VI, 1, 7 ff.

171 Cf. Śabara on MS I, 1, 5; also Śaṅkara, BUBh IV, 3, 6.

172 See above, § 12 (references to VS III, 2, 9: *śabdavyatireka*).

173 Cf. Jayanta, NM, 226 ff.; in this section, Jayanta argues against the attempt to establish the authority of the medical tradition (*āyurveda*) in a purely empirical manner, i.e. based upon the "concurrent testimony of sense-perception etc." (*pratyakṣādisaṃvāda*), and to ascertain the causes and cures of diseases by means of "positive and negative concomitance" (*anvayavyatireka*) alone. Cf. also NM, 2 (*śāstra* and *anvayayavyatireka*); 139 ff. (relation between *śabda* and *anumāna*); Bhāsarvajña, NBhūṣ, 514 ff.; Vācaspati, Tattvavaiśāradī on Yogasūtra I, 24; Medhātithi on Manu II, 6 (ed. J.H. Dave, I, Bombay 1972, 165); and specifically Abhinavagupta, Tantrāloka XXXV, 1 ff. (with commentary by Jayaratha; indebted to Bhartṛhari, VP I, 32; with Vṛtti).

174 BSBh II, 1, 14 (Works III, 199).

175 Cf. Bhartṛhari, Vṛtti on VP 137/129 (= I, 153, ed. W. Rau): *sādharmyavaidharmya* and "dry reasoning" (*śuṣkatarka*). In Nyāya, *sādharmyavaidharmya* is specifically associated with the dialectical device called *jāti* (used in the sense of "sophistic rejoinder"); cf. NS I, 2, 18 and commentaries.

176 ŚV, 208 f. (v. 83; 85; in v. 83, *grāhakotpādaṃ* has to be substituted for *grāhakotpāda-*). The problematic half-verse 85 a (*-vinābhāvād?*) is missing in Śāntarakṣita's quote of this passage (TS, v. 2070 ff.). - In most cases, Kumārila uses *anvayavyatireka* with linguistic connotations; cf., e.g., ŚV, 357 (v. 25); 628 (v. 157). ŚV, 493 (v. 28 of the *Ātmavāda*) describes the *ātman/puruṣa* as *vyāvṛttyanugamātmaka*, i.e. as "continuing (persistent) in the discontinuities" (of the states of consciousness); this is refuted by Śāntarakṣita, TS, v. 222 ff. - Cf. Śālikanātha, Prakaraṇapañcikā, ed. A. Subramanya Sastri, Benares 1961, 85: *anvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ hi vastvantaratvam avasīyate*.

177 ŚV, 202 (v. 52 f.); *tatra* refers to memories, dreams, etc.

178 TS, v. 2070 ff., Kamalaśīla paraphrases: *anvayavyatirekābhyām iti, grāhyagrāhakasmaraṇayor bhāvābhāvābhyām.* - Cf. v. 1691 f. (on Caraka's concept of *yukti*).

179 BSBh II, 2, 28 (Works III, 248); II, 2, 30 (251).

180 Works III, 249. See also the references to the Buddhist analysis of consciousness, US XVIII, 141 ff.; however, the quote from Dharmakīrti in v. 142 seems to be an interpolation; cf. S. Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, 200, n. 101 (the verse is not questioned by T. Vetter, Studien, 100). Yet, a knowledge of Dharmakīrti may be assumed for US XVIII and BSBh II, 2, 28 ff. - *Anvayavyatireka* is also mentioned by Jayanta in his presentation and refutation of Vijñānavāda; cf. NM II, 106f.; 109; see also 13 (on materialism).

181 Cf., e.g., Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu or Pramāṇavārttika for numerous occurrences; more specifically, cf. Prajñākaragupta, Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna 1953, e.g. III, 428 f. (p. 295); III, 614 ff. (p. 344 ff.); also Y. Kajiyama, Tripañcakacintā. Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia 4/5 (1963), 1-15.

182 Cf. Naiṣk. II, 8: *anvayavyatirekau ca tāv ṛte stāṃ kimāśrayau.*

183 For a survey of the US quotes in Naiṣk., cf. US, crit. ed. S. Mayeda, Tokyo 1973, 45 ff. Mayeda does not list the US quotes in Sureśvara's other works. US XVIII, 189 is quoted at least three times: Naiṣk. IV, 32; Sambandhavārttika, v. 207; and again Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika II, 4, 112 (ed. Poona 1892-1894, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Ser., p. 1051).

184 Cf., e.g., Naiṣk. III, 31.

185 Cf. II, 335; 656 f.; Śaṅkara himself does not refer to *anvayavyatireka* in his Bṛhadāraṇyaka- and Taittirīya-Upaniṣad commentaries. - See also Sureśvara's interpretation of the example of the lost hand (US VI, 1) as *anvayavyatirekodāharaṇa* (Naiṣk. IV, 26); on *tārkika* (*kutārkika*) cf. Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika I, 2; Sambandhavārttika, v. 2.

186 Cf. Naiṣk. III, 33 ff.

187 Naiṣk. III, 39, intr.

188 III, 33, intr.; cf. II, 8 (necessity of Vedic "support"); against this, see the *pūrvapakṣa* view in Sambandhavārttika, v. 441 ff., that *anvayavyatireka* alone is sufficient.

189 Cf. Naiṣk. III, 4.

190 Cf. Naiṣk. III, 5; 53; IV, 9; 18; see also Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika III, 30; II, 656 f.

191 Cf. Naiṣk. III, 6 (with introduction); III, 113 ff.

192 Cf. Naiṣk. III, 34; also III, 6, intr. (on Sāṃkhya).

193 Cf. Naiṣk. III, 40, intr.; Ānandagiri on Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika II, 656 f. (ed. Poona 1889, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Ser., p. 175).

194 Cf. BUBh-Vārttika II, 4, 114: *anvayavyatirekataḥ niṣkṛṣya*; Sambandhavārttika, v. 810 ff.; 816 f.; and specifically v. 857 (on the essential distinction between "revealed" and "rational" knowledge of the self; cf. the *pūrvapakṣa* reference to the "states of conscious-

ness", v. 441 f.).

195 Cf. v. 854 ff.; *yukti* cannot be the "cause of validity" or "validating factor" (*māna-kāraṇa*) for the Vedic revelation.

196 Cf. Pañcadaśī I, 37 ff.; VII, 210 (*anvayavyatireka* as a method of understanding the "witness", *sākṣin*); Madhusūdana, Siddhāntabindu, ed./transl. P.C. Divanji, Baroda 1933, 70.

197 Pañcapādikā, ed. Rāmaśāstrī Bhāgavatācārya, Benares 1891 (Vizianagram Sanskrit Ser.), 39; *yukti* is presented as a synonym (*paryāya*) of *tarka*. - Cf. also Rāmānuja on BS II, 1, 4: *sarveṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ kvacit kvacit tarkānugṛhītānām eva-arthaviniścayahetutvam.*

198 Pañcapādikā, 93; cf. P. Hacker, Schüler Śaṅkaras, 152 ff.

199 Studien, 118; 122; cf. also 103 ff. (on US XVIII, 90-101). Vetter admits that the search for the meaning of *tvam* is already guided by its association with *tad*; cf. Studien, 107; 123.

200 Studien, 111.

201 Cf. BSBh I, 3, 34; also W. Halbfass, Anthropological Problems in Classical Indian Philosophy; in: Beiträge zur Indienforschung, E. Waldschmidt zum 80. Geburtstag, Berlin 1977, 225-236; ib., 235; see also below, n. 204.

202 Cf. BSBh I, 1, 4 (Works III, 20): *nanv ātmā-ahampratyayaviṣayatvād upaniṣatsv eva vijñāyata ity anupapannam. na, tatsākṣitvena pratyuktatvāt.*

203 Cf. on Aitareya-Upaniṣad II, 1, intr.; especially Works I, 340: ... *yena ca mantavya ātmā-ātmanā, yaś ca mantavya ātmā, tau dvau prasajyeyātām.* On the "tenth man", cf. the references given by S. Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, 131, n. 2.

204 In this respect, Śaṅkara follows the basic principles of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā theory of *adhikāra*; cf. BSBh I, 3, 34, where the Śūdras are excluded from the access to the Veda (especially Works III, 236: *sāmarthyam api na laukikaṃ kevalam adhikārakāraṇaṃ bhavati, śāstrīye 'rthe śāstrīyasya sāmarthyasya-apekṣitatvāt*).

205 See above, § 7 (n. 100; on BUBh I, 1, intr.; Works I, 608).

206 Śaṅkara does not develop the notion of the Veda as self-manifestation of the absolute in the manner of Bhartṛhari and the tradition of *śabdādvaita*; but cf., e.g., the somewhat casual remarks in BSBh I, 1, 3. - Two recent articles concerning the role of Vedic revelation in Śaṅkara's thought came to my notice after the completion of my manuscript: J. Taber, Reason, Revelation and Idealism in Śaṅkara's Vedānta. Journal of Indian Philosophy 9(1981), 283-307; A. Sharma, Śaṅkara's Attitude to Scriptural Authority as Revealed in His Gloss on Brahmasūtra I, 1, 3. Journal of Indian Philosophy 10(1982), 179-186. They did not produce any results which would require a modification or re-examination of my interpretation. In particular, A. Sharma's textual (and contextual) basis is far too narrow, and his references to the *tatpuruṣa* and *bahuvrīhi* interpretations of the expression *śāstra-yoni(tva)* in BS I, 1, 3 are quite insufficient to account for the complexity of the issue.

III.

Śaṅkara and Kumārila on the Plurality of Religious Traditions

1. It has often been stated that Hinduism is not a well-defined, clearly identifiable *religion* in the sense of Christianity or Islam, but rather a loosely co-ordinated and somewhat amorphous conglomeration of "sects"[1] or similar formations. The response of modern Hinduism to this assessment has been twofold: On the one hand, Hinduism has tried to demonstrate its unity and to demarcate its identity against Christianity and other "religions" by defining its common denominators or even by producing "catechisms" etc.[2] On the other hand, the assessment that Hinduism is *not* a "religion" has been accepted, but the weakness or deficiency which it suggests has been turned into an element of self-affirmation: In this view, the fact that Hinduism is not a *religion* in the ordinary sense does not imply a defect; rather, it means that it is located at a different and higher level. It is something much more comprehensive, much less divisive and sectarian than the "ordinary" religions. It is not itself a religion; i.e., it is not itself a sect. Instead, it is - according to this view - a framework, a concordance and unifying totality of sects. The "ordinary" religions, such as Christianity and Islam, should not be compared and juxtaposed to Hinduism itself, but to the sects, i.e. "religions" which are contained within Hinduism. Hinduism as the *sanātanadharma* is not a religion among religions; it is said to be the "eternal religion", religion in or behind all religions, a kind of "meta-religion", a structure potentially ready to comprise and reconcile within itself all the religions of the world, just as it contains and reconciles the so-called Hindu sects, such as Śaivism or Vaiṣṇavism and their subordinate "sectarian" formations.[3] A few quotes from representative Neo-Hindu authors may illustrate this.

The most famous apostle of Hinduism in the West, Vivekananda, says that "Buddhism was the first sect in India,"[4] and that, in the context of Hinduism, it was never *more* than a sect. In the world at

large, it became the most successful missionary religion, spreading all over the then civilized world - "from Lapland on the one side to the Philippine islands on the other. ... But in India this gigantic child was absorbed, in the long run, by the mother that gave it birth, and today the very name of Buddha is almost unknown all over India."[5] The implicit references to Christianity can hardly be overlooked when Vivekananda and other modern Indian thinkers speak about Buddhism: Buddhism is a much older and much more universal missionary religion than Christianity; yet, it is nothing more than a sect in the totality and universality of Hinduism.[6] - The other religions are, or will be, ultimately included in Hinduism; Vivekananda speaks about "the infinite arms" of Vedānta, which will be able to embrace and to include all present and future developments in science, religion and philosophy.[7]

S.V. Ketkar, Vivekananda's younger contemporary, who receives his Ph.D. from Cornell University (U.S.A.) and is later editor and, to a large extent, author of the great Marathi encyclopedia, denies that a "religion" in the European sense is anything more than what he calls a *sect* or a *sampradāya* in the context of Hinduism. According to Ketkar, "religion" is an "exclusively European term", which is not applicable to the comprehensive synthetic superstructure of Hinduism. "Once the entire Hindu civilization was in the process of spreading itself over the whole world" - before it was "arrested" by the sectarian religions, Islam and Christianity. "The religions will take the same place in any future cosmopolitanism as the *sampradāyas* have taken under Hinduism."[8]

It sounds reminiscent of this statement when the most famous spokesman of Neo-Hinduism in the 20th century, S. Radhakrishnan, says: "Hinduism is not limited in scope to the geographical area which is described as India. ... There is nothing which prevents it from extending to the uttermost parts of the world."[9] - A.K. Banerjee states in his *Discourses on Hindu Spiritual Culture*: "Hinduism has evolved out of itself a multitude of *religions*, each of which bears perfect analogy to Christianity and Mohammedanism, so far as the application of this term is concerned. ... We commit an obvious logical fallacy, when we put Hinduism by the side of Christianity, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, etc., to signify that it is one of the sectarian religions of the world."[10] The contrast between Hinduism and the other religions is thus comparable or even reducible to the contrast between Hinduism and the Hindu sects, and it is a contrast between the more comprehensive and the less comprehensive.

2. The Neo-Hindu, specifically Neo-Vedāntic references to the classical tradition which are meant to document or to illustrate the all-inclusive tolerance[11] of Hinduism and its comprehensive openness for religious plurality range from the Ṛgvedic *ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*[12] to many more recent texts, such as the *Prasthānabheda* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (16th century), which is his "commentary" on verse 7 of the *Śivamahimnastotra.*[13] There is certainly no shortage of statements in which a plurality of "paths", "methods" or "names" is accepted and "tolerated" as being conducive to one and the same ultimate goal, or in which other views are presented as being compatible with, i.e. contained in or preliminary to, one's own view. To refer to other ways of thinking, to articulate one's own position in terms of its relation to other positions, or by means of including and subordinating other teachings, is a genuine and essential element of classical Indian thought.[14]

Nevertheless, the contrast between the traditional inclusivistic or perspectivistic patterns and the universalistic openness claimed by Neo-Hinduism is obvious. The traditional "inclusivism" is usually coupled with or even coincides with a more or less explicit exclusivism; at any rate, it is not without formalistic and restrictive ingredients. Modern Hinduism relates its explication and justification of religious plurality to an open, universalized concept of *adhikāra*, of religious or soteriological qualification or eligibility; the diversity of religious traditions in the world is seen as the correlate of a general "diversity of qualification" (*adhikārabheda*). This usage of *adhikāra* is characteristically different from the traditional "orthodox" understanding, which associates *adhikāra* with the rules of *dharma* and specifically with the order of castes and stages of life (*varṇāśramadharma*). In traditional Hinduism, the treatment of Buddhism etc. is usually much less conciliatory than in Neo-Hinduism. Almost invariably, non-Indian religious phenomena are disregarded or, less frequently, explicitly dismissed in the traditional schemes of harmonization or subordination. While Madhusūdana Sarasvatī states explicitly that the extra-Vedic traditions of Buddhism etc. are not even indirectly or in a preliminary sense conducive to the goal of liberation, he simply takes it for granted that the traditions of the non-Indian "barbarians" (*mleccha*) have no soteriological relevance whatsoever.[15]

According to S. Radhakrishnan and other representatives of Neo-Hinduism, the extension and universalization of the limited traditional patterns is a simple and unproblematic adjustment to the current and wider context of knowledge: "Today the samanvaya or harmonisation has to be extended to the living faiths of

mankind. ... As the author of the Brahma Sūtra tried to reconcile the different doctrines prevalent in his time, we have to take into account the present state of our knowledge and evolve a coherent picture."[16] Referring to a verse which he erroneously ascribes to Udayana, Radhakrishnan claims that Udayana would have mentioned the Christians and Muslims in his list of religious traditions if he had known about them.[17] But Udayana could have referred to Islam if he had been interested in doing so; and Madhusūdana, who explicitly dismisses Buddhism as well as all non-Indian traditions, certainly knew about Islam and may have had personal contacts with the Moghul court.[18]

The step towards historical actualization and adjustment to the "present state" of knowledge, a simple and unproblematic step according to Radhakrishnan, has not been taken in traditional Hinduism. As a matter of fact, it would have been incompatible with the basic tendencies of traditional Hindu thought, with its ahistorical or antihistorical orientation, with its attempts to establish frameworks of legitimate religious traditions once and for all. The procedure of Madhusūdana is symptomatic. Commenting on verse 7 of the *Śivamahimnastotra*, which enumerates religious paths or "methods" (*prasthāna*), such as the Vedic path, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāśupata and Vaiṣṇavism, he presents his list of the 18 traditional "sciences" (*vidyā*) of Hinduism, and he paraphrases the religious paths as *śāstra*, "timeless" branches of learning.[19] In his view, there is no basic difference between a legitimate religious tradition, which we might call a "secterian" tradition, and a traditional "science" or branch of learning, such as "astronomy" (*jyotiṣa*) or "etymology" (*nirukta*). Many centuries earlier, Bhāsarvajña (approximately 900 A.D.) discusses the possibility of extending the shorter list of 14 "sciences" (*vidyā, śāstra*), and he mentions a branch of scientific learning, i.e. medicine (*vaidyaśāstra*), and a "sectarian" tradition, i.e. Śaivasiddhānta, side by side as possible additions.[20]

3. In the following, we shall discuss how Kumārila and Śaṅkara, leading exponents of the "orthodox", supra-sectarian aspirations of classical Hindu thought, deal with the plurality and diversity of religious traditions.[21] In particular, we shall try to clarify how Śaṅkara understands the legitimate and authoritative "internal" differentiation of the Vedic relevation on the one hand and the merely factual "external" diversity of human opinions on the other hand.

Śaṅkara's special and most conspicuous interest is in the concordance (*samanvaya*) of the Upaniṣads, i.e. their agreement con-

cerning the nature of *brahman*, which is the topic of the first *adhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. It overshadows completely the wider perspective which seems to be opened by his somewhat casual observation that the one *ātman* is the ultimate referent of all human views and teachings, even of the most distorted ones, such as those of Buddhists or materialists.[22]

The second *adhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, especially in its first two sections (*pāda*), is a refutation of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and other traditions, which claim to be established by omniscient founders, such as Kapila, without recognizing that only the Veda can be the source of reliable and legitimate knowledge concerning *dharma* and ultimate reality, i.e. *brahman*. Unguided human "reasoning" (*tarka*) and "experience" (*anubhava*) are utterly insufficient to be such a source. Towards the end of the second section of the second *adhyāya*, Śaṅkara applies this uncompromising critique of extra-Vedic traditions to the more specifically sectarian movements of the Bhāgavatas or Pāñcarātrins:[23] Insofar as these movements claim sources of religious instruction and inspiration which are not ultimately based upon the Veda, they have to be rejected.

No plurality, no compromise concerning the knowledge of *brahman* can be accepted. *Brahman* is one, and there cannot be a variety of true teachings concerning its one identical nature; true knowledge cannot deviate from its object: *na ca-ekarūpe brahmaṇy anekarūpāṇi vijñānāni saṃbhavanti, na hy anyathā-artho 'nyathā jñānam.*[24] However, a certain variety of names and concepts, of paths and approaches, of different forms of "devotion" or "meditation" (*upāsanā*), is legitimate insofar as the particularized, personified *saguṇa-brahman* is concerned, i.e. *brahman* as seen through "nescience" (*avidyā*), by those who still think and strive in terms of means and ends, of acts and rewards. The categories of "devotee", "object of devotion", etc., apply as long as *brahman* appears in this way; and different modes of devotion may lead to different results.[25] In other cases, the same result may be achieved by different methods; and in such a case one may choose any one among the available legitimate meditational or devotional methods, practising it with total dedication until the desired result has been obtained: *tasmād aviśiṣṭaphalānāṃ vidyānām anyatamām ādāya tatparaḥ syād yāvad upāsyaviṣayasākṣātkaraṇena tatphalaṃ prāptam iti.*[26]

All this does not imply that Śaṅkara deals with the different forms of ritual action and religious life in a universalistic or even relativistic fashion. There may be plurality and a certain degree of

choice in this field; but this does not mean that there is an unrestricted variety. Even here, the Veda itself is the measure and the prototype of legitimate plurality.

4. The inclusivistic model, which presents other, competing religious and philosophical views as being ultimately included in one's own, and the idea of a didactic adjustment to different levels of qualification (*adhikārabheda* etc.) can, of course, be used by and for very different standpoints. Several centuries after Śaṅkara, the great Naiyāyika Udayana gives one of the most impressive presentations of this model in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*,[27] arranging the other systems of thought, including Advaita Vedānta, as preliminary stages of the Nyāya system, which he calls the "ultimate Vedānta" (*caramavedānta*). In his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, he enumerates the names of the highest principles of many religious and philosophical traditions and says that they represent in the final analysis nothing but more or less distorted ways of understanding the "Lord" (*īśvara*) of the Nyāya system.[28]

Śaṅkara is obviously aware of the relativistic dangers in using the inclusivistic model and of the potentially confusing effects of a didactic adjustment to different "levels of qualification". He accuses the Buddhists of applying such devices in an illegitimate and confusing manner, referring specifically to the Madhyamaka practice of justifying different teachings with reference to the diversity of those who have to be educated (*vineyabheda*) and of interpreting other systems of Buddhist thought as gradual preparations for the ultimate truth of Śūnyavāda.[29] Accordingly, he sees Buddhist thought as "manifold" (*bahuprakāra*) in a sense which implies disagreement and confusion: *tatra-ete trayo vādino bhavanti. kecit sarvāstitvavādinaḥ, kecit vijñānāstitvamātravādinaḥ, anye punaḥ sarvaśūnyavādina iti.*[30] Explicating the term *vineyabheda*, the commentators of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* refer to the low, medium or excellent intellectual abilities (Vācaspati: *hīnamadhyamotkṛṣṭa*; Ānandagiri: *mandamadhyamottama*), to which these three types or levels of teaching correspond. Vācaspati quotes a verse from the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, allegedly by Nāgārjuna, which expresses the didactic adjustment of Buddhist teachings and the inclusion and ultimate concordance of all teachings in the idea of *śūnyatā*, "emptiness".[31]

Attributing these different systems to the Buddha himself Śaṅkara accuses him of incoherent prattling (*asambaddhapralāpitva*) or even of deliberately and hatefully leading mankind into confusion by teaching such contradictory ideas: *api ca bāhyārthavijñāna-*

śūnyavādatrayam itaretaraviruddham upadiśatā sugatena spaṣṭīkṛtam ātmano 'sambaddhapralāpitvaṃ, pradveṣo vā prajāsu viruddhārthapratipattyā vimuhyeyur imāḥ prajā iti.[32]

On the other hand, Śaṅkara emphasizes repeatedly that the Veda itself adjusts its teachings to different levels of understanding and qualification, that it uses different methods of instruction and that it addresses different interests and capabilities. The whole "work section" (*karmakāṇḍa*) applies to those who are still in the network of "work orientation", i.e. of reward-oriented nescience; but also within the "knowledge section" (*jñānakāṇḍa*), i.e. the Upaniṣads, it speaks at different levels.[33] It offers various meditational and devotional methods and "symbolic" devices (*pratīka*), such as the *om*, to those who are of slow or mediocre understanding (*mandamadhyapratipattṝn prati*[34]). Śaṅkara is obviously convinced that such variability and didactic adjustment is legitimate and effective insofar only as it is employed, or at least sanctioned and guided, by the Veda itself, i.e. insofar as it is rooted in revelation.

Just as human understanding alone is incapable of unveiling ultimate truth and reality, it is incapable of determining the various levels of eligibility or qualification for this truth and of arranging a soteriologically meaningful and effective hierarchy of teachings. Śaṅkara rejects the idea of legitimizing the teachings of Kapila, i.e. the Sāṃkhya philosophy, in this manner, of interpreting the Sāṃkhya teachings about *prakṛti/pradhāna* etc. as a legitimate aid and stage of development for those who are not qualified to receive the Vedic revelation directly, and of coordinating Sāṃkhya and Vedānta in a scheme of reconciliation.[35] No such role has been assigned to the teachings of Kapila by the Vedic revelation, and human reason alone cannot possibly ascertain it. That the Veda uses a variety of names, such as *jyotis, ākāśa*, etc., in order to refer to the one absolute *ātman* or *brahman*,[36] does not mean that the Sāṃkhya *pradhāna/avyakta*[37] or the Vāsudeva of the Bhāgavatas[38] may simply be added as other valid, though indirect indicators of *ātman/brahman*.

Of course, Śaṅkara recognizes a sense in which all systems of thought are more or less distorted references to the one absolute. Even the materialists or the Buddhists, by postulating the "mere body" (*dehamātra*) or the "void" (*śūnya*) as ultimate reality or as the highest principle, somehow "mean" the absolute *ātman.*[39] As Vācaspati notes in his *Bhāmatī* on this passage, such conflicting views could not even be in conflict with one another without having the same "substratum" (*āśraya*). But such implicit unity of an "ultimate

intent" remains abstract and incapable of providing the factual diversity of human opinions with a meaningful soteriological structure; Śaṅkara sees no reason to extend his search for concordance (*samanvaya*) to this open field of human views and aberrations.

5. Śaṅkara's approach to the problem of religious plurality is conservative and restrictive. The extent to which religious plurality, variety of approaches to ultimate reality and liberation can be accepted is limited by the *vedamūlatva* principle, as it has been developed by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school. Śaṅkara follows the example set by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā also in his use of the concept of *adhikāra*. The Veda itself has to assign and legitimize the "qualification" and "mandate" for its revelation; and we have to accept that it excludes the Śūdras etc. from the access to Vedic teachings. Worldly capabilities alone, such as intelligence, cannot constitute *adhikāra*; Vedic matters require a Vedic capability and mandate: *sāmarthyam api na laukikaṃ kevalam adhikārakāraṇaṃ bhavati, śāstrīye 'rthe śāstrīyasya sāmarthyasya-apekṣitatvāt.*[40] And the Veda itself correlates a variety of divine names, forms etc. to the "differences of qualification": *tatra ca devasya-ekasya nāmarūpakarmaguṇaśaktibhedaḥ, adhikārabhedāt.*[41] - Although it is occasionally suggested that the Vedāntic orientation towards "knowledge" requires an essentially different understanding of *adhikāra* than the ritual orientation of Pūrvamīmāṃsā - a difference which is made much more explicit by Sureśvara[42] -, Śaṅkara's use of *adhikāra* remains basically "orthodox" and restrictive and quite different from its Neo-Vedāntic use.[43]

According to the *vedamūlatva* principle, the Veda is the criterion and measure of legitimacy and orthodoxy. Other teachings which appear outside the Veda or side by side with it do not have to be harmonized and reconciled with it; they have to be measured against it, and if they are imcompatible, they have to be rejected. Śaṅkara's treatment of the traditions of the Bhāgavatas or Pāñcarātrins leaves no doubt in this respect: Insofar as these traditions claim to be based upon an additional, independent, extra-Vedic revelation, they are illegitimate and unacceptable.[44] This distinguishes Śaṅkara's "non-sectarian" Advaita Vedānta from the "sectarian", primarily Vaiṣṇava traditions of Vedānta, which accept additional "revelations" of equal and potentially superior authority. Yāmuna's *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (ca. 1000 A.D.) is an exemplary statement concerning the authority of the so-called Pāñcarātra. According to Madhva (13th century), not only the Vedas are independent sources of religious authority, but also the Mahābhārata, the "original Rāmāyaṇa" (*mūlarāmāyaṇa*), the Brahmasūtra and the Pāñcarātra

which in his understanding includes the Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas.[45]

Unlike later thinkers and doxographers of the Advaita Vedānta tradition, Śaṅkara is not interested in presenting Vedānta as the culmination of an inclusivistic hierarchy of religious or philosophical teachings. In his genuine works, there is nothing comparable to the gradation of systems found in the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* falsely attributed to him.[46] Śaṅkara is Veda-oriented not only insofar as the unity of the absolute, the truth about *brahman* is concerned, but also concerning the plurality of paths and stages leading to this goal. Soteriologically meaningful religious or philosophical plurality is itself a matter of Vedic revelation. There is so much room for plurality in the Veda and within the tradition based upon it, that Śaṅkara sees no reason to organize, justify or explain the general, merely man-made, extra-Vedic plurality of views and traditions. His idea of *samanvaya* is essentially a matter of Vedic exegesis; the universalized *samanvaya* suggested by Radhakrishnan has no basis in Śaṅkara's own thought.[47]

6. Śaṅkara's application of the *vedamūlatva* principle, which accounts for the exclusivistic and restrictive implications of his access to religious and philosophical plurality, shows him in the tradition of Mīmāṃsā. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā, with which Śaṅkara disagrees on the other central issues, has articulated the principles of strict, uncompromising allegiance to the Veda in its interpretation of *dharma*. The Veda is the ultimate source of all knowledge of *dharma*, of ritual and religious propriety; it is the one and only source which is self-evident and self-validating. All other sources, such as *smṛti* etc., have to be measured against it and ultimately traced back to it. Any valid human orientation towards transworldly and trans-empirical goals must derive its legitimacy and its origin from the Veda, which is legitimately accessible to the community of the "twice-born" *āryas* only and allegiance to which, on the other hand, constitutes the identity of the "Āryan" community.[48]

In such a context of thought, the room for and interest in other traditions and in religious plurality in general can only be limited. However, it is by no means absent, nor is it restricted to merely polemical and negative interest. In the works of Kumārila, it plays a role which may appear surprising in view of the rigid "orthodoxy" of the school of which he is the most eloquent and successful advocate.[49]

Kumārila discusses the legitimacy and, although much less

explicitly, the origin and genesis of religious plurality, in several important sections of his *Tantravārttika*, first in connection with the meaning and status of the *smṛtis*, and then in his discussion of the *Kalpasūtras*, which are part of the *vedāṅga* literature.

In this *smṛti* discussion, Kumārila is faced with the problem of preventing illegitimate, unorthodox religious movements, like those of the Buddhists, from laying claim upon orthodoxy and legitimacy by postulating a "lost Veda", a forgotten branch of primeval revelation, as their original source. Since Kumārila himself works with the assumption of forgotten Vedic texts as ultimate legitimizers of traditions, which are recognized as "orthodox" without having a demonstrable basis in the extant Vedic texts, this is not an easy task for him. Cannot the Buddhists claim this procedure for their own teachings? Who would be able to limit the realm of application of this theory of lost texts? Could it not also be used to argue for the legitimacy of teachings which are incompatible with the directly accessible texual traditions?[50] But in this situation, the basic rule is that whatever is contradicted by a direct Vedic statement has to be rejected: *virodhe tv anapekṣyaṃ syād.*[51] And there is certainly no justification for invoking hypothetically assumed lost Vedic texts against actually accessible Vedic statements. Moreover, the Buddhists etc., unlike "orthodox" *dharma* teachers such as Gautama, usually do not claim any Vedic roots for their teachings: *na ca tair vedamūlatvam ucyate gautamādivat*. And finally, a total destruction (*uccheda*) of whole "branches" (*śākhā*) of the Vedic tradition cannot be assumed.[52]

Kumārila enumerates various types of extra-Vedic traditions, from Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra etc., which have at least a certain appearance of decency and show some respect for the Vedic *dharma*, to those which have no regard whatsoever for this *dharma* and teach what would be fitting for "barbarians" (*mleccha*). These traditions are more or less "external" (*bāhya*) to the Vedic tradition, and some of them are more despicable than others. But all have to be rejected without compromise insofar as they claim an extra-Vedic legitimacy.[53]

7. The rejection of false claims of legitimacy and orthodoxy is only one side of Kumārila's procedure. The other side, although less conspicuous in his writings and generally overlooked, is at least as remarkable and relevant, i.e. his assumption that even "unorthodox" Indian religious traditions, including those that reject any affiliation with the Veda, have certain actual "historical" roots

in the Veda. There are certain, though distorted, Vedic elements in the teachings of the Buddhists or the Jainas. These groups are just like ungrateful and alienated children, who refuse to acknowledge what they owe to their parents; i.e., they do not acknowledge to what extent they are factually indebted to the Veda. The Jainas and the Buddhists use the idea of *ahiṃsā* as an instrument of their anti-Vedic propaganda. Yet, according to Kumārila, this very idea of *ahiṃsā* is actually traceable to certain Vedic rules about not killing; these have been misunderstood and falsely universalized by the Jaina or Buddhist proponents of *ahiṃsā*.[54] Similarly, Kumārila suggests that numerous philosophical teachings have their often unrecognized origin in the *arthavāda* sections of the Veda or in the Upaniṣads, including characteristically Buddhist teachings: *vijñānamātrakṣaṇabhaṅganairātmyādivādānām apy upaniṣadarthavādaprabhavatvam* ...[55] As far as their merely theoretical dimension is concerned, i.e. insofar as they do not interfere with the injunctive center of the Vedic revelation of *dharma*, Kumārila shows a remarkable openness in accommodating these teachings, which he criticizes philosophically in his *Ślokavārttika*, and he seems willing to credit a wide range of different views with a certain relative and pedagogical usefulness and to find a certain basic value in the variety and confrontation of different views in general.[56] This does, of course, not mean that there is a legitimate variety of systems of religious and ritual orientation; in matters of *dharma*, the rigid application of the *vedamūlatva* principle leaves no room for variety or compromise.

The following section in the *Tantravārttika*, which deals with the Kalpasūtras, is equally significant, especially in its *pūrvapakṣa* portion. Kumārila, who considers various alternative interpretations of Mīmāṃsāsūtra I, 3, 11, introduces an objector who suggests the following: The authority of the Kalpasūtras, which prescribe ritualistic procedures in strict accordance with the Vedic texts and which are an auxiliary part of the Veda itself (*vedāṅga*), is essentially different from that of the *smṛti* texts, and it never requires the assumption of lost *śruti* texts for its validation. This being so, should they not be regarded as parts or as authoritative "recensions" of the Veda itself rather than as mere derivations? Pursuing this further into a somewhat modified interpretation, one might consider the idea that the Veda itself contains a potentially infinite internal variety, its "recensions" or "branches" (*śākhā*), including the Kalpasūtras, being of equal and equally direct authority. Could not then the Buddhists claim their share of this "infinity" and present their teachings as "branches" of the all-comprehensive Vedic revelation?[57] This implies the following important, potentially very far-reaching

question: If variety or plurality has to be accepted anyway as an essential ingredient of the Vedic revelation, why should it be limited in a formalistic and artificial manner? Why should it not be extended and universalized? - In his refutation of this *pūrvapakṣa*, Kumārila points out the basic difference between the Kalpasūtras and a Vedic "branch" or "recension" in the full sense, and he emphasizes that the *vedāṅgas* in general cannot be accepted as fully authorative parts of the "superhuman", "authorless" (*apauruṣeya*) Vedic revelation.[58] In this context, he refers to the linguistic character of the Buddhist texts, and he criticizes not only the Buddhists' alleged inability to use correct Sanskrit, but also their failure to use the Prakrits properly.[59]

8. The notion of a potential "infinity of Vedic branches" (*śākhānantya*) and the attempt to use it as an argument against claims of orthodoxy and exclusivity and against the *vedamūlatva* principle as such are also found in the *Nyāyamañjarī* by Jayantabhaṭṭa. How can an infinitely differentiated Veda possibly function as a criterion of orthodoxy and heterodoxy? The very idea of incompatibility with the Veda does not apply because of the infinity of its - lost or extant - traditions: *pratyuktaṃ ca viruddhatvaṃ śākhānantyāc ca durgamam.*[60]

Jayanta (9th century) is familiar with Kumārila's works. However, what distinguishes their approach to the Veda on the one hand and to the sectarian plurality on the other hand is the fact that Jayanta, unlike Kumārila, is a theistic philosopher who understands the Veda not as an authorless complex of meanings, but as the personal word and work of God (*īśvara*). The question which arises for him in this connection is: Why should the Veda as we have it today, or any part of it, be considered the only or final word of God? Why should the word of God not be present in other religious traditions as well? And why should we not accept the "validity of all traditions" (*sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*)?

Jayanta, whose presentation is richly supplemented not only by his own philosophical drama *Āgamaḍambara*, but also by the discussion in Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (ca. 900 A.D.), does not subscribe to the theory of the "validity of all traditions."[61] But on the other hand, he does not rely on the *vedamūlatva* principle as applied by Kumārila. What he relies on in order to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate religious traditions is the "acceptance by the great (and/or many) people" (*mahājanaparigṛhītatva*)[62] - a criterion which is explicitly rejected by Kumārila as potentially relativistic.[63] - Similarily, Kumārila does not recognize traditional

familiarity or common acceptance (*lokaprasiddhi*) as the basis for distinguishing between *dharma* and *adharma*, between legitimate and illegitimate ways of orientation.[64] The concept of *lokaprasiddhi* plays a more positive role in the thought of Bhartṛhari (ca. 500 A.D.), with which Kumārila is thoroughly familiar. In general, Bhartṛhari's philosophy of the Vedic "word" is one of the most significant and far-reaching contributions to the theme of religious or philosophical plurality and of its relation to the unity and coherence of the Vedic tradition. The Veda is the self-differentiation of the absolute; and this fundamental internal differentiation is extended into the variety of human "views" and traditions. Whether legitimate or not, all these various "views" seem to be indebted to and originating from the inner variety of the Veda. The Vedic word, though always one, is being handed down in many different recensions; it has numerous local and other varieties and many different "forms".[65] Moreover, the *arthavāda* sections of the Veda and similar texts, specifically the Upaniṣads, have been open to many different - legitimate as well as illegitimate - interpretations, and on this basis, the philosophical theories of non-dualists and dualists have been taught in various ways: *ekatvināṃ dvaitināṃ ca pravādā bahudhā matāḥ.*[66]

In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, the demarcation-line between the legitimate internal differentiation of the Vedic revelation and the factual variety of human opinions or ways of orientation is less clear and less significant than in the philosophy of Śaṅkara or Kumārila. Although Bhartṛhari also emphasizes the difference between thought that is guided by the sacred tradition and "dry", merely human reasoning (*śuṣkatarka, puruṣatarka*), his use of the Veda as criterion of the legitimacy and "orthodoxy" is less conspicuous and overshadowed by its all-comprehensive metaphysical status.[67] Human views and interpretations somehow continue the self-differentiation of the absolute; the variety of the perspectives or approaches is internally meaningful and corresponds to the very nature of "seeing" (*darśana*). "Differentiation of seeing" (*darśanabheda, bhinnaṃ darśanam*, etc.) has to be understood as being fully compatible with the unity and identity of its object;[68] and it has to be recognized "that insight gains distinctness by (the study of) different traditional views": *prajñā vivekaṃ labhate bhinnair āgamadarśanaiḥ.*[69]

The universalistic potential of Bhartṛhari's statements is obvious. Nevertheless, his system remains a closed, thoroughly Veda-oriented system. There is no empirical openness for extra-Vedic viewpoints; and Bhartṛhari never even refers to foreign, non-Indian traditions.

It may be a matter of perspective whether one sees the Neo-Hindu "universalism" as legitimate extension and fulfillment or as abandonment of this position.[70]

9. In Bhartṛhari's view, the Veda is the "arranger" (*vidhātṛ*), i.e. the organizing structure not only of all legitimate religious or scholarly traditions, but also of society and culture in general and ultimately of the whole world. The different branches of learning, which teach and educate mankind, proceed from the major and minor "limbs" of the Veda:

vidhātus tasya lokānām aṅgopāṅganibandhanāḥ |
vidyābhedāḥ pratāyante jñānasaṃskārahetavaḥ ||[71]

The Vṛtti paraphrases that the Veda is both the ultimate source (*prakṛti*) and the instuctor (*upadeṣṭṛ*) of the world. Accordingly, the Veda cannot be placed side by side with other religious teachings or documents. The unity of *brahman* (as "word" and ultimate reality), which is the source and purport of the Vedic revelation, may indeed be open or even conducive to a plurality of views and approaches. But this does not amount to perspectivistic indifference. There is an irreducible gradation or hierarchy, to be measured in terms of distance from the Vedic word; and the Veda itself assigns standpoints and conditions of legitimacy.

Bhartṛhari's understanding of religious and philosophical plurality may appear ambiguous and evasive in its combination of restrictive and universalistic implications, of inclusivism and exclusivism. At any rate Bhartṛhari, who has certainly had predecessors on his way of thought, has succeeded in developing an exemplary "orthodox", Veda-oriented model for dealing with the problem of religious plurality, and he has provided subsequent Hindu thinkers with important guidelines for meeting the challenge of extra-Vedic conceptions of religious and philosophical plurality, such as the Jaina perspectivism[72] or the rich and complex structures of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought.

There can be no doubt that for a number of centuries Mahāyāna Buddhism has been most productive in matters of religious hermeneutics and in developing schemes and frameworks of concordance and reconciliation. The reflection on the relationship between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, or on the paths of the "disciples" (*śrāvaka*), the "private buddhas" (*pratyekabuddha*) and the *bodhisattvas*, has led to numerous complex and intriguing suggestions concerning the variety of approaches and expressions in relation to one ultimate

goal or meaning. In particular, the Madhyamaka tradition has contributed to these developments, and it has presented Sarvāstivāda, Vijñānavāda etc. as culminating in, and amounting to, Śūnyavāda. The different schools and levels of Buddhist teaching have been interrelated, integrated and reconciled in various schemes of inclusion, fulfilment or gradual ascent, and the notion of one basic truth unfolding at different soteriological stages and through different layers of meaning and instruction has been expressed in many different ways. The idea of the *bodhisattva* and his "skill in means" (*upāyakauśalya*), the differentiation of disciples (*vineyabheda*) and of "lineages" (*gotra*) of aspirants, and fundamental hermeneutic distinctions between different modes of discourse and meaning (*neyārtha - nītārtha; saṃvṛti - paramārtha*, etc.) guide these remarkable efforts of thought, which have recently been dealt with in several pioneering studies by D.S. Ruegg.[73]

As an explicit progam, all this remains largely an internal, intra-Buddhist affair; the various devices of interpretation and reconciliation are usually not applied to non-Buddhist teachings. But it is obvious that their usage can be easily extrapolated and universalized or adopted by other schools and for other purposes. - As a matter of fact, Candrakīrti seems to observe no clear border-line between Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems in his presentation and "propaedeutic" interpretation of theories which fail to recognize the principle of "voidness".[74] And another leading follower of Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka (Bhavya), claims that the *om/brahman* of the Vedāntins is ultimately nothing but the "void" (*śūnya*) of the Madhyamaka school.[75]

As we have seen, Śaṅkara regards the Buddhist ideas concerning *vineyabheda* etc. as an aberration which is bound to create confusion. In his view, the Veda has to be the context and standard of legitimate concordance (*samanvaya*) as well as of any legitimate distinction of levels of soteriological qualification (*adhikāra*) and a corresponding adjustment of levels of truth and discourse. Śaṅkara rejects the Buddhist conceptions of *upāyakauśalya* and *vineyabheda*; but in a sense, they have become part of his understanding of the Veda.

Notes

Ch. III: Śaṅkara and Kumārila on the Plurality of Religious Traditions

[1] The historical and conceptual problems connected with the application of the term "sect" to the Indian tradition cannot be discussed in this context. At any rate, this term has had a specific affinity to the Indian religious tradition since it became known to the West; cf. already R. de' Nobili, On Indian Customs (i.e. Informatio de quibusdam moribus nationis Indicae, written in 1613, ed./transl. by S. Rajamanickam, Palayamkottai 1972), 27 ff.: "De sectis Brahmanum". The problems of finding an original Indian equivalent are illustrated by M. Monier-Williams, A Dictionary, English and Sanskrit, London 1851 (reprint Delhi 1971), s.v. "sect"; Monier-Williams suggests a wide variety of terms, including *śākhā*, *mārga*, *bhinnamārga*, *mata*, *sampradāya* and *gaṇa*.

[2] Cf. Indien und Europa, § 336; 340 f.

[3] Cf. Indien und Europa, § 338 ff.

[4] Complete Works, Calcutta 1970-1973 (revised reprints of the Mayavati Memorial Edition), III, 536.

[5] Complete Works, III, 511 f.

[6] Already de' Nobili calls Buddhism a "sect" ("secta") of the "religion of idolaters" in his *Informatio de quibusdam moribus nationis Indicae* (see above, n. 1), 27 ff.

[7] Complete Works (see above, n. 4), III, 251 f; cf. also Indien und Europa, § 227; 361 ff.

[8] An Essay on Hinduism, London 1911, 155.

[9] Religion and Society, London[2] 1948, 102.

[10] Discourses on Hindu Spiritual Culture, Delhi 1967, 5.

[11] On some problems related to the concepts of "tolerance" and "inclusivism", cf. Indien und Europa, § 361 ff.

[12] Ṛgveda I, 164, 46.

[13] Madhusūdana's term *prasthānabheda* refers specifically to the words *prabhinne prasthāne* used in the Stotra. Addressing Śiva, the verse concludes: *nṛṇām eko gamyas tvam asi payasām arṇava iti.*

[14] Cf. Indien und Europa, chapter XVIII.

[15] Madhusūdana says about the "methods" of the Buddhists etc.: *vedabāhyatvāt teṣām mlecchādiprasthānavat paramparayā-api puruṣārthānupayogitvād upekṣaṇīyatvam eva* (ed. Gurucaraṇa Tarkadarśanatīrtha, Calcutta 1939, 3).

[16] The Brahma Sūtra, London 1960, 249.

[17] The Bhagavadgītā, London[6] 1960; on IV, 11.

[18] Cf. D.C. Bhattacharyya, Sanskrit Scholars of Akbar's Time. Indian Historical Quarterly 13 (1937), 31-36; P.C. Divanji, introduction to: Siddhāntabindu of Madhusūdana, Baroda 1933 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series), XXI.

[19] Madhusūdana includes most of the "sectarian" traditions listed in the Stotra verse under *dharmaśāstra*, which he presents as one of the 4 *upāṅgas* of the Veda (together with *nyāya*, *mīmāṃsā* and *purāṇa*); in addition to the *upāṅgas*, his 18-fold list contains the 4 Vedas, 6 *vedāṅgas* and 4 *upavedas* (including *āyurveda*). On the ahistorical perspective of the traditional Indian classifications of "sciences" (*vidyā*), cf. also Indien und Europa, § 343 ff.; 355 ff.

[20] Cf. NBhūṣ, 71 (*pūrvapakṣa*): ... *caturdaśāvadhāraṇam api na yuktam, śaivasiddhāntādīnāṃ vaidyaśāstrādīnāṃ ca bhinnaviṣayatvād iti* (implying that their separate subject-matter would require their classification as separate "sciences").

[21] Cf. the role of Śaṅkara and Kumārila as defenders of the unity and identity of the "orthodox" tradition in such texts as the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* attributed to Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya; cf. also the customary definition of the *smārta*: *vyavahāre bhāṭṭaḥ, paramārthe śāṅkaraḥ.*

[22] BSBh I, 1, 1 (Works III, 6); cf. also Gauḍapāda, Kārikā III, 18 ff.

[23] BSBh II, 2, 42 ff.

[24] BSBh III, 3, 1 (Works III, 375).

[25] Cf. BSBh I, 1, 11; accordingly, Śaṅkara, who rejects the metaphysical teaching of the Pāñcarātrins, is not opposed to their forms of worship (cf. II, 2, 42).

[26] BSBh III, 3, 59 (Works III, 430); in the preceding section (III, 3, 58), the question is raised whether different procedures suggested by different *śākhās* should be combined; against this, Śaṅkara argues for making a choice among equally authoritative and legitimate alternatives.

[27] Cf. Ātmatattvaviveka, ed. Ḍhuṇḍhirāja Śāstrī, Benares 1940 (ChSS), 448 ff; see also, e.g., Yogavāsiṣṭha, Utpattiprakaraṇa 96, 48 ff., on the plurality of approaches (specifically v. 51: metaphor of the one city and the various travellers). - U. Mishra, History of Indian Philosophy II, Allahabad 1966, 158, tries to claim Udayana and his "synthetic graduation" for the Vedānta system; cf. already Gauḍabrahmānanda Sarasvatī (early 18th century) in

his commentary on Madhusūdana's Advaitasiddhi (ed. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrin, Bombay 1917, 228): *kiṃ ca-udayanācāryāṇāṃ vedāntadarśana eva mahatī śraddhā* . . . .

[28] Nyāyakusumāñjali I, 2 (prose section); cf. also Bhartṛhari, VP III/2 (*dravyasamuddeśa*), 1 (many different names of *dravya*, "substance").

[29] Cf. BSBh II, 2, 18 (Works III, 239): . . . *pratipattibhedād vineyabhedād vā*; the expression *pratipattibheda* is ambiguous insofar as it may refer either to the Buddha's own "understanding" or to that of his disciples; the second interpretation, preferred by some of the commentators, would imply that the word *vā* does not indicate an alternative in the full sense. -References to different types of disciples (*vineyajana*) and to a benevolent adjustment (*anurodha*, *ānurūpya*, etc.) to their different capacities are frequently found in Candrakīrti's commentary *Prasannapadā* on Nāgārjuna's Madhyamakakārikā; cf. VII, 34 (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibl. Buddhica, p. 177); XV, 11 (p. 276); XVIII, 6 (p. 357); 8 (p. 371); XXII, 10 (p. 444); XXVI, 2 (p. 547); on XVIII, 6 (p. 359), Candrakīrti quotes a verse attributed to Nāgārjuna himself, but not traceable in his extant works: *buddho 'vadat tathā dharmaṃ vineyānāṃ yathākṣamam*. - See also below, n. 73 ff.

[30] BSBh II, 2, 18 (Works III, 239).

[31] Bhāmatī on BSBh II, 2, 18; Vācaspati differentiates the *sarvāstitva* view further into *vaibhāṣika* and *sautrāntika*. The expression *hīnamadhyotkṛṣṭa* is also used by Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā on Madhyamakakārikā XVIII, 6 (see above, n. 29).

[32] BSBh II, 2, 32; cf. the idea of the Buddha as a deceitful incarnation of Viṣṇu.

[33] Cf., e.g., BUBh V, 1, intr.; see above, chapter II.

[34] On Kaṭha-Upaniṣad I, 2.17.

[35] Cf. BSBh II, 1, 1.

[36] Cf. BSBh I, 3, 40 f.

[37] Cf. BSBh I, 4, 1 (reference to different *śākhās*); I, 1, 5; etc.

[38] Cf. BSBh II, 2, 42 ff.

[39] BSBh I, 1, 1 (Works III, 6); see above, n. 22.

[40] BSBh I, 3, 34 (Works III, 236). The Veda "appoints", "gives a mandate to" men or whoever may be eligible for its instructions; cf. I, 3, 25 (p. 119): *śāstraṃ . . . manuṣyān eva-adhikaroti*; I, 3, 26 (p. 120): *manuṣyān adhikaroti śāstraṃ, na tu manuṣyān eva-iti.* Capability (*śaktatva*), desire (*arthitva*), non-exclusion (*aparyudastatva*) and the sacred teaching presupposing the *upanayana* and other ceremonies (*upanayanādiśāstra*) are mentioned as the conditions of *adhikāra*, in accordance with MS VI, 1, 25 ff. and Śabara's commentary; this implies that not all men, whatever their "worldly" potential may be, have the mandate for ritual works and liberating knowledge. - In his commentary on Taittirīya-Upaniṣad II, 1, 1 (Works I, 287 f.), Śaṅkara presents the "mandate for works and knowledge" (*karmajñānādhikāra*) itself as constituting the "superiority" (*prādhānya*) of man, and he quotes Aitareya-Āraṇyaka II, 3, 2, which praises man in terms of his intelligence and his openness for the future (cf. W. Halbfass, Anthropological Problems in Classical Indian Philosophy; in: Beiträge zur Indienforschung, E. Waldschmidt zum 80. Geburtstag, Berlin 1977, 225-

236). However, even here he mentions not only *śaktatva* and *arthitva*, but also *aparyudastatva* as conditions of *adhikāra*, which obviously excludes the Śūdras.

41 BUBh III, 9, 9 (Works I, 836); cf. BSBh I, 1, 4 (Works III, 13): *dharmatāratamyād adhikāritāratamyam. prasiddhaṃ ca-arthitvasāmarthyādikṛtam adhikāritāratamyam.*

42 Orientation towards "works" and "self-knowledge" may be interpreted as constituting two different types of *adhikāra*, or the applicability of this concept may be questioned, insofar as "self-knowledge" (*ātmajñāna*) is concerned; cf. Sureśvara, Sambandhavārttika, *v. 760: adhikārapraveśitvaṃ na-ātmajñānasya yujyate*; also v. 228 ff.: *vidhimārge 'dhikārasya parīkṣā vartate....* For a survey of different views concerning the relationship between the corresponding parts of the Veda cf. Maṇḍana, Brahmasiddhi, ed. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras 1937, 26 ff. (annotated German translation: T. Vetter, Maṇḍanamiśra's Brahmasiddhiḥ. Brahmakāṇḍaḥ, Wien 1969, 99 ff.).

43 In the tradition of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, a less restrictive interpretation of *adhikāra*, which does not exclude the Śūdras, is associated with the name of Bādari; cf. MS VI, 1, 25 ff. with Śabara's Bhāṣya. - In his discussion of the meaning of the word *atha* in BS I, 1, 1, Śaṅkara uses the word *adhikāra* in the sense of "new topic", "(opening of a) chapter" (cf. Works III, 4: *athaśabda ānantaryārthaḥ parigṛhyate, na-adhikārārthaḥ*; but cf. YSBhV, 4, on *atha* as *adhikārārtha* in YS I, 1). However, subsequent commentators, specifically Madhva and his followers, have included elaborate discussions concerning *adhikāra* as "qualification"/ "mandate" in their interpretations of *atha*.

44 Cf. BSBh II, 2, 42 ff.

45 Cf. Madhva, Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya I, 30 f.; also the series of post-Śaṅkara commentaries on BS II, 2, 42 ff. (Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka, Vallabha, etc.). - See also Indien und Europa, § 353 ff.; 359 (on the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata).

46 On this and other doxographies, cf. Indien und Europa, § 344 ff.; see also Sarvajñātman, Saṃkṣepaśārīraka II, 61, on the ascent from *pariṇāmavāda* to *vivartavāda*. - Śaṅkara sees, of course, more or less distance between the Vedānta on the one side and the teaching of Buddhism, Vaiśeṣika or Sāṃkhya on the other side; cf. his characterization of the Vaiśeṣika as *ardhavaināśika* (BSBh II, 2, 18; Works III, 239).

47 See above, n. 16; cf. also Radhakrishnan's "Foreword" to S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Compromises in the History of Advaitic Thought, Madras 1946, where he refers to the "spirit of comprehension" and the "master plan of Hindu thought" and says: "The revival of the spirit today will help us to take up and answer the challenge of modern times".

48 Cf. Indien und Europa, § 318 ff.

49 In the following, we shall not deal with the intricate problems concerning the Pūrvamīmāṃsā attitude towards Vedānta, which are even more intricate in the case of Kumārila's great rival Prabhākara; it is hoped that these problems can be discussed and clarified in a separate paper.

50 Cf. TV, 113 (on I, 3, 4): *ko hi śaknuyād utsannānāṃ vākyaviṣayeyattāniyamaṃ kartum?*

51 Loc. cit. (referring to MS I, 3, 3).

52 TV, 114 (on I, 3, 4).

[53] TV, 112 (on I, 3, 4); see also Medhātithi on Manu II, 6 (ed. J.H. Dave, Bombay 1972 ff., I, 163; 169; 171 f.; quoting his own *Smṛtiviveka* and criticizing the *śākhotsāda* theory).

[54] See above, chapter I, § 4.

[55] TV, 81 (on I, 3, 2). SV, 465 (Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, v. 63 ff.) finds the origin of the un-Vedic theories of the creation and dissolution of the world in *stuti* (or *arthavāda*) passages of the Veda, the Mahābhārata, etc. (*stutivākyakṛtaś ca-eṣa janānāṃ mativibhramaḥ*). - On the concept of *arthavāda* and the role of the Upaniṣads in Pūrvamīmāṃsā see above, chapter II, § 7.

[56] Cf. TV, 81 (on I, 3, 2); however, Kumārila himself is obviously not committed to the theory of a pedagogical legitimacy of *vijñānavāda* etc., which he presents in this section; concerning Kumārila's criticism of *vijñānavāda* etc., cf. also TV on I, 3, 12. - On the "pedagogical" justification of Vālmīki, Vyāsa, etc., cf. G. Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, Benares[2] 1964, 190 f.

[57] Cf. TV, 156 ff. (on I, 3, 11).

[58] TV, 162 ff. (on I, 3, 12 ff.).

[59] Cf. TV, 164 f. (on I, 3, 12).

[60] Cf. NM, 245 ff.

[61] On Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña, cf. also G. Oberhammer, Die Überlieferungsautorität im Hinduismus; in: Offenbarung, geistige Realität des Menschen, ed. G. Oberhammer, Wien 1974, 41-92. The *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* theory appears as a universalization of the Buddhist theory of *vineyabheda*; see above, n. 27. - We may add here that Bhāsarvajña, NBhūṣ, 393, relates a theory concerning the origin of "sectarian" movements which has not yet found the attention it deserves; it is one of the very rare passages in Indian philosophical literature where "concrete" historical and social circumstances are referred to in this context - the exclusion of the Śūdras and the appeal of the Jina etc. to such groups, the attractiveness of sectarian pronouncements about the end of suffering (*duḥkhakṣayopadeśa*), including the "suffering from poverty" (*dāridryaduḥkha*), to dull-witted and impoverished brahmins, etc.

[62] Unlike other authors, Jayanta does not eliminate the ambiguity of the term *mahājana*, or its connotation of a mere "majority"; with reference to what he calls *mahājanaprasiddhi*, he says: *vedadharmānuvārttī ca prāyeṇa sakalo janaḥ* (NM, 243). Cf. the criteria of legitimacy summarized in Jayanta's Āgamaḍambara, ed. V. Raghavan/A. Thakur, Darbhanga 1964, 96 f. (v. 100 ff.; primarily criteria of familiarity, continuity and decency).

[63] See above, chapter I, § 7 (n. 75).

[64] See above, chapter I, § 5 (n. 48).

[65] Cf. VP I, 5 (with Vṛtti).

[66] VP I, 8; the Vṛtti paraphrases the expression *arthavādarūpāṇi* used in the first half of the verse as an *ekaśeṣa*, comprising the meanings *arthavāda* and "what is like *arthavāda*" (*arthavādaprakāra*), and it illustrates this by adding numerous Vedic and Upaniṣadic quotes. In spite of the questions raised by M. Biardeau and in accordance with the assessment by A.

Aklujkar (The Authorship of the Vākyapadīya-vṛtti. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 16, (1972), 181-198), this Vṛtti seems to be Bhartṛhari's own work.

67 On *śuṣkatarka* etc., see above, chapter II, § 6.

68 Cf. VP I, 75; 110; II, 136; and my article Observations on *darśana*. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 23 (1979), 195-203; specifically 201. To the references given in this article, we may add an interesting passage in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (on Madhyamakakārikā XV, 11; ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, 275 f.), which first speaks about various systems and views (*madhyamakadarśana*; *astitvanāstitvadvayadarśana*; *vijñānavādidarśana*) and then about the "realization of the ultimate truth" (*paramārthadarśana*).

69 Observations on *darśana*, 202 (quoting VP II, 489).

70 For some modern traditionalistic responses to Christianity and to religious plurality in general, which are characteristically different from the approach of Neo-Hinduism, cf. R.F. Young, *Extra Vedos nulla salus*: Observations on Religious Plurality from the Perspective of Resistant Hinduism. Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 1982 (forthcoming).

71 VP I, 10.

72 Cf. Indien und Europa, 300 ff.

73 See specifically La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra: Études sur la sotériologie et la gnoséologie du bouddhisme, Paris 1969 (cf. 55 ff., for general observations on *nītārtha* and *neyārtha*, and 56, n. 1, for references to important contributions by earlier authors); several other studies supplement this monumental work, e.g. Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub, Paris 1973; The *gotra*, *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta; in: Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems. Studies in Honor of E. Conze, ed. L. Lancaster, Berkeley 1977, 283-312.

74 Cf. Prasannapadā on Madhyamakakārikā XV, 11; ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, 275 f. (quoting Nāgārjuna, Ratnāvalī I, 61 f.); see also S. Schayer, Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā, Cracow 1931, 77, n. 1.

75 Cf. V.V. Gokhale, "Masters of Buddhism Adore the Brahman through Non-Adoration". Indo-Iranian Journal 5 (1961), 271-275; H. Nakamura, The Vedānta as Presented by Bhavya. Journal of the Oriental Institute (Baroda) 14 (1964/65), 287-296; H. Nakamura, The Vedāntic Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahṛdaya. Adyar Library Bulletin 39 (1975), 300-329.

76 On some related developments in theistic thought and specifically on Madhva's use of the terms *nirṇīta*, *nirṇeya* etc., cf. Indien und Europa, 417 f.; 426.

Appendix:

Notes on the "Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa"

The so-called *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, which is more properly called *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa*,[1] was published in 1952 as volume 94 of the Madras Government Oriental Series. Its editors, who worked on the basis of a single manuscript preserved in Madras, did not hesitate to recognize this work as a genuine work of the great Śaṅkara.[2] In a stimulating study, and taking an approach otherwise completely different from that of the editors, P. Hacker also accepted - at least hypothetically - the authenticity of the text, presenting it as an early work by Śaṅkara, who later on would have "converted" from Yoga to Advaita Vedānta.[3] Hacker tries to provide evidence from Śaṅkara's later writings which would indicate a thorough familiarity with, and possibly an early allegiance to, the Yoga tradition of Patañjali. Apart from these general doctrinal observations, his argumentation for the authenticity of the text is primarily based upon the fact that the colophons of the manuscript give Śaṅkarabhagavat (or Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda) as the author; the general significance of the appearance of this name instead of Śaṅkarācārya had been pointed out by Hacker in an earlier article.[4] Hacker has *not*, as T. Leggett claims, examined the authenticity of the text by applying "linguistic and ideological tests devised by himself."[5] By and large, the text of the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* and its doctrinal and commenterial peculiarities remain unexplored in Hacker's study.

Several years later, another leading Vedānta expert, H. Nakamura, agrees that the Vivaraṇa might indeed be a work by Śaṅkara himself; but he questions Hacker's assumption that this would imply a "conversion" from Yoga to Vedānta.[6] S. Mayeda also tends to regard the text as authentic, although there is a certain vacillation in his statements.[7] T. Vetter, who follows Hacker's view, charac-

terizes the Vivaraṇa as a work of little originality in his *Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śaṅkaras.*[8] Other authors who have worked with the text also seem to accept its authenticity.[9]

However, neither the editors of the 1952 edition nor P. Hacker and his successors seem to have paid attention to the fact that a part of the text was already published in 1931 (in volume 6 of the Madras University Sanskrit Series), as an appendix to Maṇḍana's *Sphoṭasiddhi* with the commentary *Gopālikā* by Parameśvara, and that its editor, S.K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī, was not at all inclined to accept the Vivaraṇa as a work by the famous Śaṅkara, author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. In his Sanskrit introduction to the edition, Rāmanātha Śāstrī deals not only with Parameśvara, the author of the *Gopālikā*, but also with several other authors by this name, all members of the Payyūr family of Kerala, which flourished in the 14th and 15th centuries. He refers to the fact that Parameśvara I, author of the commentary *Svaditaṅkaraṇī* on Vācaspati's *Nyāyakaṇikā* (itself a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka*) and grandfather of the author of the *Gopālikā*, presents himself as a disciple of "Śaṅkarapūjyapāda" (*śaṅkarapūjyapādaśiṣya*[10]). From his consultation of the unpublished *Nītitattvāvirbhāvayākhyā* by the author of the *Gopālikā* (i.e. Parameśvara II), Rāmanātha Śāstrī concludes that Śaṅkarapūjyapāda - one of several persons in the Payyūr family whose name was Śaṅkara - was not only the *vidyāguru*, but also the paternal uncle (*pitṛvya*) of Parameśvara I.[11] He suggests that this Śaṅkara is the author of the Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa: *ayam eva śrīmacchaṅkarapūjyapādaḥ pātañjalayogabhāṣyavivaraṇakartā-iti asmākam abhyūhaḥ.*[12] He adds the *sphoṭa* section of the Vivaraṇa (i.e. pages 167 - 178 of the 1952 edition) as an appendix to his edition of the *Sphoṭasiddhi.* This section quotes and refutes a sequence of verses from Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* which is also found in the *Sphoṭasiddhi.* The section of the *Gopālikā* by Parameśvara II which deals with these verses as presented by Maṇḍana may well have been written with a knowledge of the Vivaraṇa's treatment of this topic.[13] On the other hand, Parameśvara II is also credited with a commentary on Vācaspati's *Tattvabindu*, which criticizes the *sphoṭa* theory.[14]

Rāmanātha Śāstrī has not noticed that Parameśvara I actually gives a number of quotes from the Vivaraṇa in the introductory portion of his *Svaditaṅkaraṇī*, where he deals with Vācaspati's benedictory verses.[15] No such Vivaraṇa quotes appear in the corresponding passages of the *Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī*, Parameśvara's own earlier commentary on the *Nyāyakaṇikā*. The quotes in the *Svaditaṅkaraṇī* are highly conspicuous insofar as they constitute the earliest avail-

able references to this work which seems to have been largely unknown outside Kerala until a transcript was made in 1918/19 and subsequently deposited in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library of Madras. This was again transcribed for the Adyar Library, from which Rāmanātha Śāstrī published his excerpt.[16] Based upon the information currently accessible to us we may say that there is no conclusive evidence why the quotes in the *Svaditaṅkaraṇī* could not have been taken from a work by that same Śaṅkara whom Parameśvara himself presents as his teacher later in this text. This would imply that the Vivaraṇa is a product of the (possibly earlier) 14th century. - On the other hand, there is nothing in the form or contents of the Vivaraṇa that would exclude the possibility that it is a work by the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. On the contrary, there are numerous affinities between the Vivaraṇa and Śaṅkara's commentaries on the Brahmasūtras and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad; these will be illustrated by our following observations. There is, of course, more than one explanation for such affinities; and they do certainly not constitute an adequate basis for Hacker's "conversion" thesis and for his assessment of the commentary on Gauḍapāda's Kārikās as a turning-point in Śaṅkara's development.

In general, quotes from or references to the Vivaraṇa are conspicuously absent where one would expect them if this were in fact a work by the great Śaṅkara of the period before or around A.D. 800, or if it had been widely known or recognized as such. It seems that there are no such references in the works of the greatest representative of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga renaissance, Vijñānabhikṣu, or of the great encyclopedic Vedāntins Appayadīkṣita and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,[17] who would be likely candidates to utilize a source of this kind in their attempts to establish a concordance or alliance of Vedānta and Sāṁkhya-Yoga. It is at least equally conspicuous that Vācaspatimiśra (9th century), a Yoga commentator as well as a commentator of Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and in general a man of comprehensive learning, gives no indication whatsoever in his commentary *Tattvavaiśāradī* on Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya* that he is aware of this supposedly older commentary on the same text. On the other hand, the Vivaraṇa does not show any acquaintance with the Vaiśāradī, which would be surprising if this were in fact, as Rāmanātha Śāstrī suggests, a work written in the 14th century by the teacher of Parameśvara I; by this time, Vācaspati's reputation had obviously reached a high level in Kerala. The two commentaries differ considerably in character and orientation; and moreover, they are based upon versions of the Yogabhāṣya which are often not identical - a fact which was already noticed by the editors of the

Vivaraṇa. In some cases, Vācaspati and the author of the Vivaraṇa have even different readings of the Sūtra text; II, 7 and II, 8 read *sukhānujanmā rāgaḥ* and *duḥkhānujanmā dveṣaḥ* in the Vivaraṇa instead of *sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ* and *duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ* respectively in the Vaiśāradī. But unlike Vācaspati, the author of the Vivaraṇa is aware that there are alternative readings in this case, and he mentions them explicitly.[18] It should, however, be noted that Vācaspati's Yogabhāṣya text itself, just like that of his Tattvavaiśāradī, is not always well established and that it is not necessarily identical with the text which is commonly and conventionally accepted in the modern printed editions.

The editors of the Vivaraṇa have listed many, but certainly not all significant Yogabhāṣya variants in the foot-notes of their edition; and their system of notation is not consistent: In numerous instances, they print the "standard" text of the Yogabhāṣya as supposedly commented upon by Vācaspati and cite (or fail to cite) conspicuous Vivaraṇa variants in the foot-notes; but even more frequently, this procedure is reversed. The variants seem to be more frequent and significant in such complex and intricate sections as the discussion on *dharma/dharmin* and the "three times" past, present and future (on III, 13-16). One example is the passage which reads *dharmānabhyadhiko dharmī* according to Vācaspati and the "standard" version, but *dharmābhyadhiko dharmī* according to the Vivaraṇa. In the interpretation of the Vivaraṇa, this is a reference to the view that the substance is something over and above its constituents (*dharmavyatirikta*), while according to Vācaspati it refers to the Buddhists.[19]

Very significant, at times crucial variants are found in the sections dealing with *karman* and rebirth, specifically on II, 13 and IV, 9. One of these important variants in the Bhāṣya on Sūtra II, 13 has not been cited by the editors, although it is crucial with reference to the interpretation of the term *ekabhavika* and an adequate understanding of the mechanism of rebirth according to the Yogabhāṣya. In this case, the Vivaraṇa is based upon the reading *tatra-adṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasya-eva-ayaṃ niyamo*, while Vācaspati, as presented in the modern printed editions of the Yogabhāṣya and the Vaiśāradī, has *tatra dṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasya* . . .; the reading of the Vivaraṇa, which seems to be clearly preferable in the context of the Yogabhāṣya, is again found in the version of the *Yogavārttika* by Vijñānabhikṣu.[20] Other variants in this section have been indicated by the editors, but they need not concern us here.[21] - The *karman* sections of the fourth *pāda*, specifically on IV, 9, also contain signifi-

cant and characteristic variants. According to the Vivaraṇa, the introductory statement has *vṛṣadaṃśavipākādayaḥ svakarmavyañjakāñjanāḥ*, while Vācaspati reads: *vṛṣadaṃśavipākodayaḥ svavyañjakāñjanābhivyaktaḥ*. In the following, the Vivaraṇa has *yathā-anubhavās tathā saṃskārāḥ, te ca vāsanānurūpāḥ*, instead of Vācaspati's . . . *te ca karmavāsanānurūpāḥ*. There can be no doubt that these Vivaraṇa readings, too, deserve careful consideration; they may, in fact, allow of a more coherent interpretation of the karmic mechanism than Vācaspati's text.[22]

However, a further discussion of these and related problems is beyond the scope of this "appendix." Our primary purpose is to draw attention to such sections which have an immediate bearing upon the problems raised in our three *Studies* and which have not yet been explored in the previous studies of the Vivaraṇa. This may also help to illustrate the philosophical rank and character of this work - whoever its author may have been. Specifically, we shall refer to the following problems: the attitude toward Kumārila in the Vivaraṇa; the evaluation of sacrificial *hiṃsā*; the assessment of the role of reason and of sacred, in particular Vedic texts; the argumentation against Buddhism and for the existence of an irreducible "witness" in this text, as compared to that in the Brahmasūtra and Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad commentaries.

As stated in the preface of these *Studies*, the actual evidence for Śaṅkara's acquaintance with the works of Kumārila is scarce; clearly identifiable references, if they exist at all, are very rare, as far as Śaṅkara's generally recognized works are concerned. However, the Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa quotes and refutes Kumārila - without mentioning his name - extensively in a remarkable section on the *sphoṭa* theory.[23] First, it presents a sequence of verses from the *sphoṭa* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*; this same sequence is also quoted and criticized in Maṇḍana's *Sphoṭasiddhi*.[24] Subsequently, it not only defends the *sphoṭa* theory against Kumārila's criticism, but also modifies and rephrases his verses in such a manner that they support the *sphoṭa* theory. The same section mentions the old Mīmāṃsā (and Vedānta) teacher Upavarṣa by name and adds a short quote, which is, however, already found in Śabara.[25] It is well known that there is a discussion of the *sphoṭa* theory in Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, which also contains a quote from and references to Upavarṣa. However, this quote is not identical with Śabara's quote; and in general, the treatment of the *sphoṭa* theory in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is different from that in the Vivaraṇa.[26] - In addition to the *sphoṭavāda* quotes, the Vivaraṇa also contains one shorter quote from the *vākya*

chapter of the *Ślokavārttika.*[27]

Concerning the problem of bloody rituals, i.e. of sacrificial *hiṃsā*, the author of the Vivaraṇa appears as an advocate of basic tenets of classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga which are explicitly criticized by Kumārila and which are equally incompatible with views expressed in Śaṅkara's commentaries on the Brahmasūtras and the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad.[28] He states that Vedic rituals may indeed have an "ambiguous causality" (*ubhayahetutva*), i.e. produce demerit as well as merit, since they imply an element of harming (*pīḍā*). According to the Vivaraṇa, *hiṃsā* will produce bad *karman* even if it takes place "for the sake of the sacrifice" (*kratvartha*): *kratvarthā-api satī hiṃsā-aniṣṭabhūtā-eva tadarthatāṃ pratipadyate.*[29] The correlation of helping with *dharma* and of hurting with *adharma* applies in all cases: *punaś ca tataḥ parānugrahaparapīḍanābhyāṃ dharmādharmau.*[30]

While in this respect the Vivaraṇa follows the basic attitude of the classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts, it is generally much more scripture-oriented than the *Yogabhāṣya* or even Vācaspati's *Tattvavaiśāradī*. Compared to these texts, it exhibits a conspicuous tendency to invoke the Upaniṣads, specifically the Bṛhadāraṇyaka- and the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, as well as the Bhagavadgītā. The distribution of Vedic quotes is somewhat uneven. While there are long portions without Vedic quotes or references, they appear in unusual concentration in such sections as the lengthy discussion on the existence of the "Lord" (*īśvara*; on Sūtra I, 25 ff.).

Although Vyāsa's Yogabhāṣya does contain several references to Upaniṣadic statements,[31] it never invokes the Upaniṣads explicitly as sources of authority or validation; it does not dwell upon the problem of the authority of the Veda, nor does it seem concerned about avoiding conflicts with the Vedic revelation. Vācaspati invokes the Upaniṣads occasionally, specifically the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad which is traditionally associated with Sāṃkhya and Yoga.[32] He does not show the Vivaraṇa's predilection for the Bṛhadāraṇyaka- and the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, which are, of course, Śaṅkara's favourite Upaniṣads. In general, scriptural references are much less conspicuous and significant in the Tattvavaiśāradī than in the Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa.[33]

In addition to its Upaniṣadic references, the Vivaraṇa also presents some theoretical considerations concerning the authority and the metaphysical status of the sacred texts, or more specifically: its dependence on and inherence in the omniscience and pure

"goodness" (*sattva*) of the "Lord". Although this proceeds from commentarial observations, it goes far beyond the explicit statements of Vyāsa's Bhāṣya.[34] In general, the Vivaraṇa seems to associate the terms *śāstra* and *āgama* more closely with the Veda, specifically the Upaniṣads, than the Bhāṣya does; it paraphrases, e.g., Vyāsa's expression *mokṣaśāstrādhyayana* as *upaniṣadādyadhyayana.*[35] - The discussion of *karman* and rebirth is much more scripture-oriented in the Vivaraṇa than in the Bhāṣya; there is a conspicuous concern that there should be no conflict with *śruti* and *smṛti*, and that these matters should be explicated in such a manner that there is no "infuriation of all sacred texts" (*sarvaśāstraviprakopa*) and, moreover, no "uselessness of the texts on ritual works" (*karmaśāstrānarthakya*).[36] In general, the Vivaraṇa is less susceptible than the Bhāṣya to the kind of criticism which Śaṅkara raises against Sāṃkhya and Yoga in his commentary on Brahmasūtra II, 1, 1 ff. On the other hand, there is no such attempt to distinguish the absolute, self-sufficient authority of the Veda from the conditional, limited authority of the *smṛti* texts as we find it in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya;[37] and the authoritative Yoga texts, etc. are listed side by side with the Veda itself.[38]

The Vivaraṇa also argues in terms of a concordance of reasoning or inference (*anumāna*) and authoritative texts (*āgama*).[39] Concerning the exegesis of the sacred texts, it employs the Mīmāṃsā concepts of *vidhi*, *pratiṣedha*, *stuti/arthavāda*, etc.; but it rejects, in a manner which is clearly reminiscent of what we find in various passages in Śaṅkara's "classical" works,[40] the Mīmāṃsā attempt to reduce scriptural statements concerning the existence of the "Lord" to merely auxiliary statements, "praises" (*stuti*), supplements to instructions on ritual performances or to "meditational injunctions" (*upāsanāvidhi*).[41] - Still in the context of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and without identifying meditational activities as "works" (*karman*), the Vivaraṇa advocates "knowledge" (*jñāna*), which it identifies with "detachment" (*vairāgya*) and which it contrasts with "works"; and it associates final liberation with knowledge alone.[42]

Among the most remarkable features of the Vivaraṇa is its vigorous and elaborate criticism of Buddhism, specifically of Vijñānavāda. While the Yogabhāṣya contains some critical references to the Buddhist theories of "consciousness only", momentariness, etc., it does not present any broad and comprehensive criticism of Buddhist thought, and in general, it remains open and indebted to Buddhist influences.[43] Here again, the so-called Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa shows an obvious affinity with what we know from Śaṅkara's

commentaries on the Brahmasūtras and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad.

The status of the Buddha as a teacher and the problems resulting from the plurality of Buddhas are discussed in the context of the long chapter on the "Lord" (*īśvara*), which is one of the most conspicuous sections of the whole work.[44] Buddhist concepts and doctrines - the identification of the mind with its ideas, the denial of a subject or witness of experience, the theory of momentariness, the Vijñānavāda denial of material things, problems concerning the relationship between ideas and objects - are then discussed in the commentary on Sūtra I, 32 and in several subsequent sections, specifically in the fourth *pāda*.[45]

The section on I, 32 focuses on the necessity of an identical, unifying subject of awareness, in order to account for the possibility of mental discipline and concentration as well as for the facts of daily life and experience. The subject cannot simply coincide with a "stream" of momentary data of awareness, with mere consciousness understood as a continuous flux.[46]

As stated earlier, the author of the Vivaraṇa argues specifically against the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism. On Sūtra IV, 14, the Vijñānavāda arguments for the non-existence of the material world and the exclusive existence of consciousness are presented, including the dream argument and the "rule of co-apprehension" (*sahopalambhaniyama*); the term *sahopalambhaniyama*, which Śaṅkara uses in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, apparently after becoming aware of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, does not occur in this passage.[47]

Explicating Vyāsa's formulation *na-asty artho vijñānavisahacaraḥ*, the Vivaraṇa states the Vijñānavāda position as follows: *tasmād artho vijñānavyatirekeṇa na-asti-iti pratijānīmahe. pramāṇam apy atra bhavati - vijñānavyatirekeṇa na-asti grāhyaṃ vastu, vijñānavyatirekeṇa-anupalabhyamānatvāt, vijñānasvarūpavat* . . . .[48] Against this, the Vivaraṇa first presents a soteriological *prasaṅga*: If being an object of awareness (*upalabhyamānatva*) coincides with mere appearance, i.e. with illusory existence, then awareness itself, since it is also an object of apprehension, would be unreal; and there would be no subject of awareness. Whose would be liberation? How could there be separation from anything? How would bondage and liberation be possible?[49] Various other arguments follow, which seem to be worth mentioning: The thesis that there is no object apart from consciousness is

simply contradicted by perception. Consciousness is perceiving, i.e. illuminating (*avabhāsaka*); the object has to be illuminated (*avabhāsanīya*). These are essentially different attributes, which cannot belong to one and the same substratum. Object and cognition are being "grasped", i.e. understood as essentially different, and there can be no suspicion of inseparability; the reason claimed by the Vijñānavādin is invalid.[50]

The Vijñānavādin refutes himself when he argues against others: How can he deny the existence of him against whom he tries to establish his position? If, however, the opponent exists as distinct from the Vijñānavādin's consciousness, then the existence of pots etc. is also established.[51] Moreover, followers of this doctrine could not legitimately converse with one another, by instructing disciples, etc.;[52] and in general, the whole realm of daily activities (*vyavahāra*) could not be accounted for by this and similar views; a "breakdown of *vyavahāra*" (*vyavahāravilopa*) would result.[53]

Even in dreams, consciousness is not really without extramental support, since it relates to objects which *have been* perceived: *svapnajñānam api upalabdhārthaviṣayatvāt na nirālambanam.*[54] This is a point which is already emphasized in the *nirālambanavāda* section of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*.[55] In general, the anti-Buddhist argumentation in the Vivaraṇa is obviously indebted to Kumārila; yet, it can by no means be reduced to what is already found in the *Ślokavārttika*, and it remains characteristically different in style and substance.

The author of the Vivaraṇa supplements his arguments against Vijñānavāda with others, which apply also to similar and affiliated standpoints, specifically the theory that, though objects may have an existence apart from consciousness, they arise and disappear simultaneously with acts of awareness, since whatever exists must have a relation to experience: . . . *evaṃ ghaṭādir artho 'pi vijñānasamānasamayajanmavināśa eva, bhogyatvāt iti.*[56] Here, no less than in the case of strict Vijñānavāda, the author of the Vivaraṇa sees a denial of the "commonness" (*sādhāraṇatva*) of objects, i.e. their accessibility to different subjects, and, moreover, the loss of their identity and continuity in the temporality of one's own consciousness. In general, we find here a sharp critical sense of problems concerning the temporal constitution of acts and contents of awareness. In the context of past, present and future, where past phenomena may be objects of present acts of awareness, etc., the object cannot just coincide, or be strictly synchronous, with the apprehending or intending act: *tasmāt idānīntano 'rtho na-idānīntanajñānasahabhūr eva-iti,*

grāhyatvāt, atītārthavat. atīto vā na-atītajñānasahanāśajanmā, grāhyatvāt, idānīntanārthavat. bhūtabhaviṣyajjñānagrāhyā arthā adhunā-api santi, grāhyatvāt, adhunātanapratyayagrāhyavat. idānīntanam api vastu purvottarakṣaṇeṣu tathā-eva.[57].

8. Enlarging upon a remark made in the Yogabhāṣya, the Vivaraṇa presents the Vijñānavādins as deserving compassion, since their minds are subject to a basic karmic defect. The materialists and Śūnyavādins, on the other hand, do not deserve such compassion, since they are only bent upon deceiving people: *kevalajagadvañcanārthapravṛttatvāt tu na-eteṣv anukampā kartavyā.*[58] According to the Vivaraṇa, the Vaiśeṣikas and others are also subject to a fundamental confusion, insofar as they see consciousness (*caitanya*) as a mere attribute of the self, to be eliminated in the state of release. But unlike the Buddhist "destructionists", they accept at least a stable, identical subject or substratum: *vaināśikebhyas tv ayaṃ viśeṣaḥ - sthiram ekaṃ dharmiṇam icchanti-iti.*[59]

Whatever the specific target of argumentation or criticism may be - the Vivaraṇa tries to establish the identity and distinctness of the conscious, "witnessing" self (*puruṣa, ātman*) against everything which is merely "visible" (*dṛśya*), occurs as objective content (*pratyaya*) of awareness; the illuminator (*prakāśaka*) has to be distinguished from what is to be illuminated (*prakāśya*), the perceiver (*grāhaka*) from the perceived or perceivable (*grāhya*). This is obviously in accordance with the Sāṃkhya-Yoga dualism of *puruṣa* and *pradhāna*,[60] where the objective "nature" (*pradhāna* or *prakṛti*) includes the objectifiable processes of the mental sphere (*citta*). But the Vivaraṇa goes beyond what one would expect in a Yoga text, and the style of argumentation is again reminiscent of what we find in Śaṅkara's "classical" works, such as the anti-Buddhist passages in the commentaries on the Brahmasūtras and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad. On the other hand, dualistic implications are not always avoided in these "classical" texts, where the distinctness and internal unity of the *ātman* often seems to be a more serious and direct concern than the ultimate non-duality of all reality.

Among the relevant peculiarities of the Vivaraṇa argumentation, we may mention, e.g., its references to the metaphor of the lamp (*pradīpa*) and its constant and conspicuous usage of the terms *vyatireka* and *vyatirikta*, as occurring in such compounds as *vijñānavyatireka, cittavyatirikta, vyatiriktagrāhyatva, viṣayavyatirikta, vyatiriktapuruṣa, vyatiriktadṛśyatva.*[61] Some of this refers to the separability of external objects from actual empirical awareness; but in most cases,

it is the distinctness and absoluteness of the witnessing self which is at stake. There is no exception to the rule that whatever is "given", perceived, must be given to, perceived by a distinct, non-objectifiable subject or witness: *na tu vyatiriktagrāhyatvaṃ vyabhicarati....*[62] While physical objects may exist without "empirical" acts or states of consciousness, i.e. without the *vijñāna* of Vijñānavāda or the *citta* of Yoga, neither physical objects nor acts of consciousness, mental states or "perceptions" (*pratyaya*[63]) can be "graspable" or "visible" (*grāhya, dṛśya*) without a separate witnessing subject.

Already in the second *pāda*, we find a remarkable attempt to infer the existence of an irreducible "seer" or "witness" from the "visibility" (*dṛśyatva*) of whatever can be "seen"; it is based upon the premise that whatever appears as an objectifiable datum can do so only by reflecting a "light" which is not its own. The relationship between objects and sources of manifestation is pursued through different stages up to the ultimate source of light and awareness, the *puruṣa* or *ātman*. Visible external objects, such as pots etc., as well as the "lights" (*āloka*) which illumine these objects, and the "perceptions" (*pratyaya*) which in turn illumine, i.e. let appear in cognition, these lights and all other objects - all this requires, in order to be "visible", visibility for and manifestation by an essentially different principle: *etat tu tadastitvānumānam. katham? ghaṭādīnāṃ dṛśyānāṃ svarūpavyatiriktena-anyena dṛśyatvadarśanāt, tatprakāśakānāṃ ca-ālokānāṃ vyatiriktadṛśyatvāt, sarvārthāvabhāsakānām api pratyayānāṃ svarūpavyatiriktadṛśyatvam avagamyate, ghaṭāditadālokādivad iti.*[64] The basic conditions of "visibility" or objectivity are the same in the case of external objects like pots and "inner" data, i.e. perceptions; external objects are valid inferential "examples" for the latter.

This "proof" for the existence of a witnessing subject is certainly not meant to disprove or question the existence of the objects. What is denied to the objects is not their independent existence, but their independent manifestness. However, this hierarchy of objects and factors of manifestation has also ontological connotations. The objects of manifestation may change; the "lower" levels of manifestation may turn out to be dependent on higher manifestors: What is indispensable, irreducible, constantly present in this structure of appearance is the witness. The witness or spirit (*puruṣa*) is unchanging (*apariṇāmin*) and does not "deviate" from any given content of awareness. The contents may change; the *puruṣa* does not, and this establishes his separate existence: *tadavyabhicāreṇa-eva puruṣasya vyatiriktatvasiddhiḥ.*[65]

There is an obvious connection with the *anvayavyatireka* "method" introduced in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, although the term itself is not used in this context.[66] Even more significant is the affinity with Śaṅkara's interpretation of Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 3, 1ff., which describes the successive elimination of "lights" up to the ultimate source of light and witnesshood, the pure *ātman*.[67] And it is Śaṅkara's commentary on this passage (specifically on IV, 3, 7) where we find some of the most striking correspondences to the argumentation of the Vivaraṇa. We referred earlier to the following statement in the Vivaraṇa: *na tu vyatiriktagrāhyatvaṃ vyabhicarati, pradīpayor dṛśyatvād ghaṭādivat. etena vyatiriktagrāhyatvaṃ jñānasya dṛśyatvāt pradīpādivat siddhaṃ bhavati.*[68] On Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 3, 7, Śaṅkara says: *yady api pradīpo 'nyasya-avabhāsakaḥ svayamavabhāsātmakatvāt, tathā-api vyatiriktacaitanyāvabhāsyatvaṃ na vyabhicarati, ghaṭādivad eva. yadā ca-evaṃ, tadā vyatiriktāvabhāsyatvaṃ tāvad avaśyaṃbhāvi.*[69]

There are remarkable analogies also in the manner in which common sense and daily life (*vyavahāra*) are invoked against Vijñānavāda, which is depicted as entailing a "breakdown of *vyavahāra*". The Vivaraṇa uses the expression *vyavahāravilopa*, the commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad *sarvasaṃvyavahāralopa*; and both refer specifically to the impossibility of accounting for the activities of debate etc. in terms of the "conciousness-only" theory.[70] The readiness to rely on common sense and *vyavahāra* is, of course, also a striking feature of Śaṅkara's argumentation against Vijñānavāda in his Brahmasūtra commentary (II, 2, 28ff.).

All this is conspicuously different from the treatment of Vijñānavāda and Buddhism in general in the commentary on Gauḍapāda's Kārikās (specifically IV, 24ff.), and it throws suspicion on Hacker's assessment of this work as a transitional work between the Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa and Śaṅkara's "mature" works, such as his commentaries on the Brahmasūtras and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad. In several significant respects, the Vivaraṇa is closer to these works than the commentary on Gauḍapāda; but as noted before, such affinities are open to different interpretations.

Both P. Hacker and T. Vetter suggest that in the course of his development Śaṅkara turned away from an early indebtedness to Buddhist ideas. Vetter states that Śaṅkara's anti-Buddhist polemics in his Brahmasūtra commentary might be an attempt to dissociate himself from something he himself wrote earlier, sc. in his commentary on Gauḍapāda.[71] Hacker maintains that commenting upon the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad Śaṅkara turned against a "Buddhist"

theory which he had previously accepted, i.e. the theory of the apparent disintegration of pure consciousness into subject and object.[72] But against this view, the argumentation is just as vigorous in the Vivaraṇa as it is in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad commentary. - In a recent article, F. Whaling claims that "Hacker has shown by literary analysis" that in his early days Śaṅkara was "much closer to Buddhism than he was later when he wrote the commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras."[73] Trying to further elaborate Hacker's thesis, Whaling speculates on an "early Vijñānavāda phase" in Śaṅkara's thought, and he finds a "Buddhist Gauḍapāda phase" in his "commentaries on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and Kārikās, his commentary on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, and parts of the Upadeśasāhasrī, and also possibly in his commentary on Vyāsa's commentary on the Yoga Sūtras."[74] Whaling has obviously not paid any attention to the anti-Buddhist passages of the Vivaraṇa, and his statements are definitely less cautious than those of Hacker and Vetter.

There is nothing in the Vivaraṇa passages under discussion which would exclude Śaṅkara's authorship; as we have seen, they correspond to and supplement what we find also in his "mature", "classical" works. Of course, there are also statments in the Vivaraṇa which would not be acceptable in the context of these works. Basic teachings of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, which are expressly rejected in Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta works, are simply taken for granted in the Vivaraṇa, e.g. the existence of "primal matter" (*pradhāna*) and the plurality of "selves" or "spirits" (*puruṣa*). However, the Vivaraṇa does not give any prominence to Sāṃkhya and Yoga teachings which are incompatible with Advaita Vedānta. Apart from strictly commentarial statements,[75] "primal matter" and the plurality of selves do not play a significant role.

Other themes lead the author of the Vivaraṇa to long digressions and far beyond the text on which he comments: problems of awareness; the search for the pure, irreducible subject or witness; the critique of Buddhist teachings; the existence of a supreme, omniscient "Lord" (*īśvara*). Moreover, the tendency to rely on the Upaniṣads and a conspicuous allegiance to the Vedic tradition are peculiar and untypical features of this "Yoga" text. - Whether it is by Śaṅkara or not - there is lively, intellectually stimulating argumentation in the Vivaraṇa, and its author demonstrates a remarkable level of philosophical reflection and considerable dialectical skills.[76] In particular, there is nothing stereotypical or scholastic in the argumentation against Buddhism, although there is, of course, some misunderstanding or misrepresentation of specific Buddhist

teachings. Buddhism is taken as a fresh, living challenge to be dealt with in direct and problem-oriented argumentation. The Vivaraṇa does not attempt an explicit coordination or reconciliation of "reason" and "revelation"; nor does it try to find "reason" *in* "revelation". But rational argumentation and reliance on authoritative, specifically Vedic instruction often appear side by side and in factual coordination or combination.[77]

All this would indicate a remarkable degree of "originality" if it were certain that it is by the young and developing Śaṅkara himself and not by a much later author who would be indebted to and borrowing from the works of the "mature" Śaṅkara.

It has not been the purpose of this "appendix" to solve the problem of the authorship of the so-called Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa or to refute Hacker's hypothetical reconstruction of Śaṅkara's development. However, a few final considerations concerning this matter seem appropriate. As noted earlier, Hacker's authenticity thesis is - apart from more general and obviously inconclusive observations concerning Śaṅkara's familiarity with Yoga teachings - primarily based upon the fact that the colophons present Śaṅkarabhagavat and not Śaṅkarācārya as the author of the Vivaraṇa. Hacker himself recognizes that this alone is not a sufficient criterion of authenticity.[78] It is furthermore evident that his stimulating investigations have to be supplemented by a broader sampling of texts and manuscripts, which may be based upon numerous new manuscript catalogues which were not available to him. Among the cases not considered by Hacker is the commentary *Jayamaṅgalā* on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, just like the Vivaraṇa preserved in and presumably originating from Kerala, and also attributed to Śaṅkarabhagavat in the colophons.[79] Readers of this work will hardly feel tempted to attribute it to the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya or, on the other hand, to the author of the Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa.[80] In Kerala, the name Śaṅkara has apparently been more common than elsewhere.[81] One might suspect that, if there was a confusion of authors, it was not so much a matter of confusing the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya with the institutionalized Śaṅkarācāryas, but rather with other authors whose name was Śaṅkara. Several "Yoga" works, e.g. the *Yogatārāvalī*,[82] are, of course, traditionally ascribed to "Śaṅkarācārya".

It seems obvious that the Vivaraṇa had a special and possibly unique relationship with Kerala; it is here where the text was preserved and, at least to a certain extent, studied. Even if the Vivaraṇa

should be by the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya - it would still be true that it did not have any significant impact outside Kerala; and this would obviously constitute a conspicuous and probably exceptional case among the writings of the great Śaṅkara. May we accept the Indian tradition that Śaṅkara came from Kerala, and may we speculate that the Vivaraṇa, as a youthful work of his,[83] found a certain recognition only in his homeland, while the fame of his other works spread all over India?

A merely regional impact would, however, be more normal for a work produced by a member or affiliate of the Payyūr family, such as Śaṅkara, the teacher and possibly uncle of Parameśvara I. In this case, it would also be unnecessary to dimiss the final verse of the text, which pays respect to the "venerable original Śaṅkara", as an addition made by a scribe or eager disciple.[84] If the author of the Vivaraṇa was not identical with the author of the Brahmasūtra and Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad commentaries, he was certainly familiar with these works and indebted to their author. In general, medieval Kerala was rich in local and somewhat parochial traditions of learning, which remained virtually unknown in the rest of India. The extraordinary contributions to mathematics and astronomy in medieval Kerala, which had no impact upon the development of these sciences in other parts of India, illustrate this insularity.[85] In Mīmāṃsā and other branches of traditional learning and literature, the members and affiliates of the Payyūr family made significant contributions which remained unknown outside Kerala.[86]

Yet, the assignment of the Vivaraṇa to such a late date as the 14th century is far from being satisfactory. The style of the argumentation against Buddhism, the fact that Kumārila is the latest author explicitly referred to and, more specifically, the absence of any identifiable reference to Vācaspatimiśra could easily be invoked as arguments for an earlier date.[87] How much earlier? Are there criteria which would allow us to come to a definitive chronological conclusion, even if we cannot resolve the problem?

In a recent study of the Vivaraṇa, which contains numerous significant philological observations and which has already been referred to, A. Wezler agrees that the question of the authorship of the Vivaraṇa or, more specifically, the question whether its author is identical with the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya has to remain unanswered for the time being.[88] But he argues that it can nevertheless be determined that the Vivaraṇa must be considerably older than Vācaspati's Tattvavaiśāradī. In his view, "the text of the YBhāṣya

as known to Vācaspatimiśra shows clear vestiges of an influence exercised on it by the Vivaraṇa."[89] In support of his thesis, Wezler cites several variant readings in the Yogabhāṣya texts on Sūtra I, 5 and II, 32. According to Wezler, the statement *kliṣṭapravāhapatitā apy akliṣṭāḥ* in the section on I, 5 was added to the Yogabhāṣya text under the influence of the Vivaraṇa's explication of the section. In Wezler's view, it is not only the fact that the Vivaraṇa does not cite this statement, but also the context of the Yogabhāṣya itself which suggests its spuriousness. He finds its contents "but repeated by the following phrase, viz. *kliṣṭacchidreṣv apy akliṣṭā bhavanti*", and he sees a "striking discrepancy as regards the image, i.e. *pravāha(patita)* on the one hand and *chidra* on the other, that can hardly be accounted for convincingly."[90] But the idea and imagery of a "gap in a series" or "succession" of (temporal) phenomena, or of an interruption in the "flow" of mental modes, is certainly not unnatural in the context of classical Yoga thought. The conjunction of *chidra* and *pravāha* appears again in the Bhāṣya on Sūtra IV, 27, which introduces the word *chidra*.[91] The issue of redundancy is more serious. But the statement starting with *kliṣṭacchidreṣu* is certainly not merely repetitious; it explains and justifies what has been said before in a more general sense. It would, however, not be repetitious at all if - in accordance with a possibility considered by Wezler himself - the preceding sentence could be read as implying a question or objection. If the author of the Vivaraṇa, unlike Vācaspati and other commentators, should have taken it in this sense, his following *tasmād āha* would be less problematic insofar as it could be understood as introducing Vyāsa's response to this question or objection, which the Vivaraṇa has paraphrased in detail, although without quoting the exact wording in which it was presented in the Bhāṣya.[92] In general, it is evidently impossible to reconstruct a complete text of the Yogabhāṣya from the Vivaraṇa, which does not always quote the text on which it comments in its entirety.

It may certainly be granted that the phrase *kliṣṭapravāhapatitā...*, together with the Vivaraṇa's failure to cite it, raises legitimate questions; and the idea of a later introduction may indeed "suggest itself."[93] Yet, this alone is not enough for a strong and compelling argument; further evidence, at least of a cumulative type, is called for. Is this provided by the variants in Yogabhāṣya II, 32?

Concerning this section, Wezler argues that Vācaspati's reading *mṛjjalādijanitam* instead of the Vivaraṇa's *mṛdādijanitam* originated under the influence of the explanation of the *ādi* given by the Vivaraṇa, i.e. the phrase *ādiśabdād udakaṃ ca*, and that "similarily"

the "irritating plural" *abhyavaharaṇāni* was "eliminated, i.e. replaced by" *abhyavaharaṇādi* in Vācaspati's version. But without further evidence, can we really say more than that *abhyavaharaṇāni* is the *lectio difficilior* which may or may not be the correct one? Finally, the combined reference to "earth" and "water" is very common, if not stereotypical in texts dealing with purity;[94] and water is the most familiar of all purifying substances. There is obviously no compelling reason why the *mṛjjala* in Vācaspati's version should reflect any specific influence of the Vivaraṇa. Vācaspati himself uses the compound *mṛjjalādikṣālana* in his commentary on Yogabhāṣya II, 5. In general, enumerative compounds with *ādi* are, of course, very susceptible to variants, which may result from omissions as well as from additions.[95]

As we have stated earlier, there is a large number of significant cases where Vācaspati's reading and interpretation of the Yogabhāṣya are clearly incompatible with that of the Vivaraṇa. How do the instances of an alleged influence relate to the numerous incompatibilities? Why did Vācaspati, if he had a Bhāṣya text influenced by the Vivaraṇa, follow this text in some cases, but disregard it in numerous other and apparently more significant cases? What exactly did he have - a Yogabhāṣya text which showed only occasional traces of the Vivaraṇa's interpretation, or one which was consistently shaped by it? Or did he have the Yogabhāṣya together with and embedded in the Vivaraṇa?[96] Whatever the answer to these hypothetical questions may be, it remains undeniable that there is no coherent pattern in the Yogabhāṣya variants which would support the thesis of a general influence of the Vivaraṇa upon Vācaspati's or the "standard" version of the Yogabhāṣya. Much further study of the textual tradition or traditions, of possible regional varieties, of versions other than the Vaiśāradī version is needed before definite conclusions concerning the relative chronology of the Vivaraṇa and the Tattvavaiśāradī and the role of the Vivaraṇa in the textual tradition of the Yogabhāṣya can be drawn. Borrowing a phrase from Wezler's assessment of Hacker's authorship thesis, we may say that so far the available evidence is not sufficient to turn "possibility into certainty."[97]

Nevertheless, we may readily agree with Wezler's observation that the Yogabhāṣya text as found in the Vivaraṇa is in many instances better than Vācaspati's version; and it may indeed have preserved a significant number of older readings. And in general, it is undeniable that Wezler's philological investigations have opened promising prospects for future research, which would not only affect our

understanding of the Vivaraṇa, but also of the Yogabhāṣya itself.

For the time being, the so-called Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa remains a puzzle; basic questions concerning its philological status, its historical role and its philosophical teachings are still open. And Hacker's challenging and intriguing hypothesis that Śaṅkara, the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, wrote this text as a Yogin and before "converting" to Advaita Vedānta is just this: a hypothesis, one possibility among others.[98]

Notes

Appendix: Notes on the "Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa"

[1] Cf. A. Wezler, Philological Observations on the So-Called Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa. Indo-Iranian Journal 25 (1983; forthcoming). - The shorter title Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa, which is already found in the preface by the editors and, even earlier, as title of the excerpt published by Rāmanātha Śāstrī in 1931 (see n. 10), has been used by P. Hacker and subsequently adopted by other authors, e.g. T. Vetter and S. Mayeda, and it has become the most familiar name of this work.

[2] Cf. YSBhV, XIII ff.

[3] Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin, einige Beobachtungen. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 12/13 (1968; Festschrift E. Frauwallner), 119-148; also in: Kleine Schriften, ed. L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978, 213-242.

[4] Śaṅkarācārya and Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda. Preliminary Remarks concerning the Authorship Problem. New Indian Antiquary 9 (1947), 175-186; revised version in: Kleine Schriften, 41-58.

[5] The Chapter of the Self, London 1978, 174.

[6] Cf. T. Leggett, loc. cit. - In two recent articles in Japanese, H. Nakamura has investigated various textual and doctrinal issues in the Vivaraṇa, but without systematically reviewing the authenticity problem; cf. Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Tokyo) 25/1 (1976), 70-77; 26/1 (1977), 119-126. For information concerning these two articles, which do not have an immediate bearing upon the issues discussed in this "appendix", I am indebted to my colleague W. Tyler (Philadelphia).

[7] Cf. A Thousand Teachings, Tokyo 1979, 4: "It is likely that he was familiar with Yoga, since he is the author of the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* . . ."; but 65, n. 63: "The authenticity of this text has not yet been established, but as far as I can see now, there is no conclusively negative evidence."

[8] Cf. Studien, 21: "das mit Ausnahme der Gotteslehre wenig originelle YViv".

[9] Cf. G. Oberhammer, Strukturen yogischer Meditation, Wien 1977; but see the cautionary remark on p. 135: "Śaṅkaras Subkommentar... von dem P. Hacker glaubt, daß er dem bekannten Advaitin dieses Namens zuzuschreiben und daher in die erste Hälfte des 8. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. zu datieren ist."

[10] Cf. The Sphoṭasiddhi of Ācārya Maṇḍanamiśra with the Gopālikā of Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara, ed. S. K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī, Madras 1931, XIII.

[11] Cf. loc. cit., XIV.

[12] Loc. cit., XV.

[13] Cf. Gopālikā, 193 ff.

[14] Cf. Tattvabindu by Vācaspatimiśra with Tattvavibhāvanā by Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara, ed. V.A. Ramaswami Sastri, Annamalainagar 1936; for a discussion of the "three Parameśvaras of Kerala", see the editor's introduction, 87 ff. The work of the Payyūr family is also discussed by K. Kunjunni Raja, The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature, Madras 1958, 90 ff.; Kunjunni Raja criticizes the view accepted by Ramaswami Sastri that the Śaṅkara referred to in the Svaditaṅkaraṇī was not only the teacher, but also an uncle of Parameśvara I, and he refers to C. Kunhan Raja's suggestion "that Śaṅkara may be the author of the Niruktavārttika from which Parameśvara quotes"(93).

[15] E. Stern (Philadelphia) is currently preparing an edition of this unpublished text and the Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī by the same author (together with a new, critical edition of the Vidhiviveka and the Nyāyakaṇikạ). Mr. Stern deserves much credit for having identified not only these Vivaraṇa quotations, but also numerous other significant references in the texts he is editing.

[16] Cf. YSBhV, VII (general editor's introduction); also Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts, Adyar Library and Research Centre, vol. 8 (1972; compiled by K. Parameswara Aithal), 8 f. (nos. 25-26). - For one passage of the text, a manuscript "available with the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum" was also consulted (YSBhV, VIII). This seems to be identical with the "Trivandrum manuscript" of which A. Wezler made a much more systematic use; see below, n. 88.

[17] In the case of Madhusūdana, his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, which follows Śaṅkara, but gives also much room to Patañjali's Yoga, may be mentioned specifically as a work in which one might expect, but does not actually find references to the Vivaraṇa.

[18] Cf. YSBhV, 139 (on II, 7): *sukhānuśayī tathā duḥkhānuśayī-iti anyeṣāṃ pāṭhaḥ*. In this same section, the Vivaraṇa states: *tathā ca vakṣyati dharmāt sukhaṃ sukhād rāgaḥ iti.* This seems to refer to YBh IV, 11, where, however, the Vivaraṇa (p. 331) reads *dharmāt sukham. sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ*, while Vācaspati's version has, indeed, *dharmāt sukham... sukhād rāgo...* In Vācaspati's version, YBh I, 11 has *sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ, duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ*; this is, however, not found in the Vivaraṇa.

[19] YSBhV, 246 (on III, 13); cf. also the different versions of YBh II, 18 and III, 6. An important variant not pointed out by the editors occurs in YBh I, 36, where the Vivaraṇa reads *vaiṣamya* instead of *vaiśāradya*. In several cases, the Yogabhāṣya variants of the Vivaraṇa are supported by other manuscripts. On II, 13 (YSBhV, 151), the Vivaraṇa has a phrase *trivipākārambhī vā janmāyurbhogahetutvāt* which is missing (perhaps due to a scribal error caused by the repetition of *hetutvāt*) in Vācaspati's version and in most of the printed

editions, but which occurs in some of the manuscripts and one printed text consulted by R.S. Bodas (see below, n. 20).

[20] Cf. YSBhV, 155, line 1; on p. 157, a further YBh variant concerning *(a)dṛṣṭajanmavedanīya* has been noted by the editors, while other variants on the same page remain unmentioned. - It should not be taken for granted that Vācaspati himself read *tatra dṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasya* instead of . . . *adṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasya* etc. According to the edition by R.S. Bodas, so far the only edition of the Bhāṣya and Vaiśāradī which attempts to be "critical", the reading *dṛṣṭa-* does not seem to have any clear manuscript support; cf. The Yogasūtras of Patañjali with the scholium of Vyāsa and the comm. of Vācaspatimiśra, ed. by R.S. Bodas. Revised and enlarged by the addition of the comm. of Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa by V.S. Abhyankar, Bombay[2] 1917 (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series), 71, notes on lines 7 and 21. It seems that in preferring the reading *dṛṣṭa-* Bodas has followed the lead of earlier printed editions (and perhaps an attempted emendation); cf. his survey of published and unpublished sources, Prastāvanā, X f. Nāgojībhaṭṭa obviously presupposes the reading *adṛṣṭa-* (loc. cit., 275, lines 22 ff.). - Cf. also Y.K. Wadhwani, Ekabhavika karmāśaya in Yogabhāṣya 2.13. Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference 28 (1976), 473-480; the authoress compares Vācaspati's and Vijñānabhikṣu's readings and interpretations, but she has not consulted the Vivaraṇa, and she seems to be unaware of the existence of the variant readings in the Vācaspati manuscripts. This is also the case with P.K. Guptā, Pātañjala Yogasūtra: eka samālocanātmaka adhyayana, Tattvavaiśāradī evaṃ Yogavārttika ke paripreksya meṃ, Delhi 1979, 252 ff. Both Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu give occasional references to Yogabhāṣya variants. On II, 13, Vācaspati mentions an alternative to *ekabhavika*: *kvacit pāṭha aikabhavika iti*; in the Vivaraṇa, this occurs once instead of *ekabhavika* (cf. YSBhV, 151). However, on III, 22, the Bhāṣya itself as well as Vācaspati (with one variant *ekabhavika* being listed by R.S. Bodas) have *aikabhavika*. Vijñānabhikṣu notes a variant reading *kaivalinaḥ* (instead of *kevalinaḥ*) in his commentary on I, 24 (Pātañjalayogadarśana, ed. Nārāyaṇa Miśra, Benares 1971, 71), as well as *aikabhavika* on II, 13 (p. 169).

[21] Cf., e.g., the different versions of the final statement of YBh II, 13. That the author of the Vivaraṇa considers his own reading problematic in this case, is indicated by the fact that he offers alternative explanations; but Vācaspati's "standard" version is by no means easier or more satisfactory.

[22] I hope to discuss these matters in detail in a monograph on the history of the philosophical karman theories in Hinduism which is now under preparation.

[23] YSBhV, 268 ff. (on III, 17); Kumārila's verses are found ŚV, 383 f. (v. 131 ff.).

[24] Cf. Sphoṭasiddhi on v. 27; ed./transl. K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1966, 69; ed. S.K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī (see above, n. 10), 193 f.

[25] Cf. YSBhV, 264 (on III, 17); this quote (*gakāraukāravisarjanīyāḥ*) is also given by Śabara on MS I, 1, 5; cf. E. Frauwallner, Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā, Wien 1968, 38. In YBh III, 17, the phrase occurs without reference to Upavarṣa.

[26] Cf. BSBh I, 3, 28 (Works III, 125), where the Upavarṣa quote is: *varṇā eva tu, na śabdaḥ*; YSBhV, 267: *na varṇāḥ padam* is perhaps a (critical) reference to this teaching which is reviewed more positively in BSBh.

[27] YSBhV, 275 (on III, 17).

28 See above, chapter I, § 3 ff.; 8.

29 YSBhV, 323 (on IV, 7).

30 YSBhV, 331 (on IV, 11).

31 Cf. YBh III, 35: *vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt* (i.e. BU II, 4, 14 and IV, 5, 15); see the commentary on this, YSBhV, 291 f.; in YBh II, 23, the phrase *iti śruteḥ* refers to a "scriptural" claim made by others.

32 Cf. Tattvavaiśāradī on YS/YBh II, 22 (reference to Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad IV, 5).

33 Cf., e.g., YSBhV, 183 (on II, 19): *āgamavirodha* (with reference to Taittirīya-Upaniṣad II, 1) and *smṛtivirodha*; 184: *śrutiprasiddhatva* (with reference to BU II, 4, 11).

34 Cf. YSBhV, 55 f. (on I, 24).

35 YSBhV, 216 (on II, 32); and similarly 123 (on II, 1): *mokṣaśāstrāṇāṃ ca-upaniṣatprabhṛtīnām*; see also 78 (on I, 27), where the word *āgamin* is paraphrased as *vedavādin*. On p. 250 (on III, 13), the Gītā is referred to as *āgama*. In this connection, we may also mention the phrase *avadyotakatvād āgamasya* (75; on I, 26), which is reminiscent of Śaṅkara's references to the Veda as a source of light; see above, chapter II, n. 97 (BSBh II, 1, 1); n. 121 (BUBh II, 1, 20).

36 Cf. YSBhV, 148 ff. (on II, 13); specifically 153: *sarvaśāstraviprakopaś ca syāt... karmaśāstrānarthakye ca mokṣaśāstre 'py anāśvāsaprasaṅgaḥ*; also 151: *sarvaśrutismṛtiviprakopa*. - Cf. the discussion of karman, BSBh III, 1, 1 ff.

37 See above, chapter II, § 6; 9.

38 Cf. YSBhV, 73 (on I, 25): *vedetihāsapurāṇayogadharmaśāstrādyāgamataḥ.*

39 Cf. YSBhV, 67 (on I, 25): *anumānāgamaprasiddheśvara*; *anumānāgamavirodha*. See also 114 (on I, 48).

40 See above, chapter II, n. 108.

41 Cf. YSBhV, 68 (on I, 25); the printed text requires several emendations, most conspicuously, l. 7 should read: *śrutīnāṃ vidhipratiṣedhārthatvād īśvarāpratyāyakatvam*, instead of: ... *vipratiṣedhārthatvād*...

42 Cf. YSBhV, 46 (on I, 16): *vairāgyasya jñānaprasādamātratve jñānavairāgyayor ananyatvāt tadviparītayoś ca rāgājñānayor anarthāntaratvam eva siddham*; but also 334 (on IV, 22): *yāgena svargo bhaviṣyati, samādhyādinā mokṣo bhaviṣyati.*

43 Cf., e.g., L. de La Vallée Poussin, Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali. Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 5 (1936/37), 223-242.

44 Cf. YSBhV on I, 25 (specifically 71 f.).

45 Cf. YSBhV on IV, 14 f.; 19; 21-24.

46 YSBhV, 83 ff.

47 BSBh II, 2, 28; Vācaspati uses the term *sahopalambhaniyama* in his Tattvavaiśāradī on YS IV, 14.

48 YSBhV, 340 (on IV, 14).

49 Loc. cit.

50 Cf. YSBhV, 341 (on IV, 14): *svalakṣaṇabhedena-arthajñānayor upalabhyamānatvān na-avyatirekagandho 'pi. tataś ca vyatirekeṇa-anupalabhyamānatvād ity asiddho hetus tava.*

51 Loc. cit.: *na ca-asau na-asti-iti śakyaṃ pratijñātuṃ, yaṃ prati sisādhayiṣasi. sa cet tadvijñāna-vyatiriktaḥ, tathā ghaṭādir api sidhyati.*

52 Cf. YSBhV, 345 (on IV, 16).

53 YSBhV, 351 (on IV, 19); cf. 343 (on IV, 15): *sādhyasādhanādivyavahāravilopa.*

54 YSBhV, 341 (on IV, 14).

55 Cf. ŚV, 173 f. (v. 107 ff.).

56 YSBhV, 343 (on IV, 15); that there has to be relation to experience, follows from a radical application of the karman theory, which turns the whole world into a vehicle of reward and punishment.

57 YSBhV, 344 (on IV, 15).

58 YSBhV, 356 (on IV, 23).

59 Loc. cit.

60 Cf. also YSBhV, 358 ff. (on IV, 24), where the argument from "visibility" (*dṛśyatva*) is supplemented by the "teleological" Sāṃkhya-Yoga argument that all "aggregates" must be "for the sake of *puruṣa*" (*puruṣārtha*); on the use of this argument, cf. also USG II, 56; 70.

61 Cf. YSBhV, 340 ff. (on IV, 14 f.); 349 f. (on IV, 19); 358 ff. (on IV, 24).

62 YSBhV, 350 (on IV, 19).

63 The word *pratyaya* appears in YS II, 20: *draṣṭā dṛśimātraḥ śuddho 'pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ*; cf. also YS III, 35 and YSBhV, 291: *pratyaya* as reflecting the light of the *puruṣa* (*puruṣābhāsa*). - On *pratyaya* see also US XII, 6 ff.; XVIII, 97 f.; 109 ff.

64 YSBhV, 189 (on II, 20).

65 YSBhV, 190 (on II, 20); cf. 192: *buddhipratyayasākṣitvasya siddhatvāt.* - On the use of *vyabhicāra*, *vyabhicar-*, cf. also Gītābhāṣya II, 16 (Works II, 14 f.), where "being" is presented as the pure irreducible objective factor in cognition; cognition "deviates" and fluctuates with reference to particular and changing, i.e. unreal, contents, but not with reference to "being" as such: *yadviṣayā buddhir na vyabhicarati, tat sat.* This is not, as P. Hacker (see article mentioned in n. 3, p. 131, n. 29) seems to think, a "spiritualistic" reduction of being to awareness.

[66] In its "logical" connotation, the term is used YSBhV, 26; 29 (on I, 7).

[67] Cf. BUBh IV, 3, 7 (Works I, 871), where the "light of the *ātman*" is described as *buddhivijñānāvabhāsaka* and *vyatirikta*.

[68] YSBhV, 350 (on IV, 19); see above, n. 62.

[69] Works I, 872; see above, chapter II, n. 168. - Cf. also BSBh II, 2, 28 (Works III, 250): *ataḥ pradīpavad vijñānasya-api vyatiriktāvagamyatvam asmābhiḥ prasādhitam.*

[70] Cf. YSBhV on IV, 15 (specifically 341; 343); on the other hand, BUBh IV, 3, 7 (Works I, 873 f.); see also above, n. 53.

[71] Zur Bedeutung des Illusionismus bei Śaṅkara. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 12/13 (1968; Festschrift E. Frauwallner), 407-423; ib., 409.

[72] Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin, einige Beobachtungen (see above, n. 3), 133.

[73] Śaṅkara and Buddhism. Journal of Indian Philosophy 7 (1979), 1-42; ib., 25.

[74] Loc. cit., 25 f.; 28.

[75] Cf., e.g., YSBhV, 194 (on II, 22).

[76] Insofar, T. Vetter's characterization of the Vivaraṇa as "wenig originell" (see above, n. 8) is somewhat surprising if measured against his assessment of USG II - which the Vivaraṇa would anticipate to a certain extent if it were an early work by Śaṅkara - as "der vielleicht bedeutendste denkerische Versuch" of Śaṅkara (see above, chapter II, n. 53).

[77] See also above, n. 39 (*anumānāgamaprasiddha*, etc.); there is, however, a more conspicuous tendency in the Vivaraṇa to use reason and inference independently, very often by presenting formal schemes of inference (*anumāna*).

[78] Cf. Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin, einige Beobachtungen (see above, n. 3), 124.

[79] Cf. Jayamaṅgalā, ed. H. Śarmā, Calcutta 1926, Preface.

[80] However, the identity of the authors of the Vivaraṇa and the Jayamaṅgalā seems to be assumed by Rāmanātha Śāstrī (see above, n. 10), XI: *ayam eva śaṅkaro vā syāt yogabhāṣya-vivaraṇasāṃkhyajayamaṅgalādīnāṃ kartā . . . .*

[81] In the Payyūr family alone, this name occurs repeatedly; it is also common among the representatives of the Kerala tradition of mathematics and astronomy.

[82] The Yogatārāvalī has been published in: Minor Works of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, ed. H.R. Bhagavat, Poona[2] 1952.

[83] In this case, we would have the problem that there is already a good deal of "mature", fully developed argumentation in this work - as illustrated by our preceding observations.

[84] This is done by the editors of the text; cf. YSBhV, 370, n. 1; the statement *praṇamāmy*

. . . *bhagavatpādam apūrvaśaṅkaram* can, of course, not be attributed to the "original Saṅkara" himself.

85 Cf. D. Pingree, Jyotiḥśāstra. Astral and Mathematical Literature (A History of Indian Literature, VI/4), Wiesbaden 1981, 47 ff.

86 Cf. K. Kunjunni Raja, The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature, Madras 1958; specifically XV; XIX; 90 ff. (on the Parameśvaras).

87 But cf. the lively and extensive argumentation against the Buddhists in Cidānanda, Nītitattvāvirbhāva, ed. P.K. Narayana Pillai, Trivandrum 1953, 116-124; 201-211; on this work, which may have been composed around 1300, Parameśvara II wrote his unpublished Vyākhyā. - The assumption that the Vivaraṇa is deliberately "archaic", avoiding references to more recent authors, would appear artificial.

88 Philological Observations on the So-Called Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa (see above, n. 1). I am greatly indebted to the author for giving me access to this article prior to its publication. In a number of significant cases, Wezler has compared the printed text with the manuscript transcript, on which it is based, as well as with the "Trivandrum manuscript", the existence of which was already known to the editors, but which was only consulted in one instance; see above, n. 16. In his article, Wezler also refers to a YSBhV manuscript kept in the Woolner collection, Lahore; according to his kind information, this is a palm-leaf manuscript in Malayalam script, thus also from Kerala.

89 Loc. cit., cf. ib.: ". . . to prove that the Vivaraṇa is in fact the oldest extant YS commentary it is not at all necessary to assume that its author was the famous Advaitin Śaṅkara."

90 Loc. cit.

91 There are again characteristic variants in the Vivaraṇa and the Vaiśāradī versions of this section; on *pravāha*, cf. also II, 32 (Buddhist usage); III, 2; 52.

92 Cf. YSBhV, 18; cf. also the usages of *iti* in the YBh section, 17 f.

93 A. Wezler, loc. cit.

94 Cf., e.g., Manu V, 105 ff.

95 Cf., e.g., S. Mayeda's critical apparatus on US II (USG), 1 (p. 261 ff., n. 3; 180; 206; etc.).

96 Could Vācaspati have chosen not to acknowledge his acquaintance with the Vivaraṇa? But why should he have disregarded many of its more helpful readings? Wezler presents the reading *akāṣṭhamauna* instead of *ākāramauna* in YBh II, 32 as an illustration of the superiority of the Vivaraṇa version. But in this case, possession of the Vivaraṇa, which clearly repeats the word *akāṣṭhamauna*, should have prevented the acceptance of *ākāramauna* - a word which according to Wezler owes its very existence to a scribal error.

97 Loc. cit.

98 After the completion of my *Studies*, the following new publication came to my knowledge: T. Leggett, Śaṅkara on the Yoga-sūtra-s (Vol. I: Samādhi), London 1981. This

is a translation of the first *pāda* of the so-called Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa. As far as the more intricate and technical portions of the text are concerned, this translation is often quite unsatisfactory; cf., e.g., p. 107 f., where crucial Mīmāṃsā implications and obvious inaccuracies in the printed text have been overlooked; moreover, several scriptural references in this passage are incorrect, although they had been correctly identified by the editors (cf. YSBhV, 68). - According to Leggett (Introduction, XIX), H. Nakamura has started publishing a Japanese translation "in the Buddhist journal Āgama, though only a few pages at a time".

Abbreviations

A Thousand Teachings: A Thousand Teachings. The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara. Transl. with introduction and notes by S. Mayeda, Tokyo 1979.

Beweisverfahren: H. Brückner, Zum Beweisverfahren Śaṃkaras. Eine Untersuchung der Form und Funktion von dṛṣṭāntas im Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya und im Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya des Śaṃkara Bhagavatpāda, Berlin 1979 (Diss. Marburg).

BS (Bh): Brahmasūtra (-Bhāṣya).

BU (Bh): Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad (-Bhāṣya).

ChSS: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

Indien und Europa: W. Halbfass, Indien und Europa. Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung, Basel/Stuttgart 1981.

MS: Mīmāṃsāsūtra.

Naiṣk: Sureśvara, Naiṣkarmyasiddhi.

NBhūṣ: Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, ed. Yogīndrānanda, Benares 1968.

NM: The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. S.N. Śukla, Benares 1934-1936 (Kashi Sanskrit Series).

NS: Nyāyasūtra.

NSudhā: Someśvara, Nyāyasudhā (commentary on Kumārila's Tantravārttika), ed. Mukunda Śāstrī, Benares 1909 (ChSS).

PTS: Pali Text Society.

Schüler Śaṅkaras: P. Hacker, Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavāda. 1: Die Schüler Śaṅkaras, Wiesbaden 1951 (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jg. 1950, Nr. 26).

Studien: T. Vetter, Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śaṅkaras, Wien 1979.

ŚV: Kumārila, Ślokavārttika with commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, Benares 1978 (Prācyabhāratī Series).

TS: Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha with commentary Pañjika of Kamalaśīla, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, Benares 1978 (Bauddhabhāratī Series).

TV: Kumārila, Tantravārttika; in: Mīmāṃsādarśana, ed. K.V. Abhyaṅkara/K.S. Jośī, Poona[2] 1970 (vol. I: on MS I, 2, 1 - II, 1, 49; Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series).

US: Śaṅkara's Upadeśasāhasrī. Crit. ed. with introduction and indices by S. Mayeda, Tokyo 1973 (USG: Upadeśasāhasrī, Gadyabandha).

VP: Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya.

VS: Vaiśeṣikasūtra (if not indicated otherwise, quoted according to the edition by Jambuvijaya, Baroda 1961).

Works I-III: Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit, Delhi. I: Ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śāṅkarabhāṣya, reprint 1978 (originally Delhi 1964); II: Bhagavadgītā with Śāṅkarabhāṣya, reprint 1978 (originally Poona[2] 1929, ed. Bhagavat); III: Brahmasūtra with Śāṅkarabhāṣya, n.d. (unacknowledged reprint of the edition of V.S. Paṇsīkar, Bombay 1915).

YBh:	Vyāsa, Yogabhāṣya.
YD:	Yuktidīpikā, ed. R.C. Pandeya, Delhi 1967.
YS:	Yogasūtra.
YSBhV:	Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇam of Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda, ed. P.S. Rama Sastri and S.R. Krishnamurti Sastri, Madras 1952 (Madras Government Oriental Series).

Index

Introductory note: With the exception of works of unknown or questionable authorship, titles of works are usually not listed in this index. The treatment of the notes is in general more selective than that of the text, and they are included only insofar as they provide additional information of thematic relevance.